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The effects of land titling on the urban poor

A replication of property rights

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International Initiative for Impact Evaluation

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The effects of land titling on the urban poor: a replication of property rights

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Abstract

The titling of land to improve property rights is expected (i) to increase investment in land and land-fixed capital since it enhances land security; (ii) to improve access to credit, since it allows land collateralisation; and (iii) to expand the possibility of transferring land with clarity regarding rights. Using a natural experiment in a poor urban area of Buenos Aires, Galiani and Schargrodsky (2010) find that titling substantially increases housing investment, along with a number of social impacts, including reduced household size and increased child education. They find that these impacts do not take effect through expanded credit access due to land collateralisation but through a slow channel of increased physical and human capital investment.

In this paper, we seek to replicate these results. Unfortunately, the original questionnaires and raw data are unavailable, so a complete replication including variable creation is impossible. Furthermore, additional analysis beyond a check of the results is limited by the data, with the available variables permitting only an analysis of a small and somewhat arbitrary set of impacts. A more complete theory of change than included in the original paper suggests that broader effects and pathways to the effects of property right allocation could be explored.

Despite the limited data provided, we are able to replicate Galiani and Schargrodsky's original results. These results are robust to alternative specifications, suggesting that the original paper provided an accurate assessment of the impact of land titling on the poor. Our analysis of gender heterogeneity suggests that improvements to the dwelling were more likely in households with males as the original squatters. Looking at education heterogeneity, dwelling improvements were mostly driven by original squatters who had received at least a primary education. These findings notwithstanding, the robustness of our results confirms the importance of Galiani and Schargrodsky's contribution to the literature.

Keywords: replication, land ownership, titling and tenure, land reform, saving and capital investment, fertility, family planning, property rights, natural experiment, urban poverty

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Abbreviations and acronyms

2SLS	Two Stage Least Squares
CI	Confidence interval
FDR	False discovery rate
GS	Sebastian Galiani and Ernesto Schargrodsky
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OLS	Ordinary least squares
PSM	Propensity score matching

1. Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to provide a replication and robustness check of the paper 'Property rights for the poor: effects of land titling' by Galiani and Schargrodsky (2010). The Galiani and Schargrodsky paper has been widely cited in the literature (more than 160 citations as of June 2015, according to Google Scholar) because of its use of a natural experiment to assess the impact of property ownership – something that has been difficult to do elsewhere – and its focus on social impacts in urban areas as opposed to the productive impacts that are often examined in rural contexts, which until that time had been the emphasis of much of the previous research on property rights.

Galiani and Schargrodsky's findings suggest that among the poorest of the urban poor, land titling does have positive social impacts but does not lead to an immediate increase in access to and use of formal credit, suggesting this is not the mechanism by which impact occurs. Their findings cast doubt on the common assumption that land titling improves the condition of the poor through the mechanism of increased access to credit and that the poor will collateralise newly titled land and borrow against its value (De Soto 2000). As Galiani and Schargrodsky point out, this is a particularly prescient concern for the millions of people in developing countries with feeble property rights (Deininger 2003; Banerjee & Duflo 2006). The study then suggests that below a certain threshold of poverty, the mere formalisation of land titles may be a necessary but insufficient condition to begin engaging in formal credit. This result accords with Lemanski (2011), who finds that low-income homeowners in South Africa are usually reluctant to use their '(typically-primary) asset [housing] as collateral security for credit'. These findings may even present a compelling argument for the needed addition of alternative inputs, such as self-help groups (Deininger & Liu 2009), to encourage engagement with formal credit markets among the very poor.

To identify impact, Galiani and Schargrodsky exploit a unique natural experiment wherein squatters living on land in the county of Quilmes (Buenos Aires province, Argentina) were awarded titles by the Argentine government to the land they occupied in a manner that is argued to be an effectively random allocation. They use several statistical techniques to estimate the effect of land titling among this community of squatters on housing investment, household structure, access to credit, labour earnings, fertility decisions, household size and educational outcomes among offspring of the household head(s).

Treatment households were compared to a counterfactual group who maintained only 'usufructuary' land rights over the properties they occupied, receiving no land titles. Treatment households were found to increase capital housing investment in walls, roofing, surface area, concrete sidewalks and overall appearance. These households also had fewer children, housed fewer extended family members and increased the years of secondary and post-secondary education among older children. Land titling was found to have no impact on access to formal credit, while affecting only a very modest positive increase in informal credit engagement. It had no impact on household income, investment in household durable goods or employment activities.

This is a compelling study to replicate because there is room to examine a broader set of social indicators; namely, the heterogeneity of impact and the mechanisms of impact. In particular, impacts on the treatment group seem to be incompletely understood in terms of heterogeneity among female-headed households and women in general. Depending on how property rights are allocated, intra-household dynamics may be altered, leading to a differential effect. Furthermore, while the original paper reviews much of the literature it does not explicitly describe the mechanism – beyond credit access – by which property rights might lead to improved social outcomes, although there is some speculation provided in the discussion of results. In general, the paper has a very limited discussion of the theory of change. Impact heterogeneity and mechanisms are not fully explored in the existing study, and a more robust analysis and expanded discussion could add much greater clarity to the theory of change.[1]

In this paper, we seek to replicate and expand upon the results found in the Galiani and Schargrodsky paper. The original replication plan was to follow the replication approach outlined in Brown, Cameron and Wood (2014), which includes a pure replication, measurement and estimation analysis and theory of change analysis. While the intention of the replication was to explore the theory of change noted in the preceding paragraph in more detail, data limitations restrict the analysis. The original questionnaires and raw data were not available; as such, a comprehensive pure replication was not possible, since the process by which variables were created for the analysis could not be completely replicated and thus evaluated. The number of variables available for additional analysis is also limited, since we were provided with variables used for the analysis but not additional variables.

The original authors note a number of reasons for not being able to provide the raw data. First, human subjects' confidentiality restrictions and an agreement with the local non-governmental organization partner limited the ability to share individual household data. They also rightfully note that the request for data came in 2013; the data had been collected 10 years earlier, making identification of the particular files challenging. Additionally, they note that the data is part of a number of published and ongoing studies. Finally, the data provided for the replication are consistent with the *American Economic Review* policy regarding minimal data provision for published papers, which can be viewed as the profession's standard.[2]

[1] The original authors have used these data for a number of other papers; with those papers, a more complete theory of change might be assembled.

[2] According to the *American Economic Review* Data Availability Policy (website accessed 16 June 2015) for econometric studies, the following are the rules for data provision: 'For econometric and simulation papers, the minimum requirement should include the data set(s) and programs used to run the final models, plus a description of how previous intermediate data sets and programs were employed to create the final data set(s). Authors are invited to submit these intermediate data files and programs as an option; if they are not provided, authors must fully cooperate with investigators seeking to conduct a replication who request them. The data files and programs can be provided in any format using any statistical package or software. Authors must provide a Readme PDF file listing all included files and documenting the purpose and format of each file provided, as well as instructing a user on how replication can be conducted'.

By recreating those variables that we could with the available data and using the created variables for the analysis, we replicate the results presented in the original paper. The results are also robust to different specifications and approaches and suggest that, given the variables created, the original paper provided an accurate assessment of the impact of land titling on the poor in suburban Buenos Aires.

As noted, the number of variables available permits an analysis of only a small and somewhat arbitrary set of impacts, both in the paper and in the replication. The replication is thus restricted in what is possible. This is reflected in the remainder of this replication paper, which is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a complete discussion of the theory of change. A more complete theory of change suggests broader effects of property right allocation could be explored as well as the pathways to achieving those impacts. Although the data do not permit a complete theory of change analysis as defined by Brown, Cameron and Wood (2014), the discussion highlights what Galiani and Schargrodsky are able to cover and what is missing. Section 3 presents the results of the pure replication with the provided data. Section 4 then provides the measurement and estimation analysis and theory of change analysis of the replication that are possible with the given data. Finally, section 5 presents a discussion of the replication, highlights the limitations of the replication and the Galiani and Schargrodsky paper and offers some conclusions.

2. Assessment of the theory of change

The principal motivation for this section is that the theory of change underlying the results obtained by Galiani and Schargrodsky in their original study is incompletely understood. In particular, the causal mechanisms by which titling induced behavioural change that led to impacts seemed inadequately explored. In our original replication plan we intended to thoroughly consider the theory of change by using additional variables to test alternative causal mechanisms. Since this is not possible due to data limitations, we instead provide a broader view of the theory of change using the literature on the impact of property rights in urban and rural settings, including a number of studies that have been published since 2010. The reason for including this discussion is to identify where future research might be used to address limitations in understanding causal mechanisms.

In assessing the impact of property rights on recipient households, Galiani and Schargrodsky provide the primary arguments for providing such rights. The first, the security argument, posits that when individual rights are established, households have an incentive to invest in their property, since they should obtain returns on that investment, as others cannot easily take away their improved property (Feder & Nishio 1998). The second, the collateral argument, suggests that rights allow households to obtain credit, since property can be used as collateral to secure loans from the financial sector (De Soto 2000; Kerekes & Williamson 2008). The third, the transfer argument, hypothesises that secure rights allow land to be transferred (Besley 1995). Transferability allows land to be a source of liquidity for a household in the event of a negative shock. If land markets function, the ability to transfer land can also lead to land being used more productively if it is transferred, through sales or rental, to

efficient users who move onto the land. As Galiani and Schargrodsky note, this reasoning provides the motivation for allocating property rights. The study suggests, however, that below a certain poverty threshold (particularly amongst the urban landless poor, who pay no rents), the mere formalisation of land titles may be a necessary but insufficient condition to access formal credit.

Despite providing these basic arguments for property rights having an impact on poor households, Galiani and Schargrodsky are less explicit about the overall theory of change and *how* property rights should lead to changes in household-level behaviour and, ultimately, key impact indicators. For each set of indicators analysed, the paper does provide arguments for the anticipated impact, but these are piecemeal; a coherent argument for the overall theory of change for property rights allocation is not presented. This does not mean that the indicators used or arguments presented for the potential impact are not correct, only that a more comprehensive theory of change would be helpful to understand why effects might occur and could lead to consideration of other pathways of effects. Such an exercise also normally considers what factors might limit the anticipated effects. Here, we articulate a more comprehensive theory of change.

Much of the previous work on titling focuses on rural areas and on agricultural households where the benefits of titling are largely linked to agricultural production and investments.[3] As the households in the original study are urban, it is important to consider how and why titling should affect them. A number of recent studies consider the effects of urban titling.[4] Table 1 provides a summary of the causal chain of potential social impacts of property rights on the urban poor. Impacts covered in Galiani and Schargrodsky (2010) are noted in **bold**.

Table 1: Property rights impact indicators

Initial effects	Intermediate outcomes	Final outcomes
Security	House fixed investment	**Housing improvement**
Collateral – credit	Property transactions	**Household size/composition**
Informal credit	Household entry and exit	**Income and employment**
Formal credit	Fertility (births)	Consumption level
Transferability	Wage and self-employment	Health attainment
	Expenditure shares	**Educational attainment**
	Food expenditures/diversity	
	Health spending	
	Education spending	

Note: **Bold** indicates indicators analysed in the original Galiani and Schargrodsky paper.

In urban areas, property rights should potentially provide the three initial effects noted above, although the investment is less likely to be directly linked to production, as it would be for a rural, agricultural household. But property rights allow households to

[3] See, for example, Feder *et al.* (1990); Carter and Olinto (2003); Deininger and Chamorro (2002); Deininger, Zegarra and Lavadenz (2003); Torero and Field (2005); Field, Field and Torero (2006); Zegarra, Escobal and Aldana (2008); Markussen (2008) and Do and Iyer (2008).
[4] See, for example, Field (2003), Field (2005), Field (2007), Moura, Bueno and Leony (2009), Moura and Bueno (2013), Moura and Bueno (2014) and Moura, Ribiero and Piza (2014).

invest in a dwelling knowing that, due to an increase in security, they will get the benefits of their investment either through the enjoyment of living in the home or the knowledge that they would capture the benefits should they sell the dwelling. Directly measuring an improved sense of security is challenging, although it may be possible with the right set of questions. However, the expectation is that this will be seen in investment in houses, which are a fixed, rather than mobile, asset. Confirming this idea, Field (2005) finds that strengthening property rights in the urban slums of Peru increases the rate of housing renovation by more than two thirds.

Property rights may also reduce the need for the household to protect their claims on the right, particularly through maintaining a constant presence (Clay 2006). Previous studies show that extending property rights to squatters in urban communities leads to less necessity to keep family members at home in order to protect the property from intrusion. This also leads to decreased child labour rates, increased work away from home amongst adults and improved educational outcomes. For example, using data from urban Peru, Field (2007) finds that providing property rights leads to a substantial increase in labour hours, a shift in labour supply away from work at home to work in the outside market and substitution of adult for child labour. Similar evidence from the Brazilian *Papel Passado* land titling programme in urban Sao Paulo shows a number of positive social impacts, including an increase in credit usage, consumption of durable goods, an overall increase in hours worked (Moura, Ribiero & Piza 2014), a reduction in child labour (Moura, Bueno & Leony 2009; Moura & Bueno 2014) and improvements in quality of life, as measured by happiness and satisfaction[5] (Moura & Bueno 2013).

At a macroeconomic level, there is some evidence that secure and well-defined property rights create incentives that encourage economic growth and that the mechanism is via credit access and fixed capital formation (Kerekes & Williamson 2008). Of course, at the microeconomic level the ability to invest depends on the ability to finance the investment and the capacity to purchase the necessary items to improve the property. Investment may then be limited by credit market failures that are not exclusively solved through access to collateral. In fact, Field (2005) notes that the increase in household renovation noted previously does not appear to be financed by credit. Further, in analysing a programme that combined the assignment of property rights with market-friendly land policies and credit policy reforms, Boucher, Barham and Carter (2005) find that this does not appear to induce consolidation amongst more efficient smallholders, since they remain unable to access credit. Even beyond credit markets, markets for certain goods may not be available or may be priced beyond the means of poor households, limiting the type of investment available to the household. Thus, while the security of the land is expected to induce some property-linked investments, poor access to credit and other markets may limit the ability to invest.

[5] Happiness and satisfaction are defined by Moura and Bueno (2013) as individual responses to the questions ‘taken all together, how you would say things are these days – would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy or not too happy?’ and ‘on the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?’

The evidence of the effect of property rights on land transactions in urban areas is scarce (Galiani & Schargrodsky 2011). In rural areas, the literature shows that rental markets were activated in most of the cases, but this was not the case for land sales (Deininger & Bresciani 2002; Boucher, Barham & Carter 2005). However, Zegarra, Escobal and Aldana (2008) find that, in Peru, the density of titling is an important condition for land markets to be activated by a titling programme. In urban Ecuador, Lanjouw and Levy (2002) find that titling leads to an increase in property value of 23.5 per cent and facilitates housing rentals.

By obtaining a clear property right, the homeowner has a potentially valuable asset whose value can be expanded through investment. This is largely De Soto's (2000) argument for providing rights, in that rights unleash the value of an asset. Amongst other effects, the right then creates a valued asset that the household can fall back on in the event of negative shocks. The presence of this new asset should reduce their need to hedge against risk through other means, thus potentially altering the household's range of risk management and coping behaviour.

Households take a number of actions to hedge against risk, including their choices of economic activities and their participation in social networks. The expectation, then, is that the allocation of a property right can alter the set of economic activities undertaken by a household as well as their social interactions, including with family members. As noted in Galiani and Schargrodsky, property rights may alter the value of social networks for risk mitigation. As one example, if property rights substitute for social networks as a risk management strategy, it might lead to a lesser need to house relatives. Of course, having a property right may allow households to invest in social capital and could, in theory, lead to expanded social capital and thus to housing more non-family members. There is some evidence that cash transfer programmes allow households to integrate into social networks since they are able to invest in those networks (FAO 2014a; FAO 2014b). Property rights, by increasing the value of assets and linking households more strongly to a location, could play a similar role in expanding social ties although it may vary by the type of social connection.

The property right also potentially creates stability in geographic location as households feel more secure in their residence and therefore less inclined to move or less likely to be forced to move than if they are in an insecure residence. Such stability may induce people to get jobs or even be willing to migrate due to greater confidence that their home is secure. Additionally, knowing that they are likely to stay in a location may allow households to invest more in identifying and utilising local services, including schooling and healthcare. Assuming such services are available, location can affect outcomes linked to health and education. This includes potential effects on fertility if health services provide family planning support and child health services. In assessing the impact of property rights on fertility, Field (2003) finds that it induces a significant decline in fertility rates in urban Peru. She attributes this largely though to focusing titling on women and altering their bargaining rights within the household. Indeed, Galiani and Schargrodsky (2004) find similar results while examining data from

the same population: households in titled parcels in Buenos Aires experience better weight-for-height scores among children and lower rates of pregnancy among teenage girls than those in untitled parcels.

This raises another factor in considering the impact of property rights; namely, the manner in which rights are assigned within the household and whether titles are solely or jointly owned and, if solely owned, by which household member. The literature on intra-household allocation provides significant evidence that female asset ownership alters the bargaining position of women and influences resource allocation (Quisumbing 2003). Providing joint or sole rights to females is likely to broadly alter household decision making, and thus affect the channels by which rights have an impact.

However, recent literature on the impacts of asset transfers and other household-level social development activities suggests that changes to intra-household dynamics may depend strongly on the relative *a priori* bargaining power of women within the home. For example, causal studies of national cash transfer programmes in Peru, Ecuador and Mexico find that transfers lead to the greatest decreases in interpersonal violence against women who already have cash-paying jobs and fewer children (Perova 2010) and higher levels of education relative to their partners (Hidrobo & Fernald 2013; Bobonis & Castro 2010). Meanwhile, one qualitative study in urban India finds that joint land tenure rights between men and women facilitate increased decision making and bargaining power, increased security and increased respect for women (Datta 2006). Sadly, very little causal evidence exists to inform theories of change around land titling for women in urban settings.

Beyond who within the household receives the rights, there may also be issues of whether the right is provided to an original squatter of untitled land or whether it is provided, directly or indirectly, through transfer to a later occupant of the household. Presumably, original squatters are aware that the land is not titled, since they took the land directly, while a later occupier may have a more ambiguous understanding of the legality of the housing. As such, providing property rights to an original squatter may provide greater benefits than providing them to someone who has come later. Galiani and Schargrodsky explore this to some extent in their 2010 paper.

Finally, there may be heterogeneity in the impacts noted above, which depend on the characteristics of the household or original squatter, that would be useful to explore. Given the gender discussion, an obvious factor to consider is the gender of the household head. But impacts might also vary by other factors, such as education, since understanding rights may be influenced by education; wealth, since the ability to invest is linked to wealth; and location, since the value and ability to invest may be location specific. Furthermore, Moura, Ribiero and Piza (2014) find heterogeneous impacts of land titling in Brazil on weekly hours worked among households in the lower wealth groups, suggesting that land titling programmes may have more substantial wage impacts on poorer households. Ideally, these and similar possibilities would be explored.

Overall, as the discussion highlights, assigning property rights could have a number of effects on urban households that could be seen across a range of economic and social outcomes. The underlying reasoning for these effects and the pathways might vary. Impacts might be due to the security of the right that enhances the value of the assets, to establishing a fixed location that does not need to be protected, or to the individual household member who receives the right. Impacts might also vary across households that receive rights, and these could be explored. A comprehensive assessment of the impacts of property rights would then include a broad set of indicators, including those framed in table 1, and an assessment of the heterogeneity of those impacts.

Galiani and Schargrodsky examine a subset of the possible impacts and provide little discussion of the mechanism of these impacts. Although it is common to focus research on specific issues to ensure a careful analysis, the variables included are linked to housing investment, household size, education, credit and income. While impacts are expected on these variables, they appear to be a somewhat arbitrary set of indicators, and there is no analysis of how these impacts vary across households. In another related paper, child health – using child anthropometrics and teen pregnancy – are examined, although again the casual mechanisms are not explored (Galiani & Schargrodsky 2004). The validity of the results would be strengthened if, along with final impacts, there were greater evidence that titling leads to greater expenditures on housing, education and health, to the entry and exit of members into and out of the household, to shifts in wage and self-employment amongst household members and to changes in food expenditure patterns.

