Daniel Phillips Chris Coffey Emma Gallagher Paul Fenton Villar Jennifer Stevenson Stergiani Tsoli Sharnic Dhanasekar John Eyers State-society relations in low- and middle-income countries
An evidence gap map

March 2017





#### **About 3ie**

The International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie) is an international grant-making NGO promoting evidence-informed development policies and programmes. We are the global leader in funding, producing and synthesising high-quality evidence of what works, for whom, why and at what cost. We believe that high-quality and policy-relevant evidence will make development more effective and improve people's lives.

#### 3ie evidence gap maps

3ie evidence gap maps (EGMs) are thematic collections of information about impact evaluations or systematic reviews that measure the effects of international development policies and programmes. The maps present a visual overview of existing and ongoing studies in a sector or sub-sector in terms of the types of programmes evaluated and the outcomes measured. EGM reports provide all the supporting documentation for the maps themselves, including the background information for the theme of the map, the methods and results, including the protocols and the analysis of the results. 3ie EGMs are available through an online interactive platform on the 3ie website that allows users to explore the studies and reviews that are included.

#### About this evidence gap map report

This report summarises the methods and findings of an EGM on interventions that seek to improve state-society relations, which was developed by 3ie with funding from USAID and under contract with NORC at the University of Chicago. The online map can be found here.

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Assistant production manager: Akarsh Gupta

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# State-society relations in low- and middle-income countries: An evidence gap map

Daniel Phillips International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie)

Chris Coffey

3ie

Emma Gallagher

3ie

Paul Fenton Villar

3ie

Jennifer Stevenson

3ie

Stergiani Tsoli

3ie

Sharnic Dhanasekar

3ie

John Eyers

Independent consultant

# Evidence Gap Map Report 7 March 2017



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### **Summary**

#### Background

The role of the state, the effectiveness of its institutions and its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens are central to determining a country's prospects for stability and development. The critical importance of the state-society relationship to the global development agenda is underscored by the United Nations SDG 16, which seeks to 'promote peaceful and inclusive societies, provide access to justice and build effective, accountable and effective institutions' (UNDP 2016).

Addressing the challenges that developing countries face, promoting prosperity and ensuring that prosperity is equitably shared, requires effective governance (World Bank 2017). A variety of development interventions have been implemented in recent years with the goal of effecting change in these areas. Their strategies have included addressing power asymmetries, increasing demand for good governance and public services, reducing corruption and inefficiencies in public and political institutions and building state capacity.

This report summarises the findings of an evidence gap map (EGM) produced by the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation. This EGM consolidates evidence on the effect of interventions to improve state-society relations in low- and middle-income countries (L&MICs). The map draws on systematic methods and visualisation techniques to identify, categorise and display systematic reviews and impact evaluations according to 16 intervention types and 15 outcome types; all classified within the United Nations SDG 16 domains of inclusive political processes and responsive and accountable institutions. This report provides an overview of the EGM's methodology and scope and a descriptive analysis of the characteristics and trends of the evidence base. It also offers a critical appraisal of the included systematic reviews and reports on their findings.

#### **Main findings**

We identified 18 systematic reviews, two systematic review protocols and 365 impact evaluations – 305 completed and 60 ongoing – that met our inclusion criteria.

There are important gaps in the systematic review evidence base. Most of the included systematic reviews examine interventions pertaining to public institutions and services; very few look at political processes, despite the relatively large number of impact evaluations in this area. A majority of included systematic reviews focus on institutional or service performance outcomes, while relatively few examine outcomes at the individual level.

The distribution of completed impact evaluations across countries and regions is quite uneven. Over half of the completed impact evaluations were conducted in only eight countries: Argentina, China, Philippines, Indonesia, Uganda, Mexico, Brazil and India. We found no or very few completed impact evaluations for many countries with large populations that were eligible for inclusion.

We compared the average from our sample of included impact evaluations with the average for L&MICs across the six World Governance Indicators. Our sample's average ratings for control of corruption and political stability and absence of violence are lower than the L&MIC average. But they are higher for voice and accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law.

Included impact evaluations are distributed unevenly across intervention types. The intervention areas most extensively studied by impact evaluations include information dissemination on political processes, community-driven development and performance incentives for state employees. Interventions addressing performance incentives, decentralisation and providing information on services tend to focus on education and health programmes, rather than at the central government department and bureaucracy levels.

