Elsevier

Journal of Development Economics

Volume 110, September 2014, Pages 216-225
Journal of Development Economics

Are land reforms granting complete property rights politically risky? Electoral outcomes of Mexico's certification program

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.04.003Get rights and content
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Abstract

What is the impact on voting behavior of strengthening property rights over agricultural land? To answer this question, we use the 14-year nationwide rollout of Mexico's land certification program (Procede) and match affected communities (ejidos) before and after the change in property rights with voting outcomes in corresponding electoral sections across six federal election cycles. We find that, in accordance with the investor class theory, granting complete property rights induced a conservative shift toward the pro-market party equal to 6.8 percent of its average share of votes over the period. This shift was strongest where vested interests created larger expected benefits from market-oriented policies as opposed to public-transfer policies. We also find that beneficiaries failed to reciprocate through votes for the benefactor party. We conclude that, in the Mexican experience, engaging in a land reform that strengthened individual property rights over agricultural land was politically advantageous for the right-wing party.

JEL classification

Q15
K11
O13
O541

Keywords

Land reform
Property rights
Voting
Mexico

Cited by (0)

We are grateful to Pranab Bardhan, Kyle Emerick, Dilip Mookherjee and Jean-Philippe Platteau for their helpful suggestions.