The limited set of indicators Galiani and Schargrodsky examine and the focus on average effects are most likely due to limitations in the available data. The data presented in the original paper do correspond to those provided for the replication, but without the original questionnaires or data it is not possible to determine if these are the only variables available. If there are no other data available, it is reasonable to focus the analysis on what can be done, particularly given that there is only limited research in this area. However, a stronger discussion of the theory of change, identification of intermediate indicators (as in table 1) and what could and could not be analysed would have been helpful.

3. Pure replication

As noted, Galiani and Schargrodsky exploit a natural experiment to estimate the effect of land titling amongst a community of squatters on several outcomes of interest. As they discuss in sections 2 and 4 of their paper, they establish treatment and control groups while addressing several issues related to comparability and attrition. After identifying these two groups, they conduct several tests to measure the effects of land titling. The data, identification strategy, test specifications and results of the original analysis are discussed below.

3.1 Data for replication

Galiani and Schargrodsky provided three Stata datasets and two accompanying .do files that were sufficient for replication of the original results of the study. The three datasets correspond to the three units of analysis in the study. The unit of analysis is the parcel for the housing investment variables. For the household size, credit and income outcomes, the unit of analysis is the household. For the education outcomes, the unit of analysis is the child.

Table 2: Description of non-replicable variables

Variable	Description
parcelId	Parcel identification number
householdId	Household identification number
personId	Personal identification number
neighbourhood	Neighbourhood: 1=Santa Rosa; 2=Santa Lucía; 3=La Paz; 4=El Tala; 5=San Martín
inBothDatasets	Household was surveyed in module 2
nonSurveyed	Missing=surveyed
repeatedParcel	Parcel is repeated (more than one household may live in one parcel)
householdArrivedBefore1986	Household arrived before 1986? 0=No; 1=Yes
propertyRight	1: has property right; 0: does not have property right
propertyRightEarly	Household received property rights in 1989–1991
propertyRightLate	Household received property rights in 1998
parcelSurface	Parcel surface in squared metres
distanceToCreek	Distance (in blocks) to creek
blockCorner	0: parcel is not in the block corner; 1: otherwise
distToNonSquatted	Distance to non-squatted block (in blocks)
male	The child's gender is male=1; female=0
childAge	The child's age when surveyed
spouse	Household head spouse dummy
creditCardBankAccount	Credit card or bank account dummy
nonMortgageLoan	Non-mortgage loan dummy
informalCredit	Informal credit dummy
groceryStoreCredit	Grocery store credit dummy
mortgageLoan	Mortgage loan dummy
householdHeadIncome	Household head income
totalHouseholdIncome	Total household income
totalHouseholdIncomePerCapita	Total household income per capita
totalHouseholdIncomePerAdult	Total household income per adult
employedHouseholdHead	Employed household head dummy
genderOrigSquatter	Gender of the original squatter 0=Male; 1=Female
argentineOrigSquatter	Was original squatter born in Argentina? 0=No; 1=Yes
argentineOrigSquatterFather	Was the original squatter's father born in Argentina? 0=No; 1=Yes
educYearsOrigSquatterFather	Years of education of the original squatter's father
argentineOrigSquatterMother	Was the original squatter's mother born in Argentina? 0=No; 1=Yes
overallHousingAppearance	Overall house points
numberChildrens5_13	Number of children 5–13
numberChildrens0_4	Number of children 0–4
numberOtherRelatives	Number of other relatives
numberChildrensMoreThan14	Number of children 14 years or older

Without the raw data or original questionnaires, we were unable to completely replicate the creation of variables used in the original analysis. In many of these cases the variable was almost certainly taken directly from the data (e.g. gender of individual, neighbourhood, arrival date of household), and thus there are unlikely to be any issues with the variables unless some data cleaning was done. For other variables, such as those relating to credit, income and employment, the original variable creation process is unknown and cannot be checked. There also may be variables, which were not provided, that may be useful for further analysis, but it is not possible to know this.

Table 3: Summary statistics for replicated variables

Variable	n	Mean	Std. Dev	Min	Max
goodWalls	1,853	0.596	0.491	0	1
replication	1,853	0.596	0.491	0	1
goodRoof	1,849	0.474	0.499	0	1
replication	1,849	0.474	0.499	0	1
schoolAchievement	436	-1.892	2.370	-15	2
replication	436	-1.892	2.370	-15	2
primarySchoolCompletion	447	0.539	0.499	0	1
replication	447	0.539	0.499	0	1
secondarySchoolCompletion	447	0.089	0.286	0	1
replication	447	0.089	0.286	0	1
postSecondaryEducation	447	0.027	0.162	0	1
replication	447	0.027	0.162	0	1
ageOrigSquatter	608	47.230	10.991	19	81
replication	608	47.232[$]	10.994[$]	19	81
educationYearsOrigSquatter	615	6.259	2.103	4	15
replication	615	6.259	2.103	4	15
educYearsOrigSquatterFather	608	4.584	1.362	4	15
replication	608	4.584	1.362	4	15
educYearsOrigSquatterMother	608	4.567	1.307	4	15
replication	608	4.567	1.307	4	15
ageOfOrigSquatterDummy	1,865	0.203	0.403	0	1

replication	1,865	0.203	0.403	0	1
ageOsMiss	1,865	0.674	0.469	0	1
replication	1,865	0.674	0.469	0	1
argentinaFatherOsMiss	1,865	0.670	0.470	0	1
replication	1,865	0.670	0.470	0	1
educationOfTheFatherMiss	1,865	0.674	0.469	0	1
replication	1,865	0.674	0.469	0	1
argentinaMotherOsMiss	1,865	0.670	0.470	0	1
replication	1,865	0.670	0.470	0	1
educationOfTheMotherMiss	1,865	0.674	0.469	0	1
replication	1,865	0.674	0.469	0	1

Note: $ refers to rounding inconsistencies to the nearest one thousandth.

However, there is no reason to suspect any problems and notes were included in the provided data that describe some of the original questions and the corresponding variable names that are found in the data sets. Additionally, for some variables the construction code was provided in the notes, while other variables were constructed in the original do files. We were able to replicate variables constructed using these 'original variables'. For those variables that were not described in the notes sufficiently enough to provide a method of replication and were not created in the original do files, we consider them as not replicable.

Table 2 lists variables that were not replicable, as well as descriptions of those variables. Table 3 lists those variables that we could replicate and provides summary statistics for both the original variables and the variable created in the replication process. Together, Tables 2 and 3 cover all variables used in preparation and analysis, as identified in the original Stata .do files and data sets. As noted, we found only one minor inconsistency between the original and replicated variables in table 3. Although we cannot completely replicate the variable generation process, the data seem to be reasonable and no issues are apparent.

3.2 Identification strategy

For their identification strategy, Galiani and Schargrodsky first divided the population into treatment and control groups. Both groups are composed of squatters who, starting in 1981, occupied tracts of land that were (unbeknownst to the occupants) each privately owned by 13 separate owner entities (individuals or multiple people). In 1984 a constitutionally passed expropriation law (No. 10.239) provided for compensation to the previous owners of the land and transfer of title to the squatters,

subject to three conditions.[6] According to Galiani and Schargrodsky, although eight previous owner entities accepted the government's offer of compensation (leading to distribution of the first round of titles in 1989), five owners chose to pursue their demands for higher compensation through legal channels. After one lawsuit covering one owner entity was settled, a second group of squatter households received legal titles in 1998. These households are regarded as 'late-treatment' households.

Based on these facts, Galiani and Schargrodsky seek to establish the treatment group as being composed of two arms: the squatters living on the land owned by the first group of eight owner entities are regarded as early-treatment households, and the squatters who received titles in 1998 are regarded as late-treatment households. According to Galiani and Schargrodsky, the control group is composed of the squatters living on the land owned by the group of owner entities who did not settle the lawsuit during the analysis period.[7]

In total 1,839[8] parcels were affected by the law. Of these, 1,082 parcels are located in contiguous neighbourhoods, with the remaining parcels located in San Martín, a non-adjacent neighbourhood also affected by the expropriation law. Of the 1,082 parcels, 672 are classified as treatment and 410 are classified as control. As described below, these parcels were included in Galiani and Schargrodsky's original matching process.

[6] In order to qualify for the transfer of land grants, squatters must have 'arrived to the parcels at least one year before the … law, … not possess any other property, and … use the parcel as a family home' (Galiani & Schargrodsky 2010, p.701).
[7] Using the available data, we were unable to validate the original paper's description of the relationships between former owners and the treatment and control households.
[8] Using the available data, we find that 1,838 parcels were affected (see table 4).

Table 4: Parcel, household and child observations from original analysis

Neighbour-hood classification	Property right classification	Randomly selected					Not selected		Total	
		Arrived before			Arrived after					
		Parcels	Households	Children	Parcels	Households	Parcels	Households	Parcels	Households
Contiguous	No offer	113	117	184	68	74	229	229	410	420
	Early offer	5	6	17	6	6	12	12	23	24
	Late offer	16	17	35	27	27	14	14	57	58
	Early title	49	51	48	14	14	356	356	419	421
	Late title	117	122	181	33	33	23	23	173	178
San Martín	Early offer	3	3	*	5	5	37	37	45	45
	Early title	101	104	*	23	27	561	561	685	692
	Late title	4	5	*	6	6	16	16	26	27
Contiguous subtotal		**300**	313	465	**148**	154	**634**	n/a	**1,082**	1,101
Subtotal		408	425	465	182	192	442	n/a	1,838	1,865

Note: * indicates missing from data supplied by original authors; ‘offer’ refers to the offer of land title to the squatters, and title refers to those who accepted the title as offered.

Of these 1,082 parcels, Galiani and Schargrodsky randomly selected 590 parcels (with 617 households) to be interviewed for their 2003 survey. Of the 590 parcels, 448 were considered contiguous and 142, being in the San Martín neighbourhood, were considered separate. They include observations from San Martín only for robustness checks, using parcels from the contiguous neighbourhoods for the main analysis. As indicated in table 4, within each neighbourhood a parcel (and household) can be classified according to: whether the parcel was selected during the random selection process and, within the selected parcels, the arrival date of the squatter; whether the parcel lies in a contiguous neighbourhood; and the property right classification of the parcel. Within the contiguous neighbourhoods, there are 300 parcels out of the 448 selected parcels to which the squatters arrived prior to the 1986 deadline. These 300 parcels are isolated for the main analysis, with 187 classified as treatment and 113 classified as control. The additional parcels are included for robustness checks, as noted below.

Galiani and Schargrodsky address several potential concerns with the process of establishing treatment and control. First, they explain that the land selection by the squatters could in no way have been based on *a priori* knowledge of the original owners' intent to sell their parcels, since a) the squatters mistakenly thought that the occupied land was state-owned, and b) subsequent events, such as the passage of the expropriation law, had not yet occurred.

Second, Galiani and Schargrodsky explore potential correlation between the squatters and the quality of the land. They speculate that owners who choose to fight for their land may do so because they have higher-quality land. Recognising there are only 13 owners, they examine this possibility and find that there are differences between the owners of the parcels who accepted and rejected the offer, in terms of number of co-owners of any one entity and familial ties of owners of any one entity. This suggests that differences in acceptance rates were linked to heterogeneity of owners rather than land quality. There may still be the possibility that contesting owners were motivated by their ownership of a better quality of land (as perceived by the contesting owners). Furthermore, more powerful squatters may have occupied better land. This raises the possibility that the squatters in the control group could have been sitting on higher quality land.

To explore this possibility, Galiani and Schargrodsky test differences in parcels using available observable parcel characteristics. The data used for this comparison include the 300 observations that are used for the primary analysis, the additional 148 'late arrival' observations and an additional 634 that were excluded from the original analysis on account of not being selected, for a total of 1,082 (these observations are in bold in table 4). The results, presented in panel A of table 5, show no strongly statistically significant differences between the treatment and control groups' parcels, except in the average parcel size (at the 10 per cent level), though small in magnitude (households receiving property rights had parcel sizes 9.6 square metres smaller than households not holding titles).

Galiani and Schargrodsky then test for differences between treatment and control in baseline characteristics of the original squatters, seeking to confirm that exogenous factors led to the creation of the treatment and control group and that the two groups are similar in every respect except the offer of legal transfer of title. In this case, they focus on the 300 observations used in the primary analysis that represent those in the contiguous areas who arrived before the 1986 deadline. Results are presented in panel B of table 5. Galiani and Schargrodsky find no statistically significant differences between means for the original squatters in terms of gender, nationality, parents' nationality and parents' education.

We replicate the analysis of pre-treatment characteristics in our table 5 with only minor discrepancies.[9] Cells with rounding inconsistencies (to the nearest hundredth, mostly for reported standard errors) are noted. None of these discrepancies suggest significant departures from the original findings and are potentially due to differences in statistical software (the Galiani and Schargrodsky analysis was done a number of years ago). We include the number of observations and t-statistics in the table for each mean test for comparison with the alternative approach described below.

In the original analysis of pre-treatment characteristics, mean tests for parcel characteristics between different groups included 1,082 observations (300 parcels inhabited by the 313 households that arrived before the 1986 deadline, the 148 parcels inhabited by the 154 households that arrived after the deadline and an additional 634 households that were not selected). However, the subsequent analysis focuses solely on the 300 parcels, and pre-treatment household characteristics are examined using these 300 observations. An argument can be made that the balance in the treatment and control between these observations is what is relevant for understanding potential bias in land quality. In order to explore this possibility, we consider an alternative analysis of parcel pre-treatment characteristics, focusing on only the 300 households, used in the main analysis from the contiguous region, who arrived before 1986.

[9] When we attempt to exactly replicate a table produced by Galiani and Schargrodsky, this is referred to as a replicated table. When we use an alternative approach to analysing the data, this is referred to as an alternative table. The table number referred to in the title is from the original paper. Thus, Replicated 'Table 1: Pre-treatment characteristics' is the replication of Galiani and Schargrodsky table 1.

Table 5: Replicated 'Table 1: Pre-treatment characteristics'

	Property right offer=0		Property right offer=1		Difference		N	T-stat
A. Characteristics of the parcel								
Distance to creek (in blocks)	1.995	(0.061)	1.906	(0.035)$	-0.089 $	(0.071) $	1,082	1.260
Distance to non-squatted area (in blocks)	1.732 $	(0.059)$	1.768	(0.034)$	0.036	(0.068) $	1,082	-0.533
Parcel size (in square metres)	287.219	(4.856)$	277.662	(2.800)$	-9.556*	(5.605)	1,082	1.705
Block corner=1	0.190	(0.019)	0.156	(0.014)	-0.034 $	(0.024) $	1,082	1.420
B. Characteristics of the original squatter								
Age	48.875	(0.880)$$$	50.407 $	(0.592)$$$	-1.532	(1.208)	294	-1.268
Female=1	0.407	(0.037)$$	0.353	(0.028)$$	0.054	(0.058)	300	0.931
Argentine=1	0.903	(0.027)$	0.904	(0.017)$$	-0.001	(0.035)	300	-0.031
Years of education	6.071	(0.193)$$	5.995	(0.113)$$	0.076	(0.235)	300	0.324
Argentine father=1	0.795	(0.028)$$	0.866	(0.021)$	-0.072	(0.046)	299	-1.567
Years of education of the father	4.655	(0.105)$$	4.417	(0.073)$	0.237	(0.165)	297	1.435
Argentine mother=1	0.804	(0.029)$$	0.856	(0.021)$	-0.052	(0.046)	299	-1.139
Years of education of the mother	4.509	(0.119)$$	4.548	(0.070)$$	-0.039	(0.149)	296	-0.264

Note: t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Shaded cells (number of observations and t-statistics) were not present in the original published tables; $ refers to rounding inconsistencies to the nearest one thousandth; $$ refers to rounding inconsistencies to the nearest one hundredth; $$$ refers to rounding inconsistencies to the nearest tenth.

Table 6: Alternate 'Table 1: Pre-treatment characteristics' (produced by replication researchers)

	Property right offer=0		Property right offer=1		Difference		N	T-stat
A. Characteristics of the parcel								
Distance to creek (in blocks)	2.097	(0.112)	1.567	(0.056)	-0.531***	(0.125)	300	-4.229
Distance to non-squatted area (in blocks)	1.717	(0.112)	1.936	(0.068)	0.219*	(0.131)	300	1.670
Parcel size (in square metres)	304.418	(9.991)	280.290	(4.736)	-24.129**	(11.057)	300	-2.182
Block corner=1	0.204	(0.038)	0.144	(0.026)	-0.059	(0.046)	300	-1.287

Note: Alternative Table 1 reanalyses rows 1–4 of the original Table 1 to include only the union of observations that were sampled in panel B of Table 1, examining balance between only those observations that were included in the later analysis as treatment and control observations, and excluding observations that were later dropped; -statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 7: Replicated 'Table 2: Household attrition'

Variables	Property right offer=0, column (1)		Property right offer=1, column (2)		Property right offer 1989=1, column (3)		Property right offer 1998=1, column (4)	
Household arrived before 1986 = 1	0.624	(0.036)	0.700	(0.028)	0.730 $	(0.052) $	0.689	(0.033)
Difference relative to column (1)			-0.076*	(0.046) $	-0.105*	(0.063)	-0.065 $	(0.049)
#obs in t-test with column (1)			448		255		374	

Note: t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Shaded cells (number of observations in t-test) were not present in the original published tables; $ refers to rounding inconsistencies to the nearest one thousandth.

Table 6 describes the results of this re-specification. When isolating for the observations used in the main analysis, there are significant differences in the average distance from a parcel to a nearby creek, in the distance from a parcel to a non-squatted area and in the parcel size. These differences do not necessarily undermine the findings of the original study, but they do cast some doubt on the comparability of the parcels offered property rights versus those not offered property rights for the sample used for propensity score matching. It seems that households receiving a property rights offer were 0.5 blocks closer to a creek than households not receiving offers (highly significant, at 99 per cent confidence interval). Because we do not have access to geospatial data and the size of blocks is unknown, it is difficult to determine whether 0.5 blocks is a substantial distance in the study setting. Similarly, it is difficult to determine whether the average distance from a parcel to a non-squatted area is substantial in magnitude.

However, table 6 shows that the parcel size of households receiving property rights offers was actually much smaller than the original balance table suggests, 24 square metres (258.8 square feet) smaller for control parcels, at 99 per cent confidence interval. This seems to be a somewhat large difference in average parcel size (parcels receiving property rights offers are 8 per cent smaller, on average, than those not receiving offers). Again, this finding casts some doubt on the comparability of the treatment and control parcels for estimates derived from the natural experiment alone, although it does not necessarily undermine the study findings. Furthermore, since the four variables in table 6 are used as covariates in the matching process described below, we recognise that this imbalance is potentially ameliorated.

As noted, in the original analysis Galiani and Schargrodsky exclude households that arrived after the 1986 deadline, by which time owners had to transfer title or proceed with legal action, thereby seeking to further ensure exogeneity for the outcomes of interest. However, Galiani and Schargrodsky note the potential for attrition problems as a result of this exclusion. Addressing this, they show that there is no statistically significant difference between the percentage of households in the control group that arrived before the offer of compensation in 1986 and the percentage of households in the late-treatment group that arrived before the 1986 deadline. They then compare the estimated coefficients using the late-treatment group with the coefficients using the early-treatment group, concluding that the concern of attrition is assuaged (see table 7). Table 2 of the original paper was replicated with only minor rounding inconsistencies.

In order to further insure against attrition concerns, Galiani and Schargrodsky employ propensity score matching, grouping treatment and control households in pre-set intervals, as defined by their propensity scores. We describe here the steps taken in the original analysis.

Galiani and Schargrodsky estimate one propensity score using a logit model. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the household arrived before 1986 and zero otherwise. The independent variables are the following four observable characteristics: distance to nearby creek, distance to closest non-squatted area, size of the parcel and

a binary indicator of whether the parcel is on a block. The logit model is estimated at the parcel level. Nineteen household observations are excluded from the model, on account of having been, at some point, considered the second household on the parcel.[10] The observations used to estimate the propensity score include the households located on the 300 parcels who arrived before the 1986 deadline and the households located on the 148 parcels who arrived after the deadline.