The most notable evidence gaps identified were in interventions in e-voting and training politicians and leaders, where we found only a handful of studies. Despite the widespread implementation of interventions involving citizen feedback mechanisms and civil society's involvement in priority setting, the number of studies in these areas is comparatively small.

Institutional and service-based outcomes are more widely reported than outcomes at the individual level, such as changes in individuals' knowledge of their rights or responsibilities as citizens or their attitudes towards the state. Studies adopted a range of evaluation designs, with a relatively high number employing some form of randomised design.

Around a third of included impact evaluations had some form of equity focus, either reporting on an intervention that targeted a particular disadvantaged subpopulation or assessing an intervention's impact on a disadvantaged population. The equity focus most commonly looked at women and subpopulations with differing socioeconomic status.

The research base in this area is growing. The number of studies being published each year has increased year-on-year since 2000. The proportion of studies using randomised study designs has also increased considerably over time, accounting for 80 per cent of all included studies in 2015.

#### **Conclusions**

Although an increasing number of systematic reviews and impact evaluations addressing this topic are being published, some clear gaps in the evidence remain. The spread of studies across countries and geographic regions is uneven. There is limited or no evidence on many countries with large populations that face substantial governance challenges.

A number of interventions with an extensive body of impact evaluations are yet to be the subject of a high-quality systematic review. This is particularly true for several interventions designed to enhance the transparency, effectiveness and inclusivity of political and electoral institutions and processes. Although evaluating the effectiveness of interventions in the area of state-society relations using impact evaluation methods presents challenges, this EGM finds a sizeable body of completed and ongoing studies. However, even where that evidence base is strongest, it cannot be said to address all important policy questions. The key challenge for future research lies in finding ways to evaluate those interventions where there is highest policy and programming interest and the evidence base is slimmest.

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## **Abbreviations and acronyms**

CDD Community-driven development

EGM Evidence gap map

IPP Inclusive political processes

IV Instrumental variables

L&MIC Low- and middle-income country

RAI Responsive and accountable institutions

RCT Randomised controlled trial

RDD Regression discontinuity design

SBM School-based management

SDG Sustainable Development Goals

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

WGI World Governance Indicators

#### 1. Introduction

#### 1.1 Building effective, inclusive, responsive and accountable states

The role of the state, the effectiveness of its institutions and its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens are central to determining a country's prospects for stability and development. States with more effective political institutions have been shown to be more successful in achieving sustained economic growth and human development and vice versa (Kaufmann and Kraay 2002; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). The latest World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs) show that low-income countries have a lower ranking for government effectiveness than middle-income and high-income countries respectively.1

The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) underscore the critical importance of state-society relations to the global development agenda, particularly SDG 16, which seeks to 'promote peaceful and inclusive societies, provide access to justice and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions' (UNDP 2016 p.1). Interventions that address state-society relations are also intrinsically valuable in relation to the SDGs' wider human, economic and environmental development objectives, as progress means more effective governance, which in turn means more effective policies across sectors (World Bank 2017).

The World Bank defines governance as 'the process through which state and non-state actors interact to design and implement policies, within a given set of formal and informal rules that shape and are shaped by power' (2017 p.41). Figure 1 illustrates the complex interrelationship between these actors, portraying the state-society relationship through a principal-agent model of accountability where civil society acts as the principal that holds the agents – state actors and institutions – to account.

Accountability can be indirect or direct. When it is indirect, political representatives effect policy change or hold state institutions and service providers to account on the electorate's behalf. When it is direct, civil society directly influences state policy and institutions independently of political representatives (World Bank 2016a).

Governance effectiveness depends not only on the policies implemented and the capacities of the institutions tasked with delivering change, but also on the distribution of power and the relative bargaining power of different actors (Deverajan et al. 2011). The state's accountability to different sections of civil society is mediated by civil society groups' degree of influence or voice. In turn, political leaders' ability to elicit change or hold state service providers to account on behalf of citizens is mediated by the compact between different arms of the state. Where citizens directly hold service providers to account, bypassing the political process, this is referred to as client power (World Bank 2016a).

1

<sup>1</sup> In 2015, the average percentile rank for low-income countries was 20.3, compared to 34.5 for middle-income countries and 76.8 for high-income ones.

Politicians/policy makers Indirect accountability Service providers Direct accountability Public Political Citizens Principal officials leaders Citizen feedback mechanisms Client power Voice Compact Political Public Frontline Agent officials providers leaders

Figure 1: The state-society relationship

Source: Adapted from World Bank (2016a)

In recent years, a variety of development interventions have aimed to effect change in these areas by:

- addressing power asymmetries
- increasing demand for good governance and public services
- reducing corruption and inefficiencies in public and political institutions
- building state capacity.

Some interventions are designed to ensure that leaders hear civil society's voice, for example, by providing information on citizens' rights to vote or ensuring representation of all sections of society by reserving political positions for women or minorities. Others are designed to ensure that the compact between different arms of the state – such as administrative reforms, decentralisation and incentives – is delivered. Finally, some interventions set out to promote client power by giving civil society a voice in how services are delivered, for example, by seeking feedback from citizens or involving them in setting programmatic and policy priorities.

This evidence gap map (EGM) aims to support these efforts by taking stock of evidence relating to the effectiveness of such interventions in low- and middle-income countries (L&MICs). It explicitly draws on SDG 16 to structure interventions that seek to impact state-society relations as falling within two domains: inclusive political processes (IPP) and responsive and accountable institutions (RAI).

SDG16 defines IPP as those political processes that are 'designed to improve citizen participation, voice and accountability through electoral processes, parliamentary and political development, constitutional processes, civic engagement and women's political participation'. It defines RAI as those institutions that 'deliver equitable public services and inclusive development' (UNDP 2016 p7).

Programming and research on state-society relations represents a broad thematic area; we could have used numerous interpretative frameworks to structure this analysis. EGMs catalogue evidence within a cross-tabular framework of interventions and outcomes. We chose to draw on SDG 16 to underpin the map's framework because it suited our need to catalogue the evidence into types of interventions, rather than grouping them under value concepts, such as 'transparency' or 'anti-corruption'.

#### 1.2 Methodology

3ie EGMs are thematic collections of evidence that draw on systematic methods for the identification of evidence on the effectiveness of development policies and programmes (Snilstveit *et al.* 2016; Snilstveit *et al.* 2017). They provide a visual representation of what we know and do not know about the effectiveness of interventions in a given thematic area. They identify evidence from systematic reviews and impact evaluations and illustrate where there is more, less or no evidence.

This report provides a summary of the evidence captured by an interactive, online EGM, which is available on the 3ie website.<sub>2</sub> Highlights of the online EGM include:

- the best available evidence from systematic reviews
- access to user-friendly summaries and appraisals of those studies
- the impact evaluation evidence base
- absolute gaps in the evidence (no studies)
- synthesis gaps (sufficient studies for a systematic review to be undertaken).

This report describes the characteristics of the studies found, comments on the gaps in evidence and sets out the findings from included systematic reviews. However, it does not comment on the results of included impact evaluations.

3ie EGMs construct a framework of interventions and outcomes. The framework rows represent the key interventions in the area of thematic focus. The columns cover the most relevant outcomes. The framework of intervention categories for this EGM (Table 1) is based on a review of both academic and policy literature, in consultation with key stakeholders.

This EGM draws on systematic methods to identify impact evaluations and systematic reviews meeting the thematic focus of our framework. Key elements of the methodology included a systematic search of published and unpublished literature and the application of systematic inclusion and exclusion criteria.

<sup>2</sup> http://gapmaps.3ieimpact.org/evidence-maps/state-society-relations

We define impact evaluations as ones that use counterfactual analysis to measure the net impact of an intervention (3ie 2012), while systematic reviews use transparent and systematic methods to identify, appraise and synthesise findings from studies addressing a specific issue (Waddington *et al.* 2012). This EGM includes both completed and ongoing studies to help identify research in development that might help fill existing evidence gaps.