Using the predicted propensity score, an area of common support for treatment and control observations is established using the maximum and minimum values of the range of propensity scores for those who hold property rights. Observations that fall outside this range are excluded from the analysis. The matching procedure varies slightly according to the outcome of interest. For the housing investment and household size outcomes, the area of common support is the same. The area of common support varies for the education-related outcomes and for the tests involving early and late property rights. Following this, Galiani and Schargrodsky employ a stratification method, whereby treatment and control observations are sorted into strata[11] based on their propensity scores. Though not reported in the original paper, tests for differences in means for each of the four independent variables are performed across the strata. In replicating these tests for the original matching process, we find only one statistically significant result; for the variable representing distance to non-squatted area, the treatment group in the first matching block (observations below the 10th percentile cutoff) was located approximately 0.6 blocks closer to a non-squatted area than observations in the control group. The number of observations within each stratum is small, ranging from 7 to 43 for the investment and household size outcomes.

3.3 Analysis and results

After establishing the treatment and control groups as described above, Galiani and Schargrodsky conduct a series of tests to determine what impact property rights have on the five main outcomes of interest: housing investment, household structure, human capital accumulation, access to credit and labour earnings. Housing investment is composed of five variables that measure quality of walls, quality of the roof, size of the constructed building, presence of concrete sidewalk and overall housing appearance. Differences in housing investment between treatment and control groups are explored and replicated (with only minor rounding inconsistencies in the reported per cent change between property right and control groups) in table 8 (replicating table 3 of the original paper).

Galiani and Schargrodsky use the following specifications in a series of ordinary least squares regressions: parcel and squatter characteristics separately with no clustering,

[10] The original process of deciding which household to include in the logit model is not clear. Nonetheless, this decision appears to have had no significant impact, given the small number of relevant households and lack of differences seen in the descriptive statistics across these households (not reported here).
[11] The cutoff for the strata are defined using the propensity score values for holders of property rights at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles.

with clustering at the block level and clustering at the former owner level; no controls; and parcel-characteristic controls only. They also run a reduced form regression using the intention to treat variable – whether a household received an offer for property rights – as well as two-stage least square models using this intention to treat variable as an instrumental variable, indicating that the household received the property right.

Table 8: Replicated 'Table 3: Household investment'

	Good walls	Good roof	Constructed surface	Concrete sidewalk	Overall housing appearance
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Property right	0.20***	0.15**	8.27**	0.11**	8.42***
	(3.471)	(2.489)	(2.335)	(2.176)	(3.645)
Control group mean	0.50	0.32	67.63	0.67	22.71
%Δ	40.59$$$	47.49#	12.22$$	17.01#	37.06$$
No. observations	295	297	299	300	299

Note: t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Shaded cells (number of observations) were not present in the original published tables; $$ refers to rounding inconsistencies to the nearest one hundredth; $$$ refers to rounding inconsistencies to the nearest tenth; # refers to rounding inconsistencies to the nearest whole number; % Δ is a reference to per cent change.

Additionally, using the propensity scores described above, the average treatment effect on the treated is estimated for each outcome of interest using bootstrapped standard errors with 100 iterations. After estimating the effect on the outcome of interest within each stratum, Galiani and Schargrodsky calculate the final measure for the outcome of interest by summing the average outcomes across the strata, weighted by the share of treated units in each stratum in the total number of treated units. Lastly, an ordinary least squares regression model including all observations is run, regardless of arrival time at the parcel, using only the parcel characteristics as controls. In the interest of space, Galiani and Schargrodsky put most of these alternative specifications into an appendix. We follow this approach and include all these tables in the appendix.

We find that we are able to satisfactorily replicate all results reported in the original paper. Aside from incidental rounding inconsistences, we note no difference between the output for the pure replication and that of the original paper. The full replication results are available in the appendix. Overall, our pure replication suggests that the original findings in Galiani and Schargrodsky are reasonable and stand up to scrutiny.

4. Additional analysis

Following the recommendations of Brown, Cameron and Wood (2014), we organise the additional analysis of our replication into the proceeding sections. First, we address the potential for an alternative estimation strategy using propensity score matching. Following this analysis we explore an alternative theory of change – to the limited degree possible, given the data – by examining a subgroup analysis of the gender of the original squatter and the education level of the head of household. Ideally, a much

more robust analysis than this would be conducted to broadly capture the impacts of property rights and mechanisms of impact as laid out in the theory of change, but data limitations do not make this possible.

Our original replication plan also called for the creation of a wealth index using principal components analysis to identify wealth categories and determine whether impacts varied by these demarcations. We attempted this procedure but were unable to create a satisfactory wealth index, because the data set provided by the original authors did not have a sufficient number of asset variables that could be considered reasonably exogenous.

4.1 Measurement and estimation analysis

4.1.1 Methods

As discussed in the pure replication in section 3, Galiani and Schargrodsky estimate the propensity score based on the arrival time of the household. However, since the 'treatment' of study here is whether the household received property rights, we performed two alternative matching procedures using the variable for whether the household received property rights and the variable for whether the household was offered property rights (see tables 9 and 10 for the results of this re-specification). As discussed previously, Galiani and Schargrodsky used a manual matching process in the original analysis. While we replicated their manual matching process for the pure replication, we used the pscore command in Stata version 13 for the matching process in our alternative matching procedure for the investment and household demographic outcomes. As a check, we include results from our alternative matching procedure using Galiani and Schargrodsky's manual matching process. As discussed below, we find differences in results with only one variable. We report the alternative matching-based outcome measures in tables 9 and 10.

We further estimate propensity scores using two additional variables: gender of the original squatter and a binary education variable equal to 1 if the original squatter had completed at least primary education and zero otherwise. As noted in the discussion of the theory of change, gender and education can influence decisions linked to property rights and should be considered in balancing covariates. Furthermore, gender of the original squatter and education level of the original squatter are conditioning variables in several of the specifications in the original Galiani and Schargrodsky analysis, but for some reason are not included in the estimation of the original propensity score. The justification for estimating the propensity score using the original four matching variables is based on an argument that these four parcel characteristics are time invariant. We extend this argument to include the gender of the original squatter and the education of the original squatter. We assume that the gender of the original squatter has not changed over time and that the education of the original squatter also has not changed since occupation of the parcel. For the latter, we do not expect a squatter without primary education to have completed primary schooling since moving onto the land. The results of this re-specification can be found in column 1 of table 11.

4.1.2 Results

Using the propensity scores as described previously, we estimated average treatment effects comparable with the propensity score-based results in the original study. We found little meaningful divergence from the results originally reported in Galiani and Schargrodsky. These results are reported in tables 9, 10 and 11. The table where the relevant comparison can be found is noted in each case.

The propensity score matching results for secondary school completion (column 10 of table 31 (originally table A.14): Secondary school completion for offspring of the household head 18–20 years old) is the only substantial departure from the original results.. In our re-estimation, it seems that this result is not robust to our re-specification of the matching procedure and that there is no significant impact on secondary school completion among children aged 18–20. In addition, the estimates reported for propensity score matching in column 10 of table A.12 of the original paper (school achievement of offspring of the household head aged 6–20 years old) are also insignificant in our re-estimation. Presumably, results would be similar to column 11 (among early settlers), but these seemed likely to be spurious results in the original paper, so we do not explore them further here.

As a robustness check, we also ran an additional series of tests on the logged income variables found in the labour market outcome analysis (table A.17 in the original paper). Differing from the original labour market analysis, which did not include any controls for gender, the gender of the original squatter was significant across specifications for the per capita and per adult income variables in our alternative labour market analysis. Regarding the results from the alternative matching approach, we find no meaningful conflict with the original results and conclusions. In fact, many of the results reported by the original authors were strengthened using alternative variables for the matching procedure, particularly for estimates from table A.1 (good roof), A.2 (constructed surface), A.3 (concrete sidewalk) and A.9 (number of other relatives), amongst others. The results of our replication of all propensity score matching estimates using alternative matching variables can be seen in tables 9 and 10. Again, any rounding inconsistencies are denoted and explained in the notes of each table.

4.1.3 Multiple hypothesis testing

As is common in impact evaluations, the Galiani and Schargrodsky study assesses the impact of property rights on multiple indicators. There are often concerns associated with testing multiple hypotheses without factoring in the fact that multiple hypotheses are being assessed. Anderson (2008) demonstrates an approach to controlling the false discovery rate when testing multiple outcomes, first introduced in Benjamini and Hochberg (1995). The conceptual value to this approach is that it reduces the chances of committing a Type I error, or incorrectly rejecting a null hypothesis.[12]

[12] We used the accompanying Stata code for Anderson (2008), which is available at http://are.berkeley.edu/~mlanderson/downloads/fdr_qvalues.do.zip.

Table 9: Alternative matching variables for propensity score estimates (column 10)

	Original matching variable	Alternate matching variables	
	Household arrived before deadline	Property right offer	Property right
Table 4: Good walls	0.214***	0.198***	0.189***
(t stat)	(3.340)	(3.318)	(2.908)
Observations	*273*	*295*	*295*
Table A1: Good roof	0.117*	0.142**	0.128**
(t stat)	(1.656)	(2.221)	(2.045)
Observations	*276*	*297*	*297*
Table A2: Constructed surface	8.552**	9.707***	9.040***
(t stat)	(2.177)	(2.649)	(2.691)
Observations	*277*	*299*	*299*
Table A3: Concrete sidewalk	0.082	0.131**	0.111*
(t stat)	(1.417)	(2.367)	(1.861)
Observations	*278*	*300*	*300*
Table A4: Overall housing appearance	8.235***,$$	8.273***	7.538***
(t stat)	(3.634)	(3.992)	(4.050)
Observations	*277*	*299*	*299*
Table A6: Number of household members	-0.868**	-0.827**	-0.784**
(t stat)	(2.330)	(2.150)	(2.084)
Observations	*290*	*300*	*300*
Table A7: Household head spouse	-0.046	-0.045	-0.047
(t stat)	(0.701)	(0.945)	(0.891)
Observations	*290*	*300*	*300*
Table A8: Number of offspring of the household head ≥ 14 years old	0.052	0.027	0.017
(t stat)	(0.257)	(0.152)	(0.087)
Observations	*290*	*300*	*300*
Table A9: Number of other relatives (no spouse or offspring of the household head)	-0.697**	-0.530**	-0.534***
(t stat)	(2.370)	(2.104)	(2.620)
Observations	*290*	*300*	*300*

Note: t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; standard errors reported in parentheses; number of observations reported in italics; $$ refers to rounding inconsistencies to the nearest one hundredth.

Table 10: Alternative matching variables for propensity score estimates

	(10) Property right			(11) Property right early			(11, corrected)			(12) Property right late		
	Original variable	Alternate variables		Original variable	Alternate variables		Original variable	Alternate variables		Original variable	Alternate variables	
	HH arrived before deadline	Property right offer	Property right	HH arrived before deadline	Property right offer	Property right	HH arrived before deadline	Property right offer	Property right	HH arrived before deadline	Property right offer	Property right
Table A.10: Number of offspring of the HH head 5–13 years old	-0.121	-0.195	-0.161	-0.383*	-0.360	-0.296				-0.079	-0.126	-0.104
	(0.748)	(1.412)	(1.002)	(1.771)	(1.622)	(1.202)				(0.460)	(0.668)	(0.685)
	290	*300*	*300*	*145*	*183*	*183*				*217*	*251*	*251*
Table A.11: Number of offspring of the HH head 0–4 years	-0.057	-0.086	-0.059	-0.046	-0.082	-0.056				-0.041	-0.088	-0.060
	(0.711)	(1.269)	(0.930)	(0.417)	(0.757)	(0.656)				(0.493)	(1.140)	(0.868)
	290	*300*	*300*	*145*	*183*	*183*				*217*	*251*	*251*
Table A.12: School achievement (offspring of the HH head 6–20 years)	0.081	-0.016	0.144	1.192***	1.182***	1.009***				-0.171	-0.338	-0.096
	(0.336)$^{\$\$}$	(0.060)	(0.613)	(2.770)	(3.889)	(4.071)				(0.543)	(1.555)	(0.383)
	382	*465*	*465*	*165*	*284*	*284*				*292*	*417*	*417*
Table A.13: Primary school completion (offspring of the HH head 13–20 years)	-0.008	0.011	0.021	0.004	0.021	0.010	-0.023	0.006	-0.007	0.040	0.057	0.066
	(0.158)$^{\$\$}$	(0.212)	(0.447)	(0.039)$^{\$\$}$	(0.234)	(0.126)	(0.213)	(0.072)	(0.088)	(0.611)	(0.977)	(1.216)
	250	*295*	*295*	*100*	*191*	*191*	*91*	*175*	*175*	*195*	*417*	*417*

Table A.14: Secondary school completion (offspring of the HH head 18–20 years)	0.181**	0.102	0.126	0.598***$$	0.497***	0.470***		0.063	0.006	0.042
	(2.191)	(1.209)	(1.431)	(3.160)	(3.671)	(3.013)		(0.638)$$	(0.058)	(0.446)
	109	*129*	*129*	*38*	*75*	*75*		*81*	*116*	*116*
Table A.15: Post-secondary education (offspring of the HH head 18–20 years)	0.110**	0.095*	0.100**	0.277*$$	0.275**	0.263*		0.080*	0.051	0.059
	(2.448)$$	(1.811)	(2.000)	(1.673)	(2.064)	(1.740)		(1.948) $$	(0.947)	(1.163)
	109	*129*	*129*	*38*	*75*	*75*		*81*	*116*	*116*

Note: t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; standard errors reported in parentheses; number of observations reported in italics; $$ refers to rounding inconsistencies to the nearest one-hundredth; HH stands for household.

Table 11: Heterogeneity of impact across key household characteristics

	Average treatment effect	Gender of original squatter		Original squatter completed at least primary education	
Outcome	Overall	Male	Female	No	Yes
A1. Good roof	0.196*** (3.065) 272	0.203** (2.367) 175	0.186* (1.890) 97	0.275*** (3.282) 113	0.144* (1.879) 159
4. Good walls	0.135** (2.157) 275	0.095 (1.156) 176	0.204** (2.177) 99	0.064 (0.715) 113	0.187** (2.447) 162
A2. Constructed surface	8.982** (2.385) 276	11.710** (2.265) 177	4.119 (0.715) 99	3.559 (0.528) 114	12.572*** (3.201) 162
A3. Concrete sidewalk	0.110* (1.773) 277	0.143* (1.869) 178	0.042 (0.440) 99	0.106 (1.124) 114	0.102 (1.542) 163
A4. Overall housing appearance	7.633*** (3.641) 276	8.889*** (3.018) 177	5.286 (1.557) 99	6.152* (1.852) 114	8.696*** (2.694) 162
A6. Household size	-0.762** (-2.079) 277	-0.430 (-0.929) 178	-1.348** (-2.145) 99	-1.841*** (-3.144) 114	-0.180 (-0.394) 163
A7. Spouse	-0.047 (-0.856) 277	-0.007 (-0.115) 178	-0.125 (-1.102) 99	-0.184* (-1.793) 114	0.042 (0.565) 163
A8. Number children 14 or older	0.008 (0.044) 277	0.169 (0.783) 178	-0.273 (-0.750) 99	-0.345 (-1.241) 114	0.216 (0.806) 163
A9. Number of other relatives	-0.474** (-2.057) 277	-0.573* (-1.856) 178	-0.309 (-0.873) 99	-0.812* (-1.934) 114	-0.366 (-1.401) 163
A10. Number of children age 5–13	-0.181 (-0.974) 277	-0.031 (-0.132) 178	-0.428 (-1.559) 99	-0.376 (-1.352) 114	-0.052 (-0.287) 163
A11. Number of children age 0–4	-0.068 (-1.044) 277	0.012 (0.153) 178	-0.214 (-1.542) 99	-0.125 (-1.381) 114	-0.020 (-0.194) 163
A12. School achievement	0.170 (0.821) 429	-0.157 (-0.527) 269	0.689 (1.427) 160	-0.069 (-0.176) 192	0.285 (1.058) 237
A13. Primary school completion	0.019 (0.359) 272	-0.015 (-0.255) 173	0.055 (0.764) 99	0.048 (0.617) 124	-0.014 (-0.266) 148
A14. Secondary school completion	0.130 (1.455) 121	0.105 (0.950) 74	0.181 (1.543) 47	0.183* (1.682) 55	0.083 (0.855) 66
A15. Post-secondary education	0.101* (1.855) 121	0.120* (1.847) 74	0.062 (0.916) 47	0.072 (0.878) 55	0.132** (2.512) 66

Note: z-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 12: Multiple hypothesis testing

	Original		Alternative (offer)		Alternative (right)	
Outcome variables	Naïve	Adjusted	Naïve	Adjusted	Naïve	Adjusted
Housing investment						
Table 4: Good walls	0.001***	0.003***	0.001***	0.003***	0.004***	0.010***
Table A1: Good roof	0.099*	0.124	0.027**	0.027**	0.042**	0.053*
Table A2: Constructed surface	0.030**	0.051*	0.009***	0.015**	0.008***	0.014**
Table A3: Concrete sidewalk	0.158	0.158	0.019**	0.024**	0.064*	0.064*
Table A4: Overall housing appearance	0.000***	0.002***	0.000***	0.001***	0.000***	0.001***
Household demographics						
Table A6: Number of household members	0.020**	0.040**	0.032**	0.072*	0.038**	0.076*
Table A7: Household head spouse	0.484	0.646	0.345	0.460	0.374	0.499
Table A8: Number offspring of household head ≥ 14 years	0.797	0.797	0.879	0.879	0.931	0.931
Table A9: Number of other relatives (no spouse or offspring of the household head)	0.018**	0.040**	0.036**	0.072*	0.009***	0.036**

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Following Anderson (2008), we arrange the p-values of the outcomes associated with housing investment and (in a separate run) with household demographics in a rank order. The approach is performed incrementally for decreasing values of a variable, q, where $1 \geq q > 0$. We calculate the number of unadjusted, or 'naïve', p-values that would be rejected at the given level q while accounting for M (the total number of outcomes tested). As M increases, the threshold above which a p-value can be rejected is reduced.

We performed this test on the results from the propensity score matching specifications for the housing investment outcomes and the demographic outcomes and report the p-values in table 12. We find that the effect of land titling on housing investment for 'good roof' loses statistical significance when using Galiani and Schargrodsky's specification (from the 10 per cent level), but retains significance in our alternative specifications (matching on property offer and attainment of property right). We otherwise find slight decreases in the level of significance, from 1 per cent to 5 per cent for the alternative specifications for 'constructed surface' and the (right) specification for 'number of other relatives'; and from 5 per cent to 10 per cent for the alternative (right) specification for 'good roof', the alternative specifications for 'number of household members', the alternative (offer) specification for 'number of other relatives', and the original specification for 'constructed surface'. In sum, we find these changes in significance to be minor.

4.2 Theory of change analysis

4.2.1 Methods

In accordance with our discussion of the theory of change, we examine heterogeneity of impact across two key household characteristics: gender of the original squatter and education of the original squatter. These variables are defined above. For each characteristic, we estimate the average treatment effect for each value: male or female and whether the original squatter completed primary education. Given the limited number of observations to conduct an analysis, the results should be considered carefully. The results of this analysis can be seen in table 11.

4.2.2 Results

The analysis of gender heterogeneity suggests that improvements to the dwelling were more likely in households with males as the original squatters. Improvements to the roof, expansion of the constructed surface and overall housing appearance were statistically significant (at 95 per cent confidence level or higher) for dwellings with male original squatters. Results for 'good roof' were similar for females and males, but only results for improved walls seem to be driven by female original squatters. The limited results for female squatters could be linked to their ability to invest in their homes.

The size of the household (by number of members) decreased by nearly 1.5 members amongst households with females as the original squatters (significant at 95 per cent confidence), with negative (although not significant) results for all categories. No significant results were reported for household size amongst dwellings with male

original squatters, and the only significant reduction found is amongst other relatives. Following Galiani and Schargrodsky's argument – which suggests property rights limit the need for keeping relatives in the household, since social networks have less value – this may indicate that property rights allow women to reduce dependency on others. Of course, the reduction in the number of children, although insignificant, is somewhat troubling and suggests further exploration.

Looking at education heterogeneity, decisions to make improvements to the dwelling were driven mostly by original squatters who had received at least a primary education. This could be because they understood their rights better or because education is associated with a better ability to get funds for investment. However, overall household size (number of household members) was significantly smaller (1.8 members, with a confidence level of 99 per cent) among heads of household with less than a primary education. In particular, other relatives are more likely to be located in the house when rights are established. This might reflect the fact that the less educated may need to rely more on social networks, and the establishment of rights makes those social responsibilities less important. Finally, we find that those households whose original squatters had at least a primary education drove the results for children 18–20 years receiving a post-secondary education (significant at 95 per cent). The more educated appear to be investing more in the education of their children when rights are established.