#### 1.2.1 Methodological limitations

Interventions that address state-society relations represent an extremely large thematic area. This EGM is intended to address a large subset of interventions that are of central relevance to state-society relations, but our intervention framework, our inclusion criteria and, as a result, our included studies are not meant to cover all possible programming in this area. For example, we do not aim to include rule-of-law interventions addressing justice or policing. Similarly, as a 3ie EGM already covers peacebuilding interventions in fragile and conflict affected states (Cameron *et al.* 2015), we do not aim to incorporate that body of knowledge. We set our scope in Sections 2.1 and 2.4 of this report.

This EGM follows a systematic process for identifying, screening and extracting data from relevant studies. The methodology is designed to capture relevant studies as comprehensively as possible. However, while we included studies in any language, our search was carried out in English and this may mean that we missed some studies in other languages.

We drew up our search terms with the help of a search specialist. But, given the wide scope of the map, it is possible that the search did not cover all potentially relevant studies. We employed a systematic screening process, but by using a single reviewer to screen papers at title and abstract stage, we may have excluded some relevant studies.

Table 1: Intervention categories

Domain	Intervention	Definition
Inclusive political processes	Information	Interventions increasing access to media in general or providing information related to elections and political
	dissemination (political	processes. Typically information on voting rights, candidate qualifications, voting records or incumbent performance,
	processes)	or that contain anti-corruption, anti-violence, anti-vote buying or public policy messages
	Electoral monitoring	Interventions that monitor polling and voting processes with the aim of reducing fraud and ensuring free and fair
		elections
	e-voting	Introduction of new voting technologies designed to increase turnout and reduce malfeasance
	Democratic processes	Interventions introducing local elections, facilitating feedback on politician performance, creating local political units or
oliti		introducing electoral primaries or revised terms in office
Ď	Representation of	Introduction of quotas, reserved seats or similar within political institutions – such as parliament, state legislatures and
Inclusive	women & minorities	village councils – for women, ethnic minorities and castes
	Training for politicians & leaders	Interventions providing training and capacity building for politicians and leaders
	Community-driven	CDD devolves authority to the local level, facilitating direct involvement in public funds allocation through local
	development	community committees or councils
	Decentralisation	Decentralisation interventions shift existing power over spending and decision-making to sub-national levels
Responsive and accountable institutions	Administrative reform	New processes for managing public services, including e-governance and monitoring public servant attendance or performance
	Performance incentives	Providing wage or other career incentives for public servants and politicians or performance-based grants for public sector providers
	Audits	Independent audits of public sector services, inspecting levels of spending, effectiveness and cost efficiency. This includes independent scrutiny of public sector auditors
	Citizen feedback mechanisms	Interventions facilitating meetings between service users and providers, setting up grievance redress mechanisms and
	Information	scorecards allowing users to rate providers  Information for citizens on their rights as users and providers' responsibilities or publishing allocated funds or budget
	dissemination (services)	plans for public institutions
	Participatory priority	plans for public institutions
	setting	Facilitating public participation in institutions' decision-making processes or budget allocation decisions
	Tax compliance and formalisation	Increasing tax compliance and encourage formalisation of businesses
	Land certification	Conferring freehold or leasehold rights over land
	Lana continuation	Contenting freehold of reasonald rights over land

Although we searched a variety of databases and online resources, consulted experts and checked references included in key literature reviews, it is possible that we missed some relevant and includable studies. While one person extracted data from included studies, and a second reviewer checked all coding for consistency, the possibility of coding error remains.

Although we used a consultative process to construct the map's framework, there was inevitably some disagreement on the most appropriate way to define and delimit intervention and outcome categories. As discussed above, we necessarily delimited the scope of our map in terms of the interventions covered. This meant explicitly excluding various types of programme that could easily fit within the thematic area of state-society relations. Although we intended the consultative process to minimise such a risk, there is a possibility that subfields of interventions are not represented, if we did not find any literature relating to them.

#### 1.3 Overview

The remainder of this report is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the substantive scope of the EGM. In Section 3, we present our findings, describing the size and characteristics of the evidence base, while Section 4 provides conclusions and implications. We include a full list of included studies in the references section and provide additional methodological details in our appendices.

#### 2. Scope

This EGM consolidates evidence on the effect of interventions to improve state-society relations in L&MICs. State-society relations is a large conceptual area and we do not attempt to incorporate every conceivable study that could relate to the topic. Instead, we delimit the focus of the map to cover a set of key interventions. We made this decision to ensure that the map focused on a well-defined thematic area that could be visualised on 3ie's EGM platform and that the project was of a manageable scale. The scope of the EGM is defined and delimited by the intervention and outcome categories included in the framework, as well as the type of studies included. We further define these concepts for our EGM in sections 2.1 and 2.2 below.