5. Discussion, limitations and conclusions

In this paper, we provide a replication and robustness check of the Galiani and Schargrodsky paper on property rights for the poor. The paper has a clearly defined identification strategy for assessing the impact of property rights on social outcomes in urban areas. Not only did our analysis replicate the authors' approach, but robustness checks using alternative estimates of impact also confirmed the results. In sum, we judge the outcomes presented in the original paper to be reasonable.

The primary limitation of the original paper, and correspondingly our replication, is in the data used for the analysis. The data provided for the replication were limited and only allowed for a partial assessment of the validity of the data creation process. The number of variables only permitted an analysis of a small range of indicators that in some ways seemed an arbitrary set of impacts to consider. A more complete theory of change suggests that the broader effects of property right allocation, as well as the pathways to achieving those impacts, could be explored. Alternatively, a more focused and complete impact evaluation on a set of related indicators could have been considered. The limited number of variables and observations also restricts the ability to assess the heterogeneity of impact. The two additional exercises conducted in this replication study do suggest that impacts differ by gender and education level of the original squatter. We suspect that impacts are likely to vary by other factors as well.

Although limited in these ways, the paper nonetheless explored important issues related to property rights in urban areas that had not been sufficiently examined in such a careful empirical manner, particularly at the time of the original publication.

Given the robustness of the results found here, the paper remains an important contribution to the literature. It suggests that policies that secure property rights in urban areas of developing countries can have a positive effect on social outcomes.

Of course, further analysis would be helpful, and in many ways the paper represents a point of departure for continued analysis of the allocation of urban property rights. Future research on property rights allocation should build on this work by (i) verifying these results in other settings, (ii) carefully considering the causal mechanisms by which social impacts occur, and (iii) analysing how impacts vary across different types of households, particularly by gender and level of wealth.

Appendix

The following tables follow the numbering sequence from the original paper. Any additional data (not reported by Galiani and Schargrodsky) are shaded in grey. A box around the figures indicates a rounding inconsistency between the replicated tables and the original. Alternate ‘table A.17’ does not appear in the original paper by Galiani and Schargrodsky.

Table 13: Galiani and Schargrodsky 'Table 4: Robustness of housing investment results: good walls'

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Property right	0.203***	0.187***	0.192***	0.142***	0.203***	0.203***		0.176***		0.214***	0.109**
	(3.471)	(3.316)	(3.374)	(2.655)	(3.179)	(4.198)		(2.616)		(3.340)	(2.350)
Property offer							0.163** £				
							-2.592				
Property right early									0.225***		
									(2.767)		
Property right late									0.191***		
									(2.902)		
Parcel surface	-0.001***		-0.001***	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001***	-0.001**	-0.001***	-0.001***		-0.001**
	(2.691)		(2.651)	(2.186)	(2.226)	(4.152)	(2.469)	(2.736)	(2.698)		(2.440)
Distance to creek	0.075** $$		0.071**	0.019	0.075**	0.075*** $$	0.075** $$	0.072**	0.071**		0.081***
	(2.313)		(2.293)	(0.884)	(2.467)	(2.989)	(2.263)	(2.211)	(2.107)		(3.272)
Block corner	-0.056		-0.094	-0.013	-0.056	-0.056	-0.039	-0.060	-0.056		-0.085
	(0.662)		(1.150)	(0.174)	(0.681)	(0.828)	(0.454)	(0.706)	(0.666)		(1.283)
Dist to non squatted	0.029		0.043	0.048*	0.029	0.029	0.027	0.028	0.029		0.022
	(0.972)		(1.491)	(1.803)	(0.836)	(1.650)	(0.909)	(0.963)	(0.973)		(0.893)
Age of orig squatter dummy	0.011			-0.024	0.011	0.011	0.002 $$	0.009	0.009		
	(0.183)			(0.469)	(0.183)	(0.325) $$	(0.035) $$	(0.158)	(0.162)		
Age os miss	-0.263			-0.328	-0.263	-0.263	-0.250	-0.254	-0.265		
	(1.189)			(1.594)	(1.062)	(1.589)	(1.116)	(1.145)	(1.196)		
Gender orig squatter	0.048			-0.050	0.048	0.048	0.049	0.048	0.047		
	(0.814)			(0.992)	(0.822)	(0.803)	(0.830)	(0.812)	(0.807)		
Argentine orig squatter	-0.159			-0.120	-0.159	-0.159	-0.174	-0.166	-0.162		
	(1.120)			(0.948)	(1.233)	(1.239)	(1.209)	(1.162)	(1.135)		
Education years orig squatter	-0.017			-0.008	-0.017	-0.017	-0.017	-0.017	-0.017		
	(1.028)			(0.596)	(0.980)	(1.368)	(1.047)	(1.019)	(1.038)		
Argentine orig squatter father	-0.229**			-0.161	-0.229**	-0.229***	-0.231**	-0.225**	-0.227**		
	(2.032)			(1.522)	(2.586)	(3.529)	(2.022)	(1.994)	(2.011)		
Argentina father os miss	0.378			0.442	0.378	0.378	0.362	0.371	0.376		
	(0.627)			(0.830)	(1.358)	(1.301)	(0.596)	(0.616)	(0.623)		
Educ years orig squatter father	0.016			-0.008	0.016	0.016	0.014	0.015	0.016		
	(0.598)			(0.354)	(0.660)	(0.784)	(0.535)	(0.551)	(0.607)		
Education of the father miss	-0.267			-0.128	-0.267	-0.267	-0.302	-0.289	-0.275		
	(0.435)			(0.342)	(0.863)	(0.707)	(0.487)	(0.469)	(0.446)		
Argentine orig squatter mother	0.271**			0.153	0.271**	0.271	0.281**	0.274**	0.269**		
	(2.384)			(1.424)	(2.177)	(1.487)	(2.450)	(2.407)	(2.356)		
Educ years orig squatter mother	0.002			0.025	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.002		
	(0.079)			(0.963)	(0.078)	(0.124)	(0.115)	(0.114)	(0.070)		

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Education of the mother miss	0.318			0.120	0.318**	0.318**	0.347	0.330	0.325		
	(0.647)			(0.317)	(2.152)	(2.290)	(0.700)	(0.671)	(0.659)		
Constant	0.706***	0.500***	0.581***	0.664***	0.706**	0.706***	0.716***	0.733***	0.719***		0.574***
	(3.094)	(11.921)	(3.814)	(3.541)	(2.485)	(4.544)	(3.048)	(3.177)	(3.114)		(4.778)
F-stat									0.155		
Observations	295	295	295	403	295	295	295	295	295	273	441
R-squared	0.120	0.036	0.077	0.065	0.120	0.120	0.103	0.119	0.120		0.048

Note: t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; shaded cells (number of observations) were not present in the original published tables; $$ refers to rounding inconsistencies to the nearest one hundredth; £ signifies that significance level is misreported (property offer coefficient in column 7).

Table 14: Galiani and Schargrodsky 'Table 5: Household size'

VARIABLES	(1) Number of household members	(2) Household head spouse dummy	(3) Number of children ≥ 14	(4) Number of other relatives	(5) Number of children 5–13	(6) Number of children 5–13	(7) Number of children 0–4	(8) Number of children 0–4
1: has property right; 0: doesn't have property right	-0.946***	-0.014	-0.012	-0.680***	-0.169		-0.070	
	(2.807)	(0.275)	(0.062)	(3.534)	(1.181)		(1.030)	
Household received property rights in 1989–91						-0.378*		-0.077
						(1.882)		(0.810)
Household received property rights in 1998						-0.059		-0.066
						(0.366)		(0.861)
Control mean	6.057	0.736	1.686	1.250	1.057	1.057	0.329	0.329
%Δ property right	-15.618 $$	-1.903 $$	-0.712 $$	-54.400	-15.986 $$		-21.304 $$	
%Δ property right 1989						-35.757 $$		-23.435 $$
%Δ property right 1998						-5.581 $$		-20.087 $$
Observations	313	313	313	313	313	313	313	313

Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; shaded cells (number of observations) were not present in the original published tables; $$ refers to rounding inconsistencies to the nearest one hundredth; %Δ refers to percentage change.

Table 15: Galiani and Schargrodsky 'Table 6: Education. Offspring of the household head'

VARIABLES	(1) Child school achieve-ment	(2) Child school achieve-ment	(3) Dummy=1 if the child finished primary school	(4) Dummy=1 if the child finished primary school	(5) Dummy=1 if the child finished secondary school	(6) Dummy=1 if the child finished secondary school	(7) Dummy=1 if the child started post-secondary education (tertiary or university)	(8) Dummy=1 if the child started post-secondary education (tertiary or university)
1: has property right; 0: doesn't have property right	0.222		0.021		0.064		0.109*	
	(1.151)		(0.453)		(0.724)		(1.905)	
Household received property rights in 1989–91		0.685**		0.009		0.270*		0.205** $$
		(2.293)		(0.122)		(1.927)		(2.227)
Household received property rights in 1998		0.027		0.025 $$		-0.011		0.074
		(0.125)		(0.490)		(0.119)		(1.182)
Control mean	-1.945	-1.945	0.815	0.815	0.262	0.262	0.049	0.049
Observations	436	436	290	290	126	126	126	126

Note: t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; shaded cells (number of observations) were not present in the original published tables; $$ refers to rounding inconsistencies to the nearest one hundredth.

Table 16: Galiani and Schargrodsky 'Table 7: Access to credit'

VARIABLES	(1) Credit card or bank account dummy	(2) Non-mortgage loan dummy	(3) Informal credit dummy	(4) Grocery store credit dummy	(5) Mortgage loan dummy	(6) Mortgage loan dummy
1: has property right; 0: doesn't have property right	-0.015 $$	0.007	-0.058	0.008	0.015	
	(0.714)	(0.194)	(1.001)	(0.155)	(1.577)	
Household received property rights in 1989–91						0.043***
						(3.195) $$
Household received property rights in 1998						0.001
						(0.061)
Control mean	0.050	0.093	0.409	0.273	0.000	0.000
Observations	312	312	302	312	312	312

Note: Shaded cells (number of observations) were not present in the original published tables; $$ refers to rounding inconsistencies to the nearest one hundredth.

Table 17: Galiani and Schargrodsky 'Table 8: Labour market'

VARIABLES	(1) Household head income	(2) Total household income	(3) Total household income per capita	(4) Total household income per adult	(5) Employed household head dummy
1: has property right; 0: doesn't have property right	-27.346	-43.564	1.036	-4.452	0.032
	(1.099)	(1.268)	(0.132)	(0.384)	(0.628)
Control mean	272.541	374.590	73.715	118.735	0.727
Observations	251	255	255	255	310

Note: Shaded cells (number of observations) were not present in the original published tables.

Table 18: Galiani and Schargrodsky 'Table A.1: Good roof'

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
1: has property right; 0: doesn't have property right	0.151**	0.136**	0.154***	0.144***	0.151**	0.151**		0.157**		0.117*	0.118**
	(2.489)	(2.405)	(2.652)	(2.672)	(2.256)	(2.678)		(2.224)		(1.656)	(2.550)
1: was offered property right; 0: wasn't offered property right							0.144**				
							(2.219)				
Household received property rights in 1989-91									0.223***		
									(2.634)		
Household received property rights in 1998									0.113*		
									(1.663)		
Parcel surface in squared metres	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000		0.000
	(0.420)		(0.460)	(1.446)	(0.357)	(0.245)	(0.594)	(0.428)	(0.384)		(0.977)
Distance (in blocks) to creek	0.032		0.032	0.016	0.032	0.032	0.035	0.032	0.019		0.027
	(0.942)		(1.004)	(0.753)	(0.840)	(1.313)	(1.026)	(0.953)	(0.547)		(1.075)
0: parcel is not in the block corner; 1: otherwise	0.078		0.083	0.122	0.078	0.078	0.098	0.079	0.078		0.017
	(0.906)		(1.016)	(1.601)	(0.942)	(0.684)	(1.120)	(0.912)	(0.910)		(0.259)
Distance to non-squatted block (in blocks)	-0.010		-0.018	-0.015	-0.010	-0.010	-0.011	-0.010	-0.009		-0.014
	(0.312)		(0.596)	(0.564)	(0.309)	(0.540)	(0.360)	(0.311)	(0.305)		(0.577)
Age of the original squatter dummy: below 50 = 1; else = 0	-0.008			0.006	-0.008	-0.008	-0.015	-0.008	-0.012		
	(0.134)			(0.108)	(0.135)	(0.234)	(0.248)	(0.128)	(0.202)		
Age os miss	0.087			0.018	0.087	0.087	0.088	0.085	0.080		
	(0.376)			(0.086)	(0.356)	(0.303)	(0.381)	(0.368)	(0.345)		
Gender of the original squatter, 0 = male, 1 = female	-0.039			-0.037	-0.039	-0.039	-0.039	-0.039	-0.040		
	(0.643)			(0.735) [$$]	(0.648)	(1.201)	(0.636)	(0.642)	(0.654)		
Was the original squatter born in Argentina? 0 = No, 1 = Yes	0.179			0.126	0.179	0.179	0.172	0.180	0.171		
	(1.205)			(0.984)	(1.133)	(1.383)	(1.161)	(1.212)	(1.151)		
Years of education of the original squatter	0.004			0.007	0.004	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.003		
	(0.220)			(0.502)	(0.210)	(0.126)	(0.192)	(0.218)	(0.194)		
Was the original squatter's father born in Argentina? 0 = No, 1 = Yes	-0.018			0.051	-0.018	-0.018	-0.025	-0.019	-0.013		
	(0.153)			(0.471)	(0.144)	(0.209)	(0.214)	(0.159)	(0.110)		
Argentina father os miss	0.239			-0.250	0.239	0.239*	0.233	0.240	0.231		
	(0.381)			(0.466)	(1.490)	(2.026)	(0.371)	(0.383)	(0.369)		
Years of education of the original squatter's father	-0.001			-0.012	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.000		
	(0.030)			(0.513)	(0.030)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.020)	(0.001)		
Education of the father miss	-0.054			-0.070	-0.054	-0.054	-0.067	-0.050	-0.077		
	(0.085)			(0.186)	(0.259)	(0.278)	(0.104)	(0.078)	(0.120)		
Was the original squatter's mother born in Argentina? 0 = No, 1 = Yes	-0.088			-0.113	-0.088	-0.088	-0.082	-0.089	-0.094		
	(0.733)			(1.022)	(0.622)	(0.617)	(0.677)	(0.739)	(0.784)		
Years of education of the original squatter's mother	0.005 [$$]			0.005	0.005 [$$]	0.005 [$$]	0.004	0.005 [$$]	0.004		
	(0.169)			(0.193)	(0.176)	(0.255)	(0.143)	(0.163)	(0.141)		
Education of the mother miss	-0.377			0.090	-0.377***	-0.377***	-0.365	-0.379	-0.356		
	(0.736)			(0.238)	(2.678)	(7.175)	(0.712)	(0.740)	(0.696)		

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Constant	0.122	0.318***	0.222	0.118	0.122	0.122	0.108	0.116	0.163		0.222*
	(0.521)	(7.529)	(1.413)	(0.628)	(0.502)	(0.439)	(0.452)	(0.492)	(0.691)		(1.850)
F-stat									1.479		
Observations	297	297	297	405	297	297	297	297	297	276	445
R-squared	0.043	0.019	0.029	0.047	0.043	0.043	0.039	0.043	0.049		0.021

Note: t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; shaded cells (number of observations) were not present in the original published tables; $$ refers to rounding inconsistencies to the nearest one hundredth.

Table 19: Galiani and Schargrodsky 'Table A.2: Constructed surface'

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
1: has property right; 0: doesn't have property right	8.265**	7.995** $$	9.894***	5.302*	8.265**	8.265		9.867**		8.552**	8.612***
	(2.335)	(2.333)	(2.865)	(1.679)	(2.146)	(1.444)		(2.406)		(2.177)	(3.023)
1: was offered property right; 0: wasn't offered property right							9.062**				
							(2.408)				
Household received property rights in 1989–91									10.340**		
									(2.090)		
Household received property rights in 1998									7.178*		
									(1.804)		
Parcel surface in squared metres	-0.008		-0.000	0.010	-0.008	-0.008	-0.003	-0.007	-0.008		0.012
	(0.357)		(0.017)	(0.634)	(0.370)	(0.349)	(0.121)	(0.306)	(0.374)		(0.678)
Distance (in blocks) to creek	5.896***		6.418***	2.627**	5.896***	5.896***	6.250***	6.075*** $$	5.545*** $$		4.795***
	(3.034)		(3.422)	(2.086)	(3.108)	(3.057)	(3.166)	(3.103)	(2.729)		(3.153)
0: parcel is not in the block corner; 1: otherwise	4.383		3.976	3.028	4.383	4.383	5.782	4.569	4.386		8.372**
	(0.871)		(0.817)	(0.674)	(0.768)	(1.589)	(1.132)	(0.907)	(0.871)		(2.104)
Distance to non-squatted block (in blocks)	3.668**		4.511***	3.052*	3.668	3.668	3.582**	3.689**	3.674**		2.021
	(2.059)		(2.601)	(1.929)	(1.597)	(1.425)	(2.013)	(2.070)	(2.060)		(1.362)
Age of the original squatter dummy: below 50 = 1; else = 0	-1.678			-2.626	-1.678	-1.678	-2.023	-1.586	-1.796		
	(0.478)			(0.878)	(0.506)	(0.513)	(0.578)	(0.452)	(0.511)		
Age os missing	2.294			3.927	2.294	2.294	1.962	1.762	2.072		
	(0.170)			(0.320)	(0.271)	(0.211)	(0.146)	(0.131)	(0.154)		
Gender of the original squatter, 0 = male, 1 = female	-0.697			-1.993	-0.697	-0.697	-0.671	-0.685	-0.726		
	(0.197)			(0.664)	(0.206)	(0.234)	(0.190)	(0.193)	(0.205) $$		
Was the original squatter born in Argentina? 0 = no, 1 = yes	-7.544			-8.072	-7.544	-7.544	-7.621	-7.182	-7.756		
	(0.873)			(1.068)	(0.852)	(1.482)	(0.883)	(0.829)	(0.895)		
Years of education of the original squatter	-0.077			-0.141	-0.077	-0.077	-0.115	-0.088	-0.093		
	(0.078)			(0.175) $$	(0.076)	(0.056)	(0.116)	(0.089)	(0.093)		
Was the original squatter's father born in Argentina? 0 = no, 1 = yes	-5.446			-2.433	-5.446	-5.446	-6.052	-5.680	-5.279		
	(0.795)			(0.386)	(0.827)	(1.136)	(0.881)	(0.828)	(0.769)		
Argentina father os missing	61.845*			45.198	61.845***	61.845***	61.828*	62.204*	61.666*		
	(1.688)			(1.425)	(6.319)	(10.907)	(1.689)	(1.697)	(1.682)		
Years of education of the original squatter's father	-3.312**			-3.223**	-3.312**	-3.312*	-3.289**	-3.236**	-3.288**		
	(2.062)			(2.384)	(2.205)	(1.895)	(2.048)	(2.010)	(2.044)		
Education of the father missing	-58.311			-22.124	-58.311***	-58.311***	-58.119	-56.999	-58.993		
	(1.561)			(0.992)	(5.506)	(7.420)	(1.556)	(1.523)	(1.576)		
Was the original squatter's mother born in Argentina? 0 = no, 1 = yes	10.726			8.195 $$	10.726	10.726***	10.922	10.545	10.506		
	(1.553)			(1.282)	(1.274)	(3.044)	(1.583)	(1.525)	(1.517)		
Years of education of the original squatter's mother	3.591**			3.576**	3.591*	3.591*	3.501**	3.537**	3.567**		
	(2.096)			(2.280)	(1.682)	(1.776)	(2.041)	(2.062)	(2.079)		

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Education of the mother missing	42.991			23.899	42.991***	42.991***	43.156	42.285	43.578		
	(1.437)			(1.064)	(4.590)	(6.219)	(1.444)	(1.412)	(1.454)		
Constant	54.317***	67.632***	46.277***	58.619***	54.317***	54.317***	52.193***	52.657***	55.531***		49.966***
	(3.983)	(26.487)	(5.002)	(5.316)	(3.394)	(4.324)	(3.766)	(3.813)	(4.023)		(6.784)
F-stat									0.361		
Observations	299	299	299	407	299	299	299	299	299	277	447
R-squared	0.110	0.018	0.064	0.066	0.110	0.110	0.111	0.109	0.111		0.044

Note: t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Shaded cells (number of observations) were not present in the original published tables; $$ refers to rounding inconsistencies to the nearest one hundredth.