#### 2.1 Interventions

The framework for this EGM draws heavily on SDG 16, which seeks to 'promote peaceful and inclusive societies, provide access to justice and build effective, accountable and effective institutions' (UNDP 2016, p.1). We chose to focus the map's scope on two of the four domains that make up SDG 16: IPP and RAI (UNDP 2016). So the map's overarching framework draws on SDG 16 to classify interventions into two domains. Each of these domains is then further divided into several categories of interventions. These were drawn up iteratively, with reference to the wider literature on governance, the types of studies that we found and with input from our advisory group. We defined the categories by the mechanisms used to build a relationship between state and society, to provide citizens with a voice, enforce the compact between different arms of the state or ensure accountability.

#### 2.1.1 Inclusive political processes

According to SDG16, IPPs are 'designed to improve citizen participation, voice and accountability through electoral processes, parliamentary and political development, constitutional processes, civic engagement and women's political participation' (UNDP 2016 p7). We divided the IPP domain into six broad intervention categories

Information dissemination (political processes) includes interventions to provide or increase access to media or information related to elections and political processes. These typically involve disseminating information on voting rights, electoral candidate qualifications, voting records or incumbent performance, or information that contains anti-corruption, anti-violence, anti-vote buying or public policy-focused campaign messages. Dissemination methods include leafleting; face-to-face information campaigns; and online, SMS, broadcast and print media.

Electoral monitoring includes interventions to monitor polling and voting processes with the aim or reducing fraud and ensuring free and fair elections, typically through observers.

*E-voting* includes interventions that introduced new technologies for casting votes designed to increase turnout and reduce malfeasance.

Democratic processes include introducing local elections, primaries or revised terms in office; facilitating feedback on politicians' performance; or creating local political units such as councils, committees and other decision-making bodies.

Representation of women and minorities includes introducing quotas, reserved seats or similar within political institutions – such as parliament, state legislatures and village councils – for women, ethnic minorities and castes.

Training for politicians and leaders includes interventions to train or build capacity for politicians and local leaders, including civil society organisation leaders.

Community-driven development (CDD) includes interventions to devolve some explicit forms of decision-making authority to local communities.

#### 2.1.2 Responsive and accountable institutions

SDG16 defines RAI as institutions that 'deliver equitable public services and inclusive development at the central and local levels, with a particular focus on restoring core government functions in the aftermath of crisis and attention to local governance and local development' (UNDP 2016 p7). We divided the RAI domain into nine intervention categories.

Decentralisation includes interventions to decentralise spending and decision-making to states, counties, districts or municipalities.

Administrative reform includes interventions to introduce new processes for managing public services, including e-governance and public servant attendance monitoring.

Performance incentives include interventions to provide wage or other career incentives for public servants and politicians or performance-based grants for public sector providers. Wage-related interventions are included if they are conditional on performance.

*Audits* include interventions to introduce independent audits of public sector services or assess levels of spending, effectiveness or cost efficiency.

Citizen feedback mechanisms include interventions to give citizens information on their rights as service users and service providers' responsibilities or to publish allocated funds or budget plans for public institutions.

Information dissemination (services) includes interventions to give citizens information on their rights as users and service providers' responsibilities or to publish allocated funds or budget plans for public institutions. Dissemination methods include leafleting, face-to-face information campaigns and online, SMS, broadcast and print media. We only include interventions providing information by SMS where they convey information about users' rights.

Participatory priority setting includes interventions to facilitate public participation in public institutions' decision-making processes or budget allocation decisions. We include the introduction of school-based management (SBM) or health facility committees in this category.

Tax compliance and formalisation includes interventions to increase tax compliance and encourage formalisation of businesses.

Land certification includes interventions to confer rights over land, either freehold or leasehold.