Table 20: Galiani and Schargrodsky 'Table A.3: Concrete sidewalk'

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
1: has property right; 0: doesn't have property right	0.114**	0.075	0.115**	0.100**	0.114	0.114		0.100		0.082	0.160***
	(2.176)	(1.435) $$	(2.241)	(2.408)	(1.603)	(1.551)		(1.630)		(1.417)	(3.853)
1: was offered property right; 0: wasn't offered property right							0.092				
							(1.624)				
Household received property rights in 1989–91									0.158**		
									(2.144)		
Household received property rights in 1998									0.091		
									(1.547)		
Parcel surface in squared metres	-0.000		-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000		-0.000
	(0.440)		(0.690)	(0.512)	(0.397)	(0.239)	(0.331)	(0.468)	(0.464)		(1.149)
Distance (in blocks) to creek	0.094***		0.089***	0.077***	0.094**	0.094**	0.095*** $$	0.093***	0.087***		0.108***
	(3.287)		(3.191)	(4.636)	(2.398)	(2.251)	(3.250)	(3.215)	(2.898)		(4.886)
0: parcel is not in the block corner; 1: otherwise	-0.118		-0.143**	-0.129**	-0.118	-0.118*	-0.106	-0.119	-0.118		-0.075
	(1.572)		(1.975)	(2.167)	(1.655) $$	(2.013)	(1.383)	(1.590)	(1.570)		(1.293)
Distance to non-squatted block (in blocks)	-0.066**		-0.068***	-0.047**	-0.066*	-0.066	-0.066**	-0.066**	-0.066**		-0.089***
	(2.492)		(2.657)	(2.270)	(1.676)	(1.693)	(2.500)	(2.494)	(2.485)		(4.143)
Age of the original squatter dummy: below 50 = 1; else = 0	-0.101*			-0.070*	-0.101**	-0.101*	-0.106**	-0.102*	-0.103*		
	(1.922)			(1.776)	(2.034)	(2.093)	(2.019)	(1.937)	(1.965)		
Age os miss	0.191			0.203	0.191***	0.191**	0.180	0.193	0.186		
	(1.041)			(1.340)	(2.713)	(2.175)	(0.972)	(1.051)	(1.013)		
Gender of the original squatter, 0 = male, 1 = female	-0.051			-0.061	-0.051	-0.051	-0.051	-0.051	-0.051		
	(0.955) $$			(1.545) $$	(0.904)	(1.452)	(0.949)	(0.956)	(0.966)		
Was the original squatter born in Argentina? 0 = no, 1 = yes	0.065 $$			0.047	0.065 $$	0.065 $$	0.058	0.061	0.060		
	(0.500)			(0.468)	(0.411)	(0.743)	(0.450)	(0.475)	(0.465)		
Years of education of the original squatter	-0.021			-0.016	-0.021*	-0.021**	-0.022	-0.021	-0.022		
	(1.440)			(1.504)	(1.810)	(2.748)	(1.446)	(1.433)	(1.460)		
Was the original squatter's father born in Argentina? 0 = no	-0.035 $$			-0.016	-0.035 $$	-0.035 $$	-0.037	-0.033	-0.031		
	(0.338)			(0.191)	(0.405) $$	(0.317)	(0.360)	(0.318)	(0.303)		
Argentina father OS miss	0.620			0.374	0.620**	0.620**	0.614	0.617	0.616		
	(1.131)			(0.890)	(2.329)	(2.374)	(1.116)	(1.125)	(1.124)		
Years of education of the original squatter's father	0.033			0.027	0.033	0.033*	0.032	0.032	0.033		
	(1.373)			(1.483)	(1.552)	(1.740)	(1.327)	(1.343)	(1.392)		
Education of the father miss	-0.328			-0.098	-0.328	-0.328	-0.353	-0.340	-0.342		
	(0.586)			(0.330)	(1.180)	(1.307)	(0.629)	(0.608)	(0.611)		
Was the original squatter's mother born in Argentina? 0 = no, 1 = yes	-0.021			-0.029	-0.021	-0.021	-0.017	-0.020	-0.026		
	(0.206)			(0.341)	(0.149)	(0.229)	(0.165) $$	(0.192)	(0.250)		
Years of education of the original squatter's mother	-0.029			-0.028	-0.029	-0.029	-0.030	-0.029	-0.030		
	(1.153)			(1.351)	(1.111)	(0.988)	(1.170)	(1.137)	(1.172)		
Education of the mother miss	0.125			0.108	0.125	0.125	0.138	0.131	0.138		
	(0.280)			(0.362)	(0.956)	(0.999)	(0.308)	(0.294)	(0.307)		

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Constant	0.835***	0.672***	0.708***	0.809***	0.835***	0.835**	0.844***	0.850***	0.861***		0.678***
	(4.104)	(17.195) $$	(5.166)	(5.543)	(3.272)	(2.261)	(4.056)	(4.128)	(4.182)		(6.337)
F-stat									0.714		
Observations	300	300	300	408	300	300	300	300	300	278	448
R-squared	0.145	0.007	0.104	0.179	0.145	0.145	0.139	0.145	0.147		0.159

Note: t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; shaded cells (number of observations) were not present in the original published tables; $$ refers to rounding inconsistencies to the nearest one hundredth.

Table 21: Galiani and Schargrodsky 'Table A.4: Overall housing appearance'

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
1: has property right; 0: doesn't have property right	8.418***	7.448***	8.067***	5.387***	8.418***	8.418***		10.174***		8.235*** $$	6.971***
	(3.645)	(3.377)	(3.582)	(2.674)	(3.909)	(2.975)		(3.799)		(3.634)	(3.870)
1: was offered property right; 0: wasn't offered property right							9.344***				
							(3.811)				
Household received property rights in 1989–91									6.275* $$		
									(1.946)		
Household received property rights in 1998									9.542***		
									(3.679)		
Parcel surface in squared metres	-0.018		-0.021	-0.005 $$	-0.018	-0.018*	-0.013	-0.017	-0.018		-0.021*
	(1.280)		(1.460)	(0.468)	(1.490)	(1.997)	(0.894)	(1.192)	(1.251)		(1.874)
Distance (in blocks) to creek	2.469*		2.324*	-0.260	2.469*	2.469**	2.845** $$	2.664**	2.832**		3.009***
	(1.947)		(1.900)	(0.324)	(1.853)	(2.880)	(2.212)	(2.084)	(2.138)		(3.131)
0: parcel is not in the block corner; 1: otherwise	0.133		-0.696	1.945 $$	0.133	0.133	1.588	0.337	0.130		0.022
	(0.041)		(0.219)	(0.679)	(0.038)	(0.030)	(0.477)	(0.102)	(0.040)		(0.009)
Distance to non-squatted block (in blocks)	-0.003		-0.142	-0.186	-0.003	-0.003	-0.090	0.020	-0.009		-0.487
	(0.002)		(0.126)	(0.184)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.078)	(0.017)	(0.008)		(0.519)
Age of the original squatter dummy: below 50 = 1	0.606			0.118	0.606	0.606	0.257	0.707	0.728		
	(0.265) $$			(0.062)	(0.306)	(0.432)	(0.112)	(0.308)	(0.317)		
Age OS missing	2.738			2.420	2.738	2.738	2.361	2.154	2.967		
	(0.312)			(0.309)	(0.198)	(0.201)	(0.269)	(0.245)	(0.337)		
Gender of the original squatter, 0 = male	-3.208			-3.977**	-3.208	-3.208	-3.181	-3.196	-3.179		
	(1.388)			(2.077)	(1.455)	(1.709)	(1.379)	(1.381)	(1.375) $$		
Was the original squatter born in Argentina? 0 = no	6.823			2.654	6.823	6.823**	6.768	7.221	7.042		
	(1.209)			(0.550)	(0.948)	(2.331)	(1.203)	(1.277)	(1.247)		
Years of education of the original squatter	0.701			0.479	0.701	0.701	0.661	0.689	0.716		
	(1.084)			(0.933)	(0.880)	(0.733)	(1.024)	(1.065) $$	(1.108)		
Was the original squatter's father born in Argentina?	-9.816**			-5.849	-9.816**	-9.816**	-10.456**	-10.072**	-9.989**		
	(2.195) $$			(1.453)	(2.198)	(2.397)	(2.335)	(2.247)	(2.231)		
Argentina father os miss	21.440			5.480	21.440**	21.440**	21.445	21.833	21.625		
	(0.897)			(0.271)	(2.202)	(2.709)	(0.899)	(0.912)	(0.905)		
Years of education of the original squatter's father	-1.132			-0.647	-1.132	-1.132**	-1.104	-1.049	-1.157		
	(1.080)			(0.750)	(1.369)	(2.168)	(1.055) $$	(0.998)	(1.103)		
Education of the father miss	-6.787			-1.666	-6.787	-6.787	-6.504	-5.349	-6.083		
	(0.278)			(0.117)	(0.620)	(0.698)	(0.267)	(0.219)	(0.249)		
Original squatter's mother born in Argentina? 0 = no, 1 = yes	-1.940			-1.182	-1.940	-1.940	-1.750	-2.139	-1.713		
	(0.431)			(0.290)	(0.329)	-0.453	(0.389)	(0.474)	(0.379)		
Years of education of the original squatter's mother	-1.219			-0.814	-1.219	-1.219	-1.316	-1.278	-1.194		
	(1.090)			(0.814)	(0.997)	(0.965)	(1.177)	(1.141)	(1.067)		
Education of the mother miss	-19.805			-3.918	-19.805***	-19.805***	-19.682	-20.580	-20.412		
	(1.015)			(0.274)	(3.788)	(5.034)	(1.011)	(1.053)	(1.045)		

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Constant	34.146***	22.714***	24.633***	33.205*** $$	34.146***	34.146***	31.848***	32.326***	32.892***		24.732***
	(3.837)	(13.820)	(4.082)	(4.721)	(3.712)	(3.893)	(3.527)	(3.585) $$	(3.656)		(5.314)
F-stat									0.908		
Observations	299	299	299	407	299	299	299	299	299	277	446
R-squared	0.103	0.037	0.057	0.049	0.103	0.103	0.107	0.101	0.106		0.062

Note: t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; shaded cells (number of observations) were not present in the original published tables; $$ refers to rounding inconsistencies to the nearest one hundredth.

Table 22: Galiani and Schargrodsky 'Table A.5: Durable consumption'

VARIABLES	(1) Has refrigerator with freezer? 0 = No	(2) Has refrigerator without freezer? 0 = No	(3) Has laundry machine? 0 = No	(4) Has television? 0 = No	(5) Has cellular phone? 0 = No
1: has property right; 0: doesn't have property right	0.053	0.037	0.038	-0.013	-0.008
	(0.925) $$	(0.613)	(0.670)	(0.401)	(0.316)
Parcel surface in squared metres	-0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(1.277)	(0.822)	(0.387)	(0.445) $$	(0.984)
Distance (in blocks) to creek	0.093***	-0.027	0.065** $$	0.056***	0.026*
	(2.983)	(0.826)	(2.112)	(3.122)	(1.882)
0: parcel is not in the block corner; 1: otherwise	-0.039	0.090	0.046	0.032	0.020
	(0.469)	(1.049)	(0.561)	(0.667)	(0.565)
Distance to non-squatted block (in blocks)	-0.008	0.024	0.058**	0.016	0.004
	(0.277)	(0.805) $$	(2.043)	(0.953)	(0.313)
Age of the original squatter dummy: below 50 = 1; else = 0	0.033	-0.012	0.018	0.013	-0.008
	(0.584)	(0.196)	(0.318)	(0.382)	(0.324)
Age os miss	0.092	0.152	-0.321	0.093	-0.038
	(0.455)	(0.712)	(1.468)	(0.788)	(0.429)
Gender of the original squatter, 0 = male, 1 = female	0.020	-0.045 $$	-0.049	0.035 $$	0.005 $$
	(0.352)	(0.743)	(0.858)	(1.040)	(0.198)
Was the original squatter born in Argentina? 0 = no, 1 = yes	0.052	-0.056	-0.020	-0.219***	-0.013
	(0.367)	(0.371)	(0.141)	(2.672)	(0.216)
Years of education of the original squatter	0.016	-0.022	0.021	0.015 $$	-0.005 $$
	(1.019)	(1.291)	(1.299)	(1.551)	(0.640)
Was the original squatter's father born in Argentina? 0 = no, 1 = yes	-0.098	0.051	-0.043	0.059	0.044
	(0.866)	(0.428)	(0.388)	(0.897)	(0.897)
Argentina father os miss	0.064	0.001	0.456	-0.259	-0.027
	(0.106)	(0.001)	(0.763)	(0.736)	(0.101)
Years of education of the original squatter's father	0.005	0.005	-0.014	-0.002	0.022*
	(0.206)	(0.183)	(0.543)	(0.140)	(1.912)
Education of the father miss	-1.198*	1.175*	0.206	0.040	0.094
	(1.945)	(1.805)	(0.338)	(0.113)	(0.349)
Was the original squatter's mother born in Argentina? 0 = no, 1 = yes	-0.034	0.060	-0.069	0.078	-0.024
	(0.301)	(0.495)	(0.616)	(1.184)	(0.488)
Years of education of the original squatter's mother	0.010	-0.011	-0.048*	-0.013	-0.025** $$
	(0.355) $$	(0.383)	(1.771)	(0.818)	(2.063)
Education of the mother miss	0.787	-0.639	-0.765	0.096	-0.140
	(1.599)	(1.227)	(1.567)	(0.333)	(0.647)
Constant	0.190	0.546**	0.660***	0.854***	-0.011
	(0.857)	(2.328)	(3.018)	(6.638)	(0.115)
Observations	311	311	311	312	312
R-squared	0.073	0.043	0.061	0.084	0.045

Note: t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; shaded cells (no. obs.) not present in original tables; $$ = rounding inconsistencies to the nearest one hundredth.

Table 23: Galiani and Schargrodsky 'Table A.6: Number of household members'

VARIABLES	(1) # members of the household	(2) # members of the household	(3) # members of the household	(4) # members of the household	(5) # members of the household	(6) # members of the household	(7) # members of the household	(8) # members of the household	(9) # members of the household	(10) .
1: has property right; 0: no property right	-0.946*** (2.807)	-0.866*** (2.655)	-0.859** (2.554)	-0.920*** (3.065)	-0.946** (2.554)	-0.946** (2.763)		-1.193*** (3.024)		-0.868** (2.330)
Property offer							-1.098*** (3.033)			
Property right early									-1.181** (2.500)	
Property right late									-0.821** (2.160)	
Parcel surface	0.001 (0.581)		0.001 (0.680)	0.001 (0.858)	0.001 (0.612)	0.001 (1.118)	0.000 (0.218)	0.001 (0.510)	0.001 (0.601)	
Distance to creek	0.035 $$ (0.191)		-0.037 (0.202)	0.079 (0.663)	0.035 $$ (0.189)	0.035 $$ (0.210)	-0.021 (0.115)	0.010 (0.053)	0.074 (0.389)	
Block corner	-0.047 (0.097)		0.050 (0.104)	0.027 (0.063)	-0.047 (0.112)	-0.047 (0.122)	-0.249 (0.506)	-0.073 (0.151)	-0.049 (0.100)	
Dist to non squatted	0.029 (0.168)		-0.019 (0.112)	0.096 (0.637)	0.029 (0.166)	0.029 (0.192)	0.035 (0.207)	0.028 (0.162)	0.028 (0.166)	
Age of orig squatter dummy	1.039*** (3.078)			0.772*** (2.702)	1.039*** (3.035)	1.039*** (3.863)	1.075*** (3.200)	1.022*** (3.025) $$	1.051*** (3.109)	
Age os miss	1.948 (1.623)			1.765 (1.590)	1.948 (1.475)	1.948 (1.508)	2.143* (1.784)	1.981 (1.649)	1.975 (1.643)	
Gender orig squatter	-0.086 (0.253)			-0.092 (0.322)	-0.086 (0.237)	-0.086 (0.183)	-0.075 $$ (0.221)	-0.091 (0.270)	-0.084 (0.248)	
Argentine orig squatter	-0.899 (1.074)			-0.687 (0.946)	-0.899 (1.147)	-0.899 (1.164)	-0.918 (1.100)	-0.956 (1.140)	-0.869 (1.037)	
Education years orig squatter	-0.075 (0.785)			-0.114 (1.487)	-0.075 (0.779)	-0.075 (0.537)	-0.070 (0.736)	-0.074 (0.775) $$	-0.073 (0.762)	
Argentine orig squatter father	1.236* (1.845)			1.086* (1.770)	1.236* (1.780)	1.236* (1.919)	1.329** (1.981)	1.268* (1.890)	1.218* (1.816)	
Argentina father os miss	-0.374 (0.104)			-2.155 (0.699)	-0.374 (0.193)	-0.374 (0.207)	-0.414 (0.116)	-0.430 (0.120)	-0.348 (0.097)	
Educ years orig squatter father	-0.177 (1.151)			-0.173 (1.353)	-0.177 (1.225)	-0.177 (1.297)	-0.185 $$ (1.206)	-0.187 (1.214)	-0.179 (1.162)	
Education of the father miss	-10.547*** (2.883)			-3.699* (1.707)	-10.547*** (5.905)	-10.547*** (5.799)	-10.581*** (2.899)	-10.755*** (2.934)	-10.465*** (2.857)	
Argentine orig squatter mother	-0.750 (1.113)			-0.591 (0.952)	-0.750 (1.056)	-0.750 (1.481)	-0.757 (1.126)	-0.727 (1.076)	-0.725 (1.073)	

VARIABLES	(1) # members of the household	(2) # members of the household	(3) # members of the household	(4) # members of the household	(5) # members of the household	(6) # members of the household	(7) # members of the household	(8) # members of the household	(9) # members of the household	(10) .
Educ years orig squatter mother	0.070 (0.433)			0.043 (0.294)	0.070 (0.485) $$	0.070 (0.459)	0.086 (0.533)	0.077 (0.473)	0.074 (0.455) $$	
Education of the mother miss	8.589*** (2.934)			3.400 (1.560)	8.589*** (11.614)	8.589*** (14.311)	8.582*** (2.939)	8.695*** (2.966)	8.526*** (2.909)	
Constant	6.409*** (4.889)	6.057*** (24.969)	5.722*** (6.340)	6.515*** (6.175) $$	6.409*** (5.513)	6.409*** (6.745) $$	6.772*** (5.068)	6.666*** (5.015)	6.257*** (4.706)	
F-stat									0.506	
Observations	313	313	313	425	313	313	313	313	313	290
R-squared	0.101	0.022	0.024	0.065	0.101	0.101	0.105	0.100	0.103	

Note: t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; shaded cells (number of observations) were not present in the original published tables; $$ refers to rounding inconsistencies to the nearest one hundredth.