#### 2.1.3 Interventions not included in the map

To maintain conceptual focus and ensure that the map was of a manageable scale, we chose to exclude studies from some related intervention areas:

- Rule-of-law interventions, such as policing, security and justice, which is a large thematic area in its own right
- Social welfare provision, such as cash transfers and grants, user fees in public sector goods provision, public-private partnerships and training for public sector workers, which is a large thematic area in its own right
- Private sector-related interventions, except those that evaluate business formalisation or tax compliance
- Environmental interventions, such as protected areas, payments for ecosystem services
- Community resource management interventions, such as community forest management
- Peacebuilding, post-conflict rebuilding and psychosocial interventions, which are the focus of an existing 3ie EGM<sub>3</sub>

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<sup>3 &</sup>lt;u>www.3ieimpact.org/evidence-hub/publications/evidence-gap-maps/evidence-peacebuilding-evidence-gap-map</u>

- Multi-component interventions where only a small element corresponded to one intervention category
- Survey, laboratory or lab-in-the-field type experiments.

#### 2.2 Outcomes

We drew up a set of broad outcome groups, based on the outcomes reported in included studies and grouped those that captured conceptually similar outcome measures. We always grouped subjective and objective outcome measures separately and classified the outcome groups into several broad conceptual outcome categories, as presented in Table 2. We searched for studies that measured outcomes from at least one of four broad categories:

- Individual outcomes relating to individuals' knowledge and understanding, attitudes and beliefs, social and psychological situation and general economic situation
- Electoral outcomes relating to electoral participation, the incidence of electoral malfeasance and violence, vote share, voter opinions and the diversity of candidates or parties on the ballot
- Outcomes related to public services and institutions including outcomes for participation in decision-making bodies, public servant characteristics and behaviour and the allocation of public goods or funds and those relating to service access, use and performance
- Cross-cutting outcomes relating to public confidence or the incidence of corruption.

#### 2.2.1 Outcomes not included in the map

To limit the scope of the EGM and ensure included studies were relevant to the focus of the EGM, we applied an additional inclusion criterion to one category of intervention. Only studies of land tenure programmes that reported tenure or ownership security were included in the EGM.

**Table 2: Outcome categories** 

Category	Outcome type	Definition
Individual	Knowledge and understanding	Citizens' understanding and knowledge of political processes, public service availability and rights
	Attitudes and beliefs	Beliefs, attitudes and perceptions of safety, trustworthiness, social cohesion and social capital
	Social and psychological situation	Measures of happiness, empowerment, quality of life, social, physical and psychological well-being
	Economic situation	Income, consumption, expenditure, employment, poverty and ownership, access and rights to land
	Electoral participation	Voter registration and turnout in the population as a whole or in certain subpopulations
Electoral	Electoral malfeasance & violence	Incidence of fraud in elections, intimidation of voters or officials, electoral violence. Measures of clientelism or cash for votes
	Political representation	A candidate's, political party's or ethnic or minority group's share of the vote. Voter opinion of or preference for a given candidate or party, or willingness to vote across sex, ethnic or party lines. Number and diversity of parties or candidates on the ballot.
Public institutions and services	Participation and inclusion	Inclusion or participation in decision-making body, civil society organisation or community monitoring or feedback mechanism
	Public servant characteristics & behaviour	Measures of characteristics, behaviour and qualifications of public servants, including time allocated to tasks or attendance rates
	Allocation of public funds or goods	Measures of public finance or goods allocation or their alignment with citizen needs or preferences
	Service access	Availability and capacity of services, including opening hours, waiting times and equitable access to services and resources made available by service providers
	Service use	Public take-up of services, including school enrolment or attendance, health centre or hospital use or immunisation rates
	Service performance	Measures of service quality, including: health outcomes (health status, mortality, morbidity); education outcomes (school completion rates or students' test scores); or taxes collected and business formalisation rates
Cross-cutting	Public confidence	Quality of services, performance of public servants including elected representatives and levels corruption and transparency, as perceived by the public
	Corruption	Measures of corruption, including: incidence of financial or administrative misreporting, investigations, prosecutions, convictions and self-reported incidence of being asked for a bribe

#### 2.3 Study types

We included both impact evaluations and systematic reviews of effects. Impact evaluations measure the causal change that occurs as a result of a programme or intervention. They use experimental or quasi-experimental studies to conduct a counterfactual analysis, allowing us to attribute changes in an outcome to a specific intervention or to compare the effects of different types of programmes (3ie 2012).