Table 24: Galiani and Schargrodsky 'Table A.7: Household head spouse'

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
1: has property right; 0: doesn't have property right	-0.014 (0.275) $$	-0.019 (0.372)	-0.019 (0.372)	-0.025 (0.562)	-0.014 (0.262)	-0.014 (0.409)		0.012 (0.196)		-0.046 (0.701)
Property offer							0.011 (0.196)			
Property right early									-0.026 (0.362)	
Property right late									-0.008 (0.134)	
Parcel surface	-0.000 (0.943)		-0.000 (1.452)	-0.000 (0.859)	-0.000 (0.982)	-0.000 (1.531)	-0.000 (0.862)	-0.000 (0.894)	-0.000 (0.935) $$	
Distance to creek	0.018 (0.665)		0.013 (0.471)	0.013 (0.727)	0.018 (0.700)	0.018 (0.584)	0.021 (0.755) $$	0.021 (0.754)	0.020 (0.704)	
Block corner	0.030 (0.409)		0.062 (0.844)	0.029 (0.440)	0.030 (0.437)	0.030 (0.446)	0.035 $$ (0.461)	0.033 (0.446)	0.030 (0.407)	
Dist to non squatted	0.010 (0.370)		0.001 (0.027)	0.028 (1.222)	0.010 (0.359)	0.010 (0.394)	0.010 (0.371)	0.010 (0.374)	0.010 (0.369)	
Age of orig squatter dummy	0.029 (0.558)			0.044 (1.017)	0.029 (0.475) $$	0.029 (0.568)	0.030 (0.582)	0.030 (0.590)	0.029 (0.569)	
Age os miss	-0.118 (0.648)			-0.013 (0.080)	-0.118 (0.524)	-0.118 (0.438)	-0.123 (0.673)	-0.121 (0.666)	-0.117 (0.640)	
Gender orig squatter	-0.278*** (5.409)			-0.310*** (7.203)	-0.278*** (4.817)	-0.278*** (4.660)	-0.278*** (5.401)	-0.277*** (5.394)	-0.278*** (5.398)	
Argentine orig squatter	-0.006 (0.047)			0.015 $$ (0.136)	-0.006 (0.052)	-0.006 (0.040)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.004 (0.035)	
Education years orig squatter	0.025* $$ (1.713)			0.012 (1.017)	0.025* $$ (1.766)	0.025** $$ (2.220)	0.025* $$ (1.703)	0.025* $$ (1.706)	0.025* $$ (1.717)	
Argentine orig squatter father	-0.045 (0.446)			-0.022 (0.236)	-0.045 (0.548)	-0.045 (0.772)	-0.049 (0.483)	-0.049 (0.479)	-0.046 (0.454)	
Argentina father os miss	0.289 (0.531)			0.408 (0.877)	0.289** (2.501)	0.289** (2.144)	0.295 (0.542)	0.295 (0.542)	0.290 (0.533)	
Educ years orig squatter father	0.001 (0.026)			0.016 (0.852)	0.001 (0.025)	0.001 (0.026)	0.002 (0.070)	0.002 (0.071)	0.000 (0.021)	
Education of the father miss	0.491 (0.884)			-0.127 (0.389)	0.491*** (2.789)	0.491*** (3.841)	0.511 (0.920)	0.512 (0.922)	0.495 (0.890)	
Argentine orig squatter mother	-0.059 (0.579)			-0.087 (0.934)	-0.059 (0.634)	-0.059 (0.535) $$	-0.061 (0.600)	-0.062 (0.602)	-0.058 (0.565) $$	
Educ years orig squatter mother	-0.020 (0.806)			0.003 (0.122)	-0.020 (0.640)	-0.020 (0.847)	-0.021 (0.836)	-0.020 (0.833)	-0.020 (0.797)	
Education of the mother miss	-0.535 (1.205)			0.165 (0.503)	-0.535*** (4.105)	-0.535*** (5.718)	-0.545 (1.228)	-0.546 (1.229)	-0.538 (1.210)	

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Constant	0.887***	0.736***	0.841***	0.731***	0.887***	0.887***	0.859***	0.860***	0.879***	
	(4.461)	(19.443)	(6.009)	(4.595) $$	(5.248)	(9.381)	(4.230)	(4.269)	(4.357)	
F-stat									0.056	
Observations	313	313	313	425	313	313	313	313	313	290
R-squared	0.132	0.000	0.015	0.141	0.132	0.132	0.131	0.131	0.132	

Note: t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; shaded cells (number of observations) were not present in the original published tables; $$ refers to rounding inconsistencies to the nearest one hundredth.

Table 25: Galiani and Schargrodsky 'Table A.8: Number of offspring of household head (>= 14 years)'

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
1: has property right; 0: doesn't have property right	-0.012 (0.062)	-0.027 (0.151)	0.011 (0.061)	-0.060 (0.367)	-0.012 (0.059)	-0.012 (0.057)		-0.184 (0.844)		0.052 (0.257)
Property offer							-0.169 (0.847)			
Property right early									-0.335 (1.290)	
Property right late									0.160 (0.765)	
Parcel surface	0.001 (0.998)		0.001 (1.122)	0.002* (1.922)	0.001 (0.965) $$	0.001 (1.546)	0.001 (0.817)	0.001 (0.908)	0.001 (1.054)	
Distance to creek	0.096 (0.947)		0.080 (0.811)	0.028 (0.426)	0.096 (0.886)	0.096 (1.263)	0.074 (0.714)	0.078 (0.769)	0.150 (1.426)	
Block corner	-0.061 (0.229)		-0.005 (0.021)	0.137 (0.582)	-0.061 (0.249)	-0.061 (0.400)	-0.107 (0.393)	-0.080 (0.298)	-0.064 (0.239)	
Dist to non squatted	0.083 (0.879)		0.065 $$ (0.709)	0.044 (0.532)	0.083 (0.893)	0.083 (1.329)	0.083 (0.885)	0.082 (0.871)	0.082 (0.877)	
Age of orig squatter dummy	0.274 (1.470)			0.240 (1.534)	0.274 (1.585)	0.274 (1.615) $$	0.271 (1.458)	0.263 (1.407)	0.292 (1.568)	
Age os miss	-0.546 (0.824)			-0.689 (1.137)	-0.546 (0.923)	-0.546 (0.920)	-0.498 (0.750)	-0.523 (0.788)	-0.510 (0.772)	
Gender orig squatter	-0.018 (0.098)			-0.114 (0.727)	-0.018 (0.099)	-0.018 (0.117)	-0.020 (0.106)	-0.022 (0.119)	-0.016 (0.088)	
Argentine orig squatter	-0.159 (0.344)			-0.101 (0.254)	-0.159 (0.378)	-0.159 (0.315)	-0.193 (0.418)	-0.199 (0.429)	-0.119 (0.257)	
Education years orig squatter	0.002 (0.036)			-0.013 (0.302)	0.002 (0.033)	0.002 (0.027)	0.003 (0.059)	0.003 (0.048)	0.005 $$ (0.090)	
Argentine orig squatter father	0.492 (1.329)			0.299 (0.891)	0.492* (1.709)	0.492** (2.219)	0.524 (1.412)	0.514 (1.387)	0.467 (1.266)	
Argentina father os miss	-0.753 (0.380)			-1.419 (0.841)	-0.753 (1.206)	-0.753 (1.310)	-0.790 (0.399)	-0.793 (0.399)	-0.718 (0.364)	
Educ years orig squatter father	0.012 (0.137)			0.008 (0.108)	0.012 (0.122)	0.012 (0.096)	0.005 $$ (0.057)	0.005 $$ (0.053)	0.009 (0.106)	
Education of the father miss	-3.197 (1.582)			-1.964* (1.658)	-3.197*** (4.495)	-3.197*** (3.212)	-3.315 (1.643)	-3.342 (1.649)	-3.084 (1.531)	
Argentine orig squatter mother	-0.117 (0.314)			0.070 (0.205)	-0.117 (0.340)	-0.117 (0.235) $$	-0.105 (0.283)	-0.101 (0.269)	-0.082 (0.222)	
Educ years orig squatter mother	0.042 (0.470)			0.020 (0.251)	0.042 (0.477)	0.042 (0.624)	0.048 (0.538)	0.047 (0.521)	0.047 (0.528)	
Education of the mother miss	2.681* (1.658)			2.169* (1.821)	2.681*** (6.562)	2.681*** (9.065)	2.737* (1.695)	2.755* (1.700)	2.595 (1.610)	

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Constant	0.475	1.686***	1.028**	0.758	0.475	0.475	0.671	0.654	0.265	
	(0.656)	(12.835) $$	(2.111)	(1.315) $$	(0.737)	(0.694)	(0.907)	(0.890)	(0.363)	
F-stat									3.162*	
Observations	313	313	313	425	313	313	313	313	313	290
R-squared	0.043	0.000	0.008	0.039	0.043	0.043	0.045	0.040	0.053	

Note: t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; shaded cells (number of observations) were not present in the original published tables; $$ refers to rounding inconsistencies to the nearest one hundredth.

Table 26: Galiani and Schargrodsky 'Table A.9: Number of other relatives (no offspring or spouse of head)'

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
1: has property right; 0: doesn't have property right	-0.680***	-0.533***	-0.550***	-0.556***	-0.680***	-0.680***		-0.896***		-0.697**
	(3.534)	(2.746)	(2.754)	(3.226)	(3.515) $$	(4.966)		(3.966)		(2.370)
Property offer							-0.824***			
							(3.996)			
Property right early									-0.365 $$	
									(1.356)	
Property right late									-0.848***	
									(3.918)	
Parcel surface	-0.000		0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	
	(0.080)		(0.015)	(0.039)	(0.099)	(0.214)	(0.561)	(0.185)	(0.130)	
Distance to creek	-0.080		-0.091	-0.022	-0.080	-0.080	-0.125 $$	-0.101	-0.133	
	(0.761)		(0.845)	(0.318)	(0.729)	(1.091)	(1.176)	(0.961)	(1.217)	
Block corner	0.027		0.003	-0.064	0.027	0.027	-0.128	0.004	0.029	
	(0.098)		(0.012)	(0.258)	(0.124)	(0.157)	(0.455)	(0.015) $$	(0.107)	
Dist to non squatted	-0.119		-0.118	-0.074	-0.119	-0.119**	-0.115 $$	-0.120	-0.119	
	(1.226)		(1.180)	(0.862)	(1.318)	(2.171)	(1.183)	(1.232)	(1.224)	
Age of orig squatter dummy	-0.347*			-0.426***	-0.347*	-0.347*	-0.322*	-0.361*	-0.364*	
	(1.801)			(2.594)	(1.935)	(2.073)	(1.680)	(1.869)	(1.893)	
Age OS miss	2.150***			1.544**	2.150*	2.150*	2.301***	2.179***	2.115***	
	(3.134)			(2.424)	(1.947)	(2.102)	(3.361)	(3.168)	(3.090)	
Gender orig squatter	0.321*			0.256	0.321*	0.321	0.329*	0.316	0.319*	
	(1.660)			(1.564)	(1.774)	(1.560)	(1.708)	(1.630)	(1.654)	
Argentine orig squatter	-0.712			-0.526	-0.712	-0.712	-0.733	-0.762	-0.751	
	(1.488)			(1.262)	(1.484)	(1.361)	(1.541)	(1.586)	(1.573)	
Education years orig squatter	-0.097*			-0.092**	-0.097**	-0.097	-0.094*	-0.097*	-0.100*	
	(1.781)			(2.086)	(2.077)	(1.660)	(1.722)	(1.763)	(1.837)	
Argentine orig squatter father	0.974**			0.857**	0.974*	0.974*	1.047***	1.002***	0.998***	
	(2.542)			(2.433)	(1.912)	(1.835)	(2.740)	(2.608)	(2.611)	
Argentina father OS miss	-1.417			-1.502	-1.417	-1.417	-1.453	-1.466	-1.451	
	(0.691)			(0.848)	(1.345)	(1.354)	(0.713)	(0.713)	(0.710)	
Educ years orig squatter father	-0.057			-0.068	-0.057	-0.057	-0.065 $$	-0.066	-0.055 $$	
	(0.653)			(0.932)	(0.506)	(0.625) $$	(0.741)	(0.752)	(0.625)	
Education of the father miss	-6.109***			-1.653	-6.109***	-6.109***	-6.159***	-6.291***	-6.219***	
	(2.922)			(1.329)	(5.371)	(5.147)	(2.963)	(2.998)	(2.982)	
Argentine orig squatter mother	-0.371			-0.313	-0.371	-0.371	-0.374	-0.351	-0.405 $$	
	(0.963)			(0.878)	(0.835)	(1.056)	(0.976)	(0.908)	(1.052)	

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Educ years orig squatter mother	0.028			-0.020	0.028	0.028	0.041	0.034	0.023	
	(0.304)			(0.242)	(0.286)	(0.341)	(0.446)	(0.366)	(0.252)	
Education of the mother miss	6.869***			2.272*	6.869***	6.869***	6.877***	6.961***	6.953***	
	(4.105)			(1.817)	(15.990)	(16.139)	(4.134)	(4.150)	(4.166)	
Constant	2.565*** $$	1.250***	1.634***	2.547***	2.565*** $$	2.565*** $$	2.868***	2.788***	2.770***	
	(3.423)	(8.659)	(3.048)	(4.206)	(3.730)	(5.052)	(3.767)	(3.665) $$	(3.659)	
F-stat									2.808*	
Observations	313	313	313	425	313	313	313	313	313	290
R-squared	0.172	0.024	0.029	0.109	0.172	0.172	0.181	0.169	0.180	

Note: t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; shaded cells (number of observations) were not present in the original published tables; $$ refers to rounding inconsistencies to the nearest one hundredth.

Table 27: Galiani and Schargrodsky 'Table A.10: Number of offspring of the household head 5–13 years old'

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
1: has property right; 0: doesn't have property right	-0.169	-0.219	-0.232	-0.212*	-0.169	-0.169		-0.122		-0.121		
	(1.181)	(1.512)	(1.556)	(1.661)	(1.229)	(0.989)		(0.725)$^{\$\$}$		(0.748)		
Property offer							-0.112					
							(0.724)					
Property right early									-0.378*		-0.383*	
									(1.882)		(1.771)	
Property right late									-0.059			-0.079
									(0.366)			(0.460)
Parcel surface	0.000		0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000			
	(0.141)		(0.239)	(0.207)	(0.142)	(0.139)	(0.101)	(0.172)	(0.185)$^{\$\$}$			
Distance to creek	0.008		-0.040	0.043	0.008	0.008	0.010	0.013	0.043			
	(0.102)		(0.493)	(0.857)	(0.106)	(0.155)	(0.120)	(0.163)	(0.528)			
Block corner	-0.012		-0.015$^{\$\$}$	-0.071	-0.012	-0.012	-0.024	-0.007	-0.013			
	(0.056)		(0.069)	(0.387)	(0.061)	(0.059)	(0.116)	(0.031)	(0.064)			
Dist to non squatted	0.030		0.002	0.068	0.030	0.030	0.031	0.031	0.030			
	(0.419)		(0.025)	(1.070)	(0.464)	(0.370)	(0.431)	(0.421)	(0.415)			
Age of orig squatter dummy	0.932***			0.763***	0.932***	0.932***	0.940***	0.935***$^{\$\$}$	0.943***			
	(6.481)			(6.276)	(5.945)	(13.017)	(6.543)	(6.497)	(6.564)			
Age OS miss	-0.245			-0.078	-0.245	-0.245*	-0.235	-0.252	-0.222			
	(0.480)			(0.164)	(1.068)	(1.769)	(0.458)	(0.492)	(0.435)			
Gender orig squatter	-0.148			-0.023	-0.148	-0.148	-0.145	-0.147	-0.147			
	(1.027)			(0.192)	(1.013)	(1.003)	(1.006)	(1.019)	(1.020)			
Argentine orig squatter	0.256			0.213	0.256	0.256	0.271	0.267	0.282			
	(0.719)			(0.688)	(0.709)	(0.784)	(0.760)	(0.749)	(0.792)			
Education years orig squatter	-0.014			-0.006	-0.014	-0.014	-0.014	-0.015$^{\$\$}$	-0.013			
	(0.352)			(0.171)	(0.358)	(0.462)	(0.346)	(0.356)	(0.307)			
Argentine orig squatter father	-0.294			-0.149	-0.294	-0.294	-0.294	-0.300	-0.309			
	(1.029)			(0.569)	(0.936)	(1.000)	(1.024)	(1.050)	(1.086)			
Argentina father OS miss	0.841			-0.288	0.841	0.841*	0.854	0.852	0.864			
	(0.550)			(0.219)	(1.543)	(1.894)	(0.558)	(0.557)	(0.566)			
Educ years orig squatter father	-0.130**			-0.128**	-0.130**	-0.130***	-0.128*	-0.128*	-0.132**			
	(1.988)			(2.357)	(2.183)	(3.068)	(1.950)	(1.955)$^{\$\$}$	(2.018)			
Education of the father miss	-1.789			-0.431	-1.789***	-1.789***	-1.731	-1.749	-1.717			
	(1.148)			(0.468)	(3.204)	(3.795)	(1.110)	(1.121)	(1.103)			
Argentine orig squatter mother	-0.224			-0.295$^{\$\$}$	-0.224	-0.224	-0.232	-0.229	-0.202			
	(0.781)			(1.116)	(0.611)	(1.555)	(0.807)	(0.796)	(0.704)			
	0.049			0.046	0.049	0.049	0.048	0.047	0.052			

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Educ years orig squatter mother	(0.705) $$			(0.735)	(0.636)	(0.527)	(0.698)	(0.686)	(0.753)			
Education of the mother missing	-0.115			-0.596	-0.115	-0.115	-0.147	-0.135	-0.170			
	(0.092)			(0.643)	(0.355)	(0.335)	(0.118)	(0.109)	(0.137)			
Constant	1.166**	1.057***	1.068***	1.125**$$	1.166**	1.166***	1.127**$$	1.116**	1.030*			
	(2.087)	(9.816)	(2.665)$$	(2.506)	(2.121)	(3.654)	(1.973)	(1.973)	(1.825) $$			
F-stat									2.194			
Observations	313	313	313	425	313	313	313	313	313	290	145	217
R-squared	0.160	0.007	0.008	0.117	0.160	0.160	0.158	0.160	0.166			

Note: t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; shaded cells (number of observations) were not present in the original published tables; $$ refers to rounding inconsistencies to the nearest one hundredth.

Table 28: Galiani and Schargrodsky 'Table A.11: Number of offspring of the household head 0–4 years old'

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
1: has property right; 0: doesn't have property right	-0.070	-0.068	-0.068	-0.066	-0.070	-0.070*		-0.003		-0.057		
	(1.030)	(1.051)	(1.014)	(1.087)	(0.914)	(1.804)		(0.042)		(0.711)		
Property offer							-0.003					
							(0.042)					
Property right early									-0.077		-0.046	
									(0.810)		(0.417)	
Property right late									-0.066			-0.041
									(0.861)			(0.493)
Parcel surface	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000			
	(0.784)		(0.927)	(0.233)	(0.670)	(0.851)	(0.857)	(0.874)	(0.786)			
Distance to creek	-0.008		0.002	0.017	-0.008	-0.008	-0.001	-0.001	-0.006			
	(0.209)		(0.042)	(0.682)	(0.202)	(0.307)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.168)			
Block corner	-0.031		0.003	-0.004	-0.031	-0.031	-0.024	-0.024	-0.031			
	(0.318)		(0.036)	(0.046)	(0.366)	(0.306)	(0.245)[$$]	(0.244)	(0.318)			
Dist to non squatted	0.025		0.032	0.030	0.025	0.025	0.026	0.026	0.025			
	(0.736)		(0.960)	(0.991)	(0.747)	(0.640)	(0.743)	(0.742)	(0.734)			
Age of orig squatter dummy	0.152**			0.151***	0.152**	0.152***	0.156**	0.156**	0.152**			
	(2.225)			(2.600)	(2.116)	(4.652)	(2.291)	(2.284)	(2.224)			
Age OS miss	0.708***			1.001***	0.708**	0.708**	0.699***	0.699***	0.709***			
	(2.919)			(4.427)	(2.372)	(2.790)	(2.870)	(2.877)	(2.916)			
Gender orig squatter	0.037			0.099*	0.037	0.037	0.039	0.039	0.037			
	(0.545)			(1.696)	(0.577)	(0.804)	(0.568)	(0.567)	(0.545)			
Argentine orig squatter	-0.278			-0.288*	-0.278*	-0.278***	-0.263	-0.263	-0.277			
	(1.646)			(1.943)	(1.852)	(4.871)	(1.551)	(1.549)	(1.636)			
Education years orig squatter	0.010			-0.016	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010			
	(0.512)			(1.011)	(0.588)	(0.662)	(0.499)	(0.499)	(0.515)[$$]			
Argentine orig squatter father	0.109			0.101	0.109	0.109	0.101	0.101	0.109			
	(0.809)			(0.806)	(1.091)	(1.380)	(0.742)	(0.743)	(0.803)			
Argentina father OS miss	0.666			0.646	0.666***	0.666***	0.681	0.681	0.667			
	(0.919)			(1.027)	(3.466)	(6.744)	(0.938)	(0.939)	(0.919)			
Educ years orig squatter father	-0.002			-0.000	-0.002	-0.002	0.001	0.001	-0.002			
	(0.048)			(0.011)	(0.055)[$$]	(0.111)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.050)			
Education of the father miss	0.058			0.476	0.058	0.058	0.115	0.114	0.061			
	(0.079)			(1.079)	(0.276)	(0.308)	(0.155)	(0.154)	(0.082)			
Argentine orig squatter mother	0.021			0.034	0.021	0.021	0.015[$$]	0.015	0.022			
	(0.157)			(0.271)	(0.195)	(0.342)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.162)			
Educ years orig squatter mother	-0.029			-0.005	-0.029	-0.029	-0.031	-0.031	-0.029			
	(0.887)			(0.170)	(0.905)	(0.951)	(0.937)	(0.939)	(0.881)			

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Education of the mother miss	-0.311			-0.610	-0.311*	-0.311**	-0.340	-0.340	-0.313			
	(0.527)			(1.374)	(1.969)	(2.272)	(0.575)	(0.574)	(0.529)			
Constant	0.317	0.329***	0.150	0.355*$$	0.317	0.317	0.248	0.248	0.312			
	(1.196)	(6.783)	(0.836)	(1.650)	(1.091)	(1.634)	(0.915) $$	(0.921)	(1.161)			
F-stat									0.012			
Observations	313	313	313	425	313	313	313	313	313	290	145	217
R-squared	0.063	0.004	0.010	0.079	0.063	0.063	0.059	0.060	0.063			

Note: t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; shaded cells (number of observations) were not present in the original published tables; $$ refers to rounding inconsistencies to the nearest one hundredth.

Table 29: Galiani and Schargrodsky 'Table A.12: School achievement (offspring of the household head 6–20 years old)'

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
1: has property right; 0: doesn't have property right	0.222	0.177	0.251	0.222	0.222	0.222		0.445*$$		0.081		
	(1.151)	(0.984)	(1.310)	(1.039)	(1.154)	(0.823)		(1.804)		(0.336) $$		
Property offer							0.405*$$					
							(1.812)					
Household received property rights in 1989-91									0.685**		1.192***	
									(2.293)		(2.770)	
Household received property rights in 1998									0.027			-0.171
									(0.125)			(0.543)
Parcel surface	-0.001		-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001			
	(0.693)		(0.344)	(0.624)	(0.620)	(0.728)	(0.255) $$	(0.556)	(0.787)			
Distance to creek	0.121		0.126	0.121	0.121	0.121	0.167	0.145$$	0.066			
	(1.112)		(1.180)	(0.980)	(1.059)	(1.142)	(1.476)	(1.312)	(0.587)			
Block corner	-0.520*		-0.295$$	-0.520	-0.520	-0.520*	-0.379	-0.471	-0.485*			
	(1.816)		(1.094)	(1.486)	(1.555) $$	(1.826)	(1.258)	(1.630)	(1.696)			
Dist to non squatted	-0.119		-0.077	-0.119	-0.119	-0.119	-0.133	-0.137	-0.104			
	(1.081)		(0.706)	(0.968)	(0.925) $$	(1.101)	(1.212)	(1.240)	(0.952)			
Male	-0.243	-0.250	-0.231	-0.243	-0.243	-0.243	-0.224	-0.246	-0.235			
	(1.349)	(1.374)	(1.263)	(1.391)	(1.386)	(1.592)	(1.244)	(1.365) $$	(1.311)			
The child's age when surveyed	-0.345***	-0.341***	-0.342***	-0.345***	-0.345***	-0.345***	-0.345***$$	-0.346***	-0.343***			
	(16.309)	(15.721)	(15.766)	(14.100)	(12.573)	(9.892)	(16.335)	(16.313)	(16.210)			
Age of orig squatter dummy	-0.136			-0.136	-0.136	-0.136	-0.130	-0.121	-0.159			
	(0.664)			(0.574)	(0.620)	(0.711)	(0.640)	(0.593)	(0.783)			
Age OS miss	-0.905			-0.905	-0.905	-0.905	-0.960	-0.956	-0.903			
	(1.035)			(1.558)	(1.524)	(1.513)	(1.099)	(1.090)	(1.036)			
Gender orig squatter	-0.470**			-0.470**	-0.470**	-0.470**	-0.462**	-0.448**	-0.499***			
	(2.506)			(2.235) $$	(2.352)	(2.910)	(2.471)	(2.377)	(2.661)			
Argentine orig squatter	0.662			0.662	0.662	0.662**	0.755$$	0.730	0.540			
	(1.191)			(1.190)	(1.305)	(2.520)	(1.351)	(1.306)	(0.968)			
Education years orig squatter	0.168***			0.168**	0.168**	0.168***	0.163***	0.161***	0.166***			
	(2.956)			(2.549)	(2.387)	(2.995)	(2.887)	(2.824)	(2.932)			
Argentine orig squatter father	-1.291***			-1.291***	-1.291***	-1.291***	-1.410***	-1.369***	-1.203***			
	(3.149)			(3.505)	(3.630)	(4.920)	(3.375)	(3.307)	(2.929)			
Argentina father OS miss	0.000			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000			
	(.)			(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)			
Educ years orig squatter father	0.063			0.063	0.063	0.063	0.066	0.066	0.066			
	(0.718)			(0.737)	(0.715) $$	(0.696)	(0.747)	(0.745) $$	(0.755)			

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Education of the father miss	0.000			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000			
	(.)			(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)			
Argentine orig squatter mother	0.164			0.164	0.164	0.164	0.152	0.192	0.083			
	(0.462)			(0.406)	(0.471)	(0.439)	(0.428)	(0.537)	(0.232)			
Educ years orig squatter mother	0.007			0.007	0.007	0.007	-0.001	0.014	-0.007			
	(0.076)			(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.074)	(0.015) $$	(0.145) $$	(0.076)			
Education of the mother miss	2.243			2.243***	2.243***	2.243***	2.201	2.172	2.314*			
	(1.642)			(4.584)	(4.698)	(6.437)	(1.615)	(1.587)	(1.700)			
Constant	2.639***	2.961***	3.022***	2.639***	2.639***	2.639***	2.354***	2.448***	2.913***			
	(3.128)	(8.931)	(5.098)	(3.008)	(3.237)	(3.980)	(2.719)	(2.863)	(3.422)			
F-stat									4.093**			
Observations	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	382	165	292
R-squared	0.435	0.374	0.381	0.435	0.435	0.435	0.437	0.433	0.440			

Note: t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; shaded cells (number of observations) were not present in the original published tables; $$ refers to rounding inconsistencies to the nearest one hundredth.

Table 30: Galiani and Schargrodsky 'Table A.13: Primary school completion (offspring of the household head 13–20 years old)'

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(11) corrected	(12)
1: has property right; 0: doesn't have property right	0.021	0.015$^{\$\$}$	0.029	0.021	0.021	0.021		0.065$^{\$\$}$		-0.008			
	(0.453)	(0.344)	(0.640)	(0.436)	(0.418)	(0.633)		(1.123)		(0.158) $^{\$\$}$			
Property offer							0.058						
							(1.127)						
Household received property rights in 1989–91									0.009		0.004	-0.023	
									(0.122)		(0.039) $^{\$\$}$	(0.213)	
Household received property rights in 1998									0.025$^{\$\$}$				0.040
									(0.490)				(0.611)
Parcel surface	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000				
	(0.396)		(0.406)	(0.404)	(0.404)	(0.436)	(0.641)	(0.511)	(0.405)				
Distance to creek	0.009		-0.006	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.015	0.013	0.010				
	(0.356)		(0.263)	(0.324)	(0.364)	(0.386)	(0.600)	(0.515)	(0.395)				
Block corner	-0.051		0.007	-0.051	-0.051	-0.051	-0.031	-0.043	-0.051				
	(0.740)		(0.105)	(0.742)	(0.805) $^{\$\$}$	(1.440)	(0.442)	(0.626)	(0.742)				
Dist to non squatted	-0.031		-0.033	-0.031	-0.031	-0.031*	-0.035$^{\$\$}$	-0.035$^{\$\$}$	-0.031				
	(1.174)		(1.256)	(1.187)	(1.458)	(1.892)	(1.315) $^{\$\$}$	(1.316)	(1.171)				
Male	-0.023	-0.008	-0.011	-0.023	-0.023	-0.023	-0.019	-0.022	-0.023				
	(0.525) $^{\$\$}$	(0.179)	(0.258)	(0.590)	(0.651)	(0.584)	(0.441)	(0.507)	(0.536)				
The child's age when surveyed	0.053***	0.051***	0.051***	0.053***	0.053***	0.053***	0.053***	0.053***	0.053***				
	(5.504)	(5.264)	(5.269)	(4.724)	(4.446)	(6.192)	(5.546)	(5.494)	(5.498)				
Age of orig squatter dummy	0.053			0.053	0.053	0.053	0.054	0.056	0.053				
	(1.065)			(0.998)	(0.989)	(1.158)	(1.103)	(1.124)	(1.074)				
Age OS miss	-0.363			-0.363	-0.363	-0.363	-0.364	-0.359	-0.365				
	(1.622)			(1.415)	(1.377)	(1.474)	(1.627)	(1.600)	(1.626)				
Gender orig squatter	-0.105**			-0.105**	-0.105**	-0.105**	-0.103**	-0.100**	-0.105**$^{\$\$}$				
	(2.312)			(2.026)	(2.091)	(2.300)	(2.282)	(2.189)	(2.290)				
Argentine orig squatter	-0.049			-0.049	-0.049	-0.049	-0.033	-0.036	-0.046				
	(0.359)			(0.480)	(0.588)	(0.813)	(0.246)	(0.263)	(0.341)				
Education years orig squatter	0.032**			0.032**	0.032**	0.032*	0.032**	0.032**	0.032**				
	(2.464)			(2.470)	(2.525) $^{\$\$}$	(2.008)	(2.431)	(2.416)	(2.448)				
Argentine orig squatter father	-0.083			-0.083	-0.083	-0.083	-0.103	-0.097	-0.085				
	(0.869)			(1.135) $^{\$\$}$	(1.165)	(1.511)	(1.062)	(1.007)	(0.884)				

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(11) corrected	(12)
Argentina father OS miss	0.000			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000				
	(.)			(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)				
Educ years orig squatter father	0.049**			0.049***	0.049***	0.049***	0.049**	0.049**	0.049**				
	(2.354)			(3.070)	(3.644)	(4.791)	(2.371)	(2.369)	(2.341)				
Education of the father miss	0.000			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000				
	(.)			(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)				
Argentine orig squatter mother	-0.069			-0.069	-0.069	-0.069	-0.069	-0.065$^{\$\$}$	-0.067				
	(0.852)			(0.823)	(0.871)	(0.957)	(0.850)	(0.796)	(0.826)				
Educ years orig squatter mother	-0.022			-0.022	-0.022	-0.022	-0.023	-0.022	-0.022				
	(0.989)			(1.074)	(1.100)	(1.366)	(1.035) $^{\$\$}$	(0.959)	(0.968)				
Education of the mother miss	0.416			0.416***	0.416***	0.416***	0.407	0.399	0.415				
	(1.518)			(3.260)	(3.211)	(4.043)	(1.485)	(1.451)	(1.512)				
Constant	-0.178	-0.035$^{\$\$}$	-0.009	-0.178	-0.178	-0.178	-0.229	-0.219	-0.185				
	(0.751)	(0.210)	(0.044)	(0.676)	(0.710)	(0.849)	(0.950)	(0.911)	(0.770)				
F-stat									0.037				
Observations	290	290	290	290	290	290	290	290	290	250	100	91	195
R-squared	0.198	0.089	0.095	0.198	0.198	0.198	0.201	0.195	0.198				

Note: t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; shaded cells (number of observations) were not present in the original published tables; $$ refers to rounding inconsistencies to the nearest one hundredth.

Table 31: Galiani and Schargrodsky 'Table A.14: Secondary school completion (offspring of the household head 18–20 years old)'

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
1: has property right; 0: doesn't have property right	0.064 (0.724)	0.098 (1.216)	0.094 (1.090)	0.064 (0.676)	0.064 (0.596)	0.064 (0.527)		0.097 (0.868)		0.181** (2.191)		
Property offer							0.086 (0.869)					
Household received property rights in 1989–91									0.270* (1.927)		0.598***$$ (3.160)	
Household received property rights in 1998									-0.011 (0.119)			0.063 (0.638) $$
Parcel surface	0.000 (0.295)		0.000 (0.445)	0.000 (0.296)	0.000 (0.301)	0.000 (0.503)	0.000 (0.436)	0.000 (0.389)	0.000 (0.085) $$			
Distance to creek	0.050 (1.037)		0.073 (1.599)	0.050 (0.951)	0.050 (0.832)	0.050 (0.618)	0.057 (1.145)	0.053 (1.096)	0.024 (0.491)			
Block corner	-0.215 (1.505) $$		-0.211 (1.581)	-0.215** (2.068)	-0.215** (2.227)	-0.215* (2.113)	-0.194 (1.315) $$	-0.206 (1.428)	-0.218 (1.543)			
Dist to non squatted	0.059 (1.143)		0.070 (1.427)	0.059 (1.029)	0.059 (0.863)	0.059 (1.308)	0.056 (1.095) $$	0.055 (1.073)	0.061 (1.202)			
Male	0.036 (0.422)	-0.014 (0.171)	-0.015$$ (0.184)	0.036 (0.441)	0.036 (0.410)	0.036 (0.791)	0.041 (0.485)	0.036 (0.424)	0.046 (0.547)			
The child's age when surveyed	0.151*** (2.758)	0.151*** (2.716)	0.154*** (2.818)	0.151*** (2.933)	0.151*** (2.949)	0.151*** (5.718)	0.152*** (2.772)	0.153*** (2.779)	0.138** (2.533)			
Age of orig squatter dummy	-0.083 (0.905)			-0.083 (0.888)	-0.083 (0.882)	-0.083 (1.546)	-0.084 (0.920)	-0.077 (0.827)	-0.078 (0.852)			
Age OS miss	0.000 (.)			0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)			
Gender orig squatter	-0.109 (1.289)			-0.109 (1.246)	-0.109 (1.318)	-0.109* (2.018)	-0.109 (1.288)	-0.105 (1.235) $$	-0.110 (1.305)			
Argentine orig squatter	0.487* (1.744)			0.487** (2.567)	0.487** (2.586)	0.487** (3.005)	0.497* (1.775)	0.493* (1.762)	0.394 (1.403)			
Education years orig squatter	0.041 (1.533)			0.041 (1.439)	0.041 (1.603)	0.041** (2.767)	0.040 (1.523)	0.040 (1.520)	0.041 (1.574)			
Argentine orig squatter father	-0.389* (1.912)			-0.389*** (4.175) $$	-0.389*** (4.695)	-0.389*** (4.868)	-0.397* (1.946)	-0.394* (1.931)	-0.295$$ (1.421)			
Argentina father OS miss	0.000 (.)			0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)			
Educ years orig squatter father	-0.006 (0.153)			-0.006 (0.190)	-0.006 (0.180)	-0.006 (0.189)	-0.004 (0.118)	-0.004 (0.117)	-0.005 (0.143)			
Education of the father miss	0.000 (.)			0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)			

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Argentine orig squatter	0.221			0.221**	0.221*	0.221**	0.211	0.222	0.182			
mother	(1.256)			(2.152)	(1.995) $$	(2.597)	(1.198)	(1.260)	(1.039)			
Educ years orig squatter	-0.043			-0.043	-0.043	-0.043	-0.046	-0.044	-0.043			
mother	(1.044)			(1.031)	(1.042)	(1.284)	(1.107)	(1.061)	(1.048)			
Education of the mother	0.000			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000			
miss	(.)			(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)			
Constant	-3.063***	-2.600**	-2.965***	-3.063***	-3.063***	-3.063***	-3.118***	-3.135***$$	-2.716**			
	(2.745)	(2.460)	(2.762)	(2.943)	(3.151)	(5.377)	(2.783)	(2.783)	(2.429)			
F-stat									3.523*			
Observations	126	126	126	126	126	126	126	126	126	109	38	81
R-squared	0.214	0.066	0.128	0.214	0.214	0.214	0.216	0.213	0.239			

Note: t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; shaded cells (number of observations) were not present in the original published tables; $$ refers to rounding inconsistencies to the nearest one hundredth.

Table 32: Galiani and Schargrodsky 'Table A.15: Post-secondary education (offspring of the household head 18–20 years old)'

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
1: has property right; 0: doesn't have property right	0.109*	0.092*	0.094*	0.109*	0.109	0.109*		0.104		0.110**		
	(1.905)	(1.763)	(1.672)	(1.870)	(1.448)	(1.940)		(1.441)		(2.448) $^{\$\$}$		
Property offer							0.093					
							(1.431)					
Household received property rights in 1989–91									0.205**$^{\$\$}$		0.277*$^{\$\$}$	
									(2.227)		(1.673)	
Household received property rights in 1998									0.074			0.080*
									(1.182)			(1.948) $^{\$\$}$
Parcel surface	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000			
	(0.872)		(0.466)	(0.890)	(1.053)	(1.426)	(0.899)	(0.833)	(0.720)			
Distance to creek	0.051		0.051*	0.051	0.051	0.051**	0.054*	0.050	0.039			
	(1.625)		(1.701)	(1.620)	(1.596)	(2.319)	(1.666)	(1.594)	(1.201)			
Block corner	-0.057		-0.062	-0.057	-0.057	-0.057	-0.045	-0.058	-0.058			
	(0.614)		(0.718)	(1.018)	(1.017)	(1.048)	(0.468)	(0.622)	(0.632)			
Dist to non squatted	0.045$^{\$\$}$		0.048	0.045$^{\$\$}$	0.045$^{\$\$}$	0.045*$^{\$\$}$	0.046	0.045	0.046			
	(1.339)		(1.485)	(1.492)	(1.669)	(1.984)	(1.363)	(1.341)	(1.376)			
Male	0.053	0.045$^{\$\$}$	0.042	0.053	0.053	0.053*	0.059	0.053	0.058			
	(0.978)	(0.858)	(0.805)	(1.009)	(0.945)	(1.936)	(1.071)	(0.978)	(1.065)			
The child's age when surveyed	0.059	0.049	0.051	0.059**	0.059*	0.059**	0.058	0.058	0.053			
	(1.647)	(1.381)	(1.447)	(2.114)	(1.851)	(2.419)	(1.605) $^{\$\$}$	(1.638)	(1.474)			
Age of orig squatter dummy	-0.006			-0.006	-0.006	-0.006	-0.015$^{\$\$}$	-0.007	-0.003$^{£}$			
	(0.102)			(0.090)	(0.098)	(0.094)	(0.244)	(0.115) $^{\$\$}$	(0.058)			
Age OS missing	0.000			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000			
	(.)			(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)			
Gender orig squatter	-0.007			-0.007	-0.007	-0.007	-0.011	-0.007	-0.007			
	(0.126)			(0.138)	(0.148)	(0.145)	(0.206)	(0.135) $^{\$\$}$	(0.128)			
Argentine orig squatter	0.100			0.100	0.100	0.100	0.103	0.099	0.057			
	(0.551)			(0.502)	(0.650)	(1.487)	(0.561)	(0.546)	(0.309)			
Education years orig squatter	-0.010			-0.010	-0.010	-0.010	-0.010	-0.010	-0.009			
	(0.560)			(0.610)	(0.574)	(1.000)	(0.552)	(0.558)	(0.546)			
Argentine orig squatter father	-0.340**			-0.340*	-0.340**	-0.340***	-0.343**	-0.339**	-0.296**			
	(2.572)			(1.931)	(2.128)	(7.870)	(2.567)	(2.565) $^{\$\$}$	(2.182)			
Argentina father OS miss	0.000			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000			
	(.)			(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)			

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Educ years orig squatter father	0.044*			0.044	0.044	0.044	0.044*	0.044*	0.044*			
	(1.823)			(1.479)	(1.241)	(1.333)	(1.796)	(1.811)	(1.837)			
Education of the father miss	0.000			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000			
	(.)			(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)			
Argentine orig squatter mother	0.143			0.143	0.143	0.143**	0.131	0.143	0.125			
	(1.251)			(1.594)	(1.649)	(2.574)	(1.137)	(1.250)	(1.089)			
Educ years orig squatter mother	-0.030			-0.030	-0.030	-0.030*	-0.032	-0.030	-0.030			
	(1.115)			(1.306)	(1.253)	(2.049)	(1.180)	(1.111)	(1.113)			
Education of the mother miss	0.000			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000			
	(.)			(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)			
Constant	-1.275*	-0.912	-1.169*	-1.275**	-1.275*	-1.275**	-1.248*	-1.266*	-1.115[$$]			
	(1.759)	(1.345)[$$]	(1.677)	(2.215)[$$]	(1.817)	(2.425)[$$]	(1.700)	(1.731)	(1.521)			
F-stat									1.764			
Observations	126	126	126	126	126	126	126	126	126	109	38	81
R-squared	0.177	0.045	0.089	0.177	0.177	0.177	0.165	0.177	0.190			

Note: t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; shaded cells (number of observations) were not present in the original published tables; $$ refers to rounding inconsistencies to the nearest one hundredth; £ refers to misreported negative value.

Table 33: Galiani and Schargrodsky 'Table A.16: Access to credit'

VARIABLES	(1) Credit card or bank account dummy	(2) Credit card or bank account dummy	(3) Non-mortgage loan dummy	(4) Non-mortgage loan dummy	(5) Informal credit dummy	(6) Informal credit dummy	(7) Grocery store credit dummy	(8) Grocery store credit dummy	(9) Mortgage loan dummy	(10) Mortgage loan dummy
1: has property right; 0: doesn't have property right	-0.015$^{\$\$}$		0.007		-0.058		0.008		0.015	
	(0.714)		(0.194)		(1.001)		(0.155)		(1.577)	
Household received property rights in 1989–91		-0.012		0.012		-0.040		0.023		0.043***
		(0.410)		(0.235)		(0.495)		(0.307)		(3.195) $^{\$\$}$
Household received property rights in 1998		-0.016		0.004		-0.068		0.000		0.001
		(0.698)		(0.108)		(1.029)		(0.008)		(0.061)
Parcel surface in squared metres	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(1.243)	(1.237)	(0.495)	(0.498)	(1.103)	(1.108)	(0.639)	(0.646)	(0.383)	(0.299)
Distance (in blocks) to creek	0.022*	0.022*	-0.014	-0.015$^{\$\$}$	-0.031	-0.034	-0.008	-0.011	0.002	-0.003
	(1.950)	(1.821)	(0.709)	(0.718)	(0.984)	(1.031)	(0.287)	(0.356)	(0.344)	(0.513)
0: parcel is not in the block corner; 1: otherwise	-0.002	-0.002	-0.055$^{\$\$}$	-0.055$^{\$\$}$	-0.132	-0.132	0.023	0.023	0.019	0.019
	(0.072)	(0.071)	(1.060)	(1.057)	(1.598)	(1.593)	(0.298)	(0.298)	(1.373)	(1.407)
Distance to non-squatted block (in blocks)	0.002	0.002	-0.030	-0.030	-0.002	-0.002	-0.033	-0.033	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.192)	(0.193)	(1.624)	(1.621)	(0.073)	(0.062)	(1.221)	(1.217)	(0.440)	(0.431)
Age of the original squatter dummy: below 50 = 1; else = 0	0.011	0.011	0.024	0.023	0.097*	0.096	0.066	0.065$^{\$\$}$	-0.003	-0.005$^{\$\$}$
	(0.535) $^{\$\$}$	(0.525)	(0.656)	(0.647)	(1.654)	(1.632)	(1.243)	(1.224)	(0.338)	(0.491)
Age OS miss	-0.018	-0.018	0.062	0.062	-0.097	-0.099	-0.131	-0.132	-0.008	-0.011
	(0.243)	(0.247)	(0.487)	(0.482)	(0.475)	(0.483)	(0.696)	(0.704)	(0.238)	(0.328)
Gender of the original squatter, 0 = male, 1 = female	-0.004	-0.004	-0.048	-0.048	0.016	0.016	-0.077	-0.077	0.005	0.005$^{\$\$}$
	(0.205) $^{\$\$}$	(0.205)	(1.323)	(1.322)	(0.280)	(0.277)	(1.442)	(1.442)	(0.516)	(0.508)
Was the original squatter born in Argentina? 0 = no, 1 = yes	-0.005$^{\$\$}$	-0.005	-0.015$^{\$\$}$	-0.015	0.006	0.003	0.224*	0.222*	0.007	0.004
	(0.092)	(0.099)	(0.165)	(0.172)	(0.038)	(0.020)	(1.708)	(1.689)	(0.310)	(0.163)
Years of education of the original squatter	0.008	0.008	-0.002	-0.003	-0.017	-0.018	-0.005$^{\$\$}$	-0.005	0.002	0.002
	(1.340)	(1.332)	(0.245)	(0.249)	(1.061)	(1.066)	(0.327)	(0.335)	(0.703)	(0.622)
Was the original squatter's father born in Argentina? 0 = no, 1 = yes	-0.025$^{\$\$}$	-0.025$^{\$\$}$	-0.074	-0.074	0.145	0.147	-0.017	-0.016	-0.000	0.002
	(0.602)	(0.595) $^{\$\$}$	(1.033)	(1.026)	(1.267)	(1.279)	(0.167)	(0.156)	(0.005)	(0.097)
Argentina father OS miss	-0.029	-0.029	0.064	0.063	0.046	0.044	-0.592	-0.593	0.007	0.004
	(0.129)	(0.130)	(0.166)	(0.165)	(0.076)	(0.072)	(1.055)	(1.056)	(0.068)	(0.037)
Years of education of the original squatter's father	0.027***	0.027***	0.002	0.002	0.031	0.031	-0.017	-0.017	0.007	0.007*
	(2.820)	(2.817)	(0.140)	(0.142)	(1.187)	(1.192)	(0.724)	(0.718)	(1.649)	(1.723)
Education of the father miss	0.073	0.072	0.015	0.013	0.243	0.237	0.792	0.787	0.044	0.034
	(0.322)	(0.317)	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.391)	(0.380)	(1.385)	(1.373)	(0.417)	(0.331)
Was the original squatter's mother born in Argentina? 0 = no, 1 = yes	0.032	0.032	0.098	0.098	-0.019	-0.021	-0.003	-0.004	0.005$^{\$\$}$	0.002
	(0.769)	(0.759)	(1.342)	(1.332)	(0.167)	(0.183)	(0.027)	(0.041)	(0.244)	(0.113)

VARIABLES	(1) Credit card or bank account dummy	(2) Credit card or bank account dummy	(3) Non-mortgage loan dummy	(4) Non-mortgage loan dummy	(5) Informal credit dummy	(6) Informal credit dummy	(7) Grocery store credit dummy	(8) Grocery store credit dummy	(9) Mortgage loan dummy	(10) Mortgage loan dummy
Years of education of the original squatter's mother	-0.018*	-0.018*	0.036**	0.036**	0.036	0.036	0.013	0.013	-0.008*	-0.008*
	(1.753)	(1.754)	(2.092)	(2.083)	(1.310)	(1.293)	(0.528)	(0.518)	(1.676)	(1.790)
Education of the mother miss	-0.052	-0.051	0.082	0.083	0.779	0.784	-0.164	-0.160	-0.043	-0.035
	(0.289)	(0.284)	(0.262)	(0.266)	(1.567)	(1.573)	(0.358)	(0.349)	(0.508)	(0.426)
Constant	-0.144*	-0.142*	0.056	0.059	0.232	0.242	0.253	0.263	-0.031	-0.013
	(1.771)	(1.723)	(0.400)	(0.417)	(1.032)	(1.066)	(1.236)	(1.263)	(0.821)	(0.351)
F-stat		0.020		0.019		0.098		0.078		8.613***
Observations	312	312	312	312	302	302	312	312	312	312
R-squared	0.074	0.074	0.048	0.048	0.077	0.078	0.065	0.065	0.030	0.058

Note: t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; shaded cells (number of observations) were not present in the original published tables; $$ refers to rounding inconsistencies to the nearest one hundredth.

Table 34: Galiani and Schargrodsky 'Table A.17: Labour market'

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Household head income		Total household income		Total household income per capita		Total household income per adult		Employed household head dummy	
1: has property right; 0: doesn't have property right	-27.346		-43.564		1.036		-4.452		0.032	
	(1.099)		(1.268)		(0.132)		(0.384)		(0.628)	
Household received property rights in 1989–91		-22.067		-32.715$^{\$\$}$		8.906		-6.890		0.046
		(0.633)		(0.687)		(0.819)		(0.428)		(0.639)
Household received property rights in 1998		-30.335		-49.846		-3.522		-3.041		0.025$^{\$\$}$
		(1.065)$^{\$\$}$		(1.267)		(0.392)		(0.229)		(0.430)
Parcel surface in squared metres	-0.101	-0.101	0.011	0.009	-0.011	-0.011	0.007	0.008	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.620)	(0.620)	(0.047)	(0.042)	(0.208)	(0.225)$^{\$\$}$	(0.099)	(0.102)	(0.936)	(0.943)
Distance (in blocks) to creek	8.248	7.454	13.693	11.985$^{\$\$}$	2.831	1.591	0.665$^{\$\$}$	1.048	-0.009	-0.011
	(0.631)	(0.548)	(0.763)	(0.640)	(0.689)	(0.372)	(0.110)	(0.166)	(0.320)	(0.385)$^{\$\$}$
0: parcel is not in the block corner; 1: otherwise	29.724	30.017	32.254	32.543	12.968	13.177	13.998	13.933	-0.106	-0.106
	(0.796)	(0.802)	(0.623)	(0.628)	(1.096)	(1.114)	(0.801)	(0.796)	(1.456)	(1.452)
Distance to non-squatted block (in blocks)	0.594	0.727	10.946	11.202	0.725$^{\$\$}$	0.910	1.290	1.232	0.057**	0.057**
	(0.048)	(0.058)	(0.645)$^{\$\$}$	(0.658)	(0.187)	(0.234)	(0.225)$^{\$\$}$	(0.214)	(2.238)	(2.233)
Age of the original squatter dummy: below 50 = 1;	17.669	17.500	-17.510	-18.206	-12.505$^{\$\$}$	-13.009	8.300	8.456	0.085*	0.084*
	(0.704)	(0.695)	(0.507)	(0.525)$^{\$\$}$	(1.582)	(1.643)	(0.711)	(0.721)	(1.677)	(1.654)
Age OS miss	71.061	71.386	74.434	74.940	-4.318	-3.950	35.231	35.117	-0.023	-0.025
	(0.814)	(0.815)	(0.612)	(0.615)	(0.155)	(0.142)	(0.858)	(0.853)	(0.128)	(0.137)
Gender of the original squatter, 0 = male	-50.455**$^{\$\$}$	-50.210**	-62.866*	-62.539*	-8.493	-8.256	-14.472	-14.545$^{\$\$}$	-0.100*	-0.100*
	(2.006)	(1.990)	(1.796)	(1.783)	(1.061)	(1.032)	(1.224)	(1.228)	(1.960)	(1.961)
Was the original squatter born in Argentina? 1 = yes	-15.099	-15.667	18.432	17.405$^{\$\$}$	29.029	28.283	39.149	39.380	-0.046	-0.048
	(0.251)	(0.259)	(0.220)	(0.207)	(1.514)	(1.475)$^{\$\$}$	(1.382)	(1.387)	(0.367)	(0.380)
Years of education of the original squatter	3.203	3.140	9.522	9.437	5.287**	5.225**	4.133	4.152	0.008	0.008
	(0.460)	(0.450)	(0.989)	(0.978)	(2.403)	(2.374)	(1.272)	(1.274)	(0.590)	(0.579)
Original squatter's father born in Argentina dummy	-20.683	-20.473	-9.097	-8.619	-20.627	-20.280	-40.661*	-40.769*	0.067	0.068
	(0.442)	(0.437)	(0.139)	(0.132)	(1.383)	(1.360)	(1.845)	(1.846)	(0.668)	(0.677)
Argentina father OS miss	299.049	297.525	603.846	600.963	162.916*	160.825*	222.771*	223.419*	1.008*	1.006*
	(1.094)	(1.086)	(1.585)	(1.574)	(1.870)	(1.846)	(1.731)	(1.732)	(1.873)	(1.867)
Years of education of the original squatter's father	4.361	4.398	23.449	23.511	2.884	2.930	-1.345	-1.359	0.011	0.011
	(0.408)	(0.410)	(1.452)	(1.453)	(0.781)	(0.794)	(0.247)	(0.249)	(0.485)$^{\$\$}$	(0.489)
Education of the father miss	-441.444	-442.776	-667.470*	-670.617*	-69.360	-71.643	-111.370	-110.663	-0.975*	-0.980*
	(1.591)	(1.592)	(1.720)	(1.724)	(0.782)	(0.807)	(0.850)	(0.842)	(1.777)	(1.782)
Original squatter's mother born in Argentina? 0 = no, 1 = yes	20.286	19.777	-69.835	-71.007	-3.348	-4.198	3.875$^{\$\$}$	4.138	0.005$^{\$\$}$	0.003
	(0.441)	(0.428)	(1.089)	(1.104)	(0.228)	(0.286)	(0.179)	(0.190)	(0.046)	(0.032)
Years of education of the original squatter's mother	-10.693	-10.805$^{\$\$}$	-2.671	-2.880	-4.093	-4.245$^{\$\$}$	-2.352	-2.305	-0.010	-0.010
	(0.921)	(0.927)	(0.163)	(0.175)$^{\$\$}$	(1.090)	(1.130)	(0.424)	(0.414)	(0.399)	(0.406)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Household head income		Total household income		Total household income per capita		Total household income per adult		Employed household head dummy	
Education of the mother miss	119.430	120.857	299.508	302.539	-33.604	-31.405	-47.592	-48.273	0.271	0.274
	(0.614)	(0.619)	(1.102)	(1.111)	(0.541)	(0.505)	(0.519)	(0.525)	(0.617)	(0.624)
Constant	313.472***	316.340***	246.893*	253.166*	44.438	48.988	97.590**	96.181**	0.675***$$	0.684***
	(3.338)	(3.329)	(1.880)	(1.904)	(1.480)	(1.615) $$	(2.200)	(2.141)	(3.412)	(3.405)
F-stat		0.047		0.108		1.095		0.048		0.075$$
Observations	251	251	255	255	255	255	255	255	310	310
R-squared	0.054	0.054	0.072	0.073	0.072	0.076	0.052	0.052	0.078	0.078

Note: t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; shaded cells (number of observations) were not present in the original published tables; $$ refers to rounding inconsistencies to the nearest one hundredth.

Table 35: Alternative 'Table A.17' Labour market (logged)'

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Logged household head income		Logged total household income		Logged total household income per capita		Logged total household income per adult		Logged employed household head dummy	
1: has property right; 0: doesn't have property right	0.142		0.088		0.170		0.134		0.032	
	(0.568)		(0.462)		(1.088)		(0.815)		(0.628)	
Household received property rights in 1989-91		0.123		0.085		0.298		0.164		0.046
		(0.354)		(0.324)		(1.375)		(0.715)		(0.639)
Household received property rights in 1998		0.152		0.089		0.096		0.117		0.025
		(0.532)		(0.410)		(0.537)		(0.622)		(0.430)
Parcel surface in squared metres	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.474)	(0.473)	(0.426)	(0.425)	(0.266)	(0.279)	(0.156)	(0.159)	(0.936)	(0.943)
Distance (in blocks) to creek	0.075	0.078	0.112	0.113	0.085	0.064	0.070	0.066	-0.009	-0.011
	(0.575)	(0.572)	(1.133)	(1.090)	(1.034)	(0.756)	(0.818)	(0.733)	(0.320)	(0.385)
0: parcel is not in the block corner; 1: otherwise	0.271	0.270	0.043	0.043	0.162	0.165	0.088	0.088	-0.106	-0.106
	(0.724)	(0.720)	(0.151)	(0.151)	(0.687)	(0.701)	(0.353)	(0.356)	(1.456)	(1.452)
Distance to non-squatted block (in blocks)	-0.009	-0.009	0.113	0.113	0.054	0.057	0.068	0.068	0.057**	0.057**
	(0.070)	(0.073)	(1.202)	(1.197)	(0.696)	(0.734)	(0.829)	(0.835)	(2.238)	(2.233)
Age of the original squatter dummy: below 50 = 1; else = 0	0.170	0.170	0.204	0.204	-0.097	-0.105	0.130	0.128	0.085*	0.084*
	(0.676)	(0.677)	(1.071)	(1.067)	(0.613)	(0.664)	(0.784)	(0.770)	(1.677)	(1.654)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Logged household head income		Logged total household income		Logged total household income per capita		Logged total household income per adult		Logged employed household head dummy	
ageOsmiss	0.646	0.645	0.568	0.568	0.218	0.224	0.497	0.498	-0.023	-0.025
	(0.740)	(0.737)	(0.846)	(0.844)	(0.393)	(0.404)	(0.852)	(0.852)	(0.128)	(0.137)
Gender of the original squatter, 0 = male, 1 = female	-0.529**	-0.530**	-0.505***	-0.505***	-0.329**	-0.325**	-0.346**	-0.345**	-0.100*	-0.100*
	(2.102)	(2.098)	(2.616)	(2.610)	(2.063)	(2.037)	(2.060)	(2.050)	(1.960)	(1.961)
Was the original squatter born in Argentina? 0 = no, 1 = yes	0.467	0.469	0.405	0.406	0.566	0.554	0.636	0.633	-0.046	-0.048
	(0.775)	(0.776)	(0.876)	(0.874)	(1.481)	(1.448)	(1.581)	(1.570)	(0.367)	(0.380)
Years of education of the original squatter	0.004	0.004	0.039	0.039	0.042	0.041	0.030	0.029	0.008	0.008
	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.725)	(0.724)	(0.964)	(0.941)	(0.642)	(0.635)	(0.590)	(0.579)
Was the original squatter_s father born in Argentina? 0 = no, 1 = yes	-0.244	-0.245	-0.140	-0.140	-0.331	-0.325	-0.360	-0.359	0.067	0.068
	(0.521)	(0.521)	(0.389)	(0.388)	(1.112)	(1.092)	(1.150)	(1.144)	(0.668)	(0.677)
argentinafatherOsmiss	6.709**	6.715**	7.186***	7.187***	5.764***	5.730***	6.133***	6.126***	1.008*	1.006*
	(2.454)	(2.450)	(3.418)	(3.410)	(3.320)	(3.298)	(3.356)	(3.344)	(1.873)	(1.867)
Years of education of the original squatter_s father	-0.049	-0.049	-0.029	-0.029	0.027	0.028	-0.030	-0.030	0.011	0.011
	(0.455)	(0.455)	(0.320)	(0.320)	(0.370)	(0.380)	(0.392)	(0.389)	(0.485)	(0.489)
educationOfThefathermiss	-6.527**	-6.523**	-7.523***	-7.523***	-4.403**	-4.440**	-4.872***	-4.880***	-0.975*	-0.980*
	(2.351)	(2.344)	(3.512)	(3.503)	(2.489)	(2.508)	(2.616)	(2.615)	(1.777)	(1.782)
Was the original squatter_s mother born in Argentina? 0 = no, 1 = yes	0.415	0.417	-0.243	-0.243	-0.070	-0.084	-0.102	-0.105	0.005	0.003
	(0.902)	(0.903)	(0.686)	(0.683)	(0.241)	(0.288)	(0.332)	(0.341)	(0.046)	(0.032)
	0.025	0.025	0.035	0.035	0.000	-0.002	0.023	0.022	-0.010	-0.010

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Logged household head income		Logged total household income		Logged total household income per capita		Logged total household income per adult		Logged employed household head dummy	
Years of education of the original squatter_s mother	(0.212)	(0.215)	(0.390)	(0.389)	(0.001)	(0.032)	(0.293)	(0.285)	(0.399)	(0.406)
educationOfThemothermiss	1.477	1.472	1.650	1.649	0.167	0.202	0.045	0.053	0.271	0.274
	(0.759)	(0.754)	(1.100)	(1.097)	(0.135)	(0.163)	(0.034)	(0.041)	(0.617)	(0.624)
Constant	4.474***	4.465***	4.830***	4.829***	3.180***	3.254***	3.751***	3.768***	0.675***	0.684***
	(4.762)	(4.696)	(6.662)	(6.578)	(5.313)	(5.377)	(5.952)	(5.905)	(3.412)	(3.405)
F-stat		0.005		0.000		0.727		0.034		0.075
Observations	251	251	255	255	255	255	255	255	310	310
R-squared	0.076	0.076	0.106	0.106	0.089	0.092	0.091	0.091	0.078	0.078

Note: t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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