Specifically, we included the following types of studies:

- Randomised controlled trial
- Regression discontinuity design
- Controlled before-and-after study using appropriate methods to control for selection bias and confounding, such as:
  - o propensity score matching or other matching methods
  - instrumental variable estimation or other methods using an instrumental variable such as the Heckman Two step approach
  - o difference-in-differences
  - o or a fixed- or random-effects model with an interaction term between time and intervention for baseline and follow-up observations
- Cross-sectional or panel studies with an intervention and comparison group using methods to control for selection bias and confounding as described above
- Studies explicitly described as systematic reviews and reviews that describe search, data collection and synthesis methods according to the 3ie database of systematic reviews protocols (Snilstveit et al. 2014).

We excluded studies that use simulation or forecast models to estimate business-asusual versus future scenarios based on different reference levels. We also excluded observational studies with no control, efficacy trials such as survey or choice experiments and non-systematic literature reviews.

#### 2.4 Other inclusion and exclusion criteria

To be included, studies had to be of interventions in L&MICs. We searched for studies made available between 2000 and September 2016. Some of these analyse historic data; we only included those analysing data from the 1970s onwards. We did not limit inclusion based on publication status or language of publication, and included ongoing and completed impact evaluations and systematic reviews. To be included, ongoing studies needed to provide enough information on the intervention, evaluation methodology, location and outcomes to be assessed according to our inclusion criteria.

#### 3. Results

This section reports on our search and screening process and then describes the characteristics and trends of our evidence base. We examine completed impact evaluations, ongoing impact evaluations and systematic reviews in turn, then go on to discuss the major evidence gaps and the findings from included systematic reviews.


All our analysis is undertaken at the study level. When we talk about studies, we refer to a unique evaluation of an includable intervention; when we talk about papers, we refer to a unique document. In this way, a single paper might include multiple studies (if it includes evaluations of the same programme in two different countries, for example). Equally, two papers might use more or less the same dataset to look at the same intervention but undertake analysis of different outcomes. In such cases, we count two papers but a single study.

#### 3.1 Search and screening, volume of evidence base

Figure 2 provides an outline of the search and screening process we used to identify included studies. It involved carefully calibrating the search to delimit the results we recovered. We identified 20,645 records through topical website-based databases and online academic databases, reference checked the bibliographies of 66 documents and hand searched the CVs of a number of researchers in the area. We then imported the records that met our inclusion criteria into our data management software, removing duplicates.

As with other areas of social science (Waddington *et al.* 2012), many studies used obscure titles and unstructured abstracts, making it difficult to determine whether a paper met the inclusion criteria. In these cases, we had to review the full text. We downloaded and screened the full texts of 1,217 documents. Where multiple versions of the same study were available, we included the most comprehensive or up to date. If different papers examined the same intervention but used different datasets or looked at different outcomes, we included them in their own right.

Figure 2: PRISMA flow diagram



# 3.2 Characteristics and trends of the evidence base from impact evaluations

#### 3.2.1 Distribution of studies across interventions

We included 305 completed impact evaluations described in 280 papers. Figure 3 shows the number of included studies disaggregated by the 16 different intervention categories covered by the EGM, as well as multi-category interventions. Of these, 45 per cent (n=139) lie in the IPP domain and 55 per cent (n=168) in the RAI domain. Two studies feature in both domains.




Figure 3: Impact evaluations by intervention category

Note: One study may be included in more than one intervention category.

Information dissemination on political processes is the intervention category with the highest number of studies (14%, n=44). The next highest number of studies are in administrative reform and performance incentives for civil servants (both at 11%, n=35), followed by CDD (11%, n=33). The category with the fewest studies is training for politicians and leaders, with only two studies (<1%, n=2). The second-lowest number of studies is in the e-voting category, (<3%, n=7) and audits (3%, n=8).

We found that the vast majority (n=24 out of 26) of studies evaluating interventions to improve the representation of women and minorities were concentrated on a single reform in India (the 73rd constitutional amendment [1993]) that has these mandates:

- Seats in all local governments would be reserved for marginalised groups in proportion to their population ratio
- One-third of all seats would be reserved for women
- One-third of Pradhan (village chief) positions would be randomly selected and reserved for women.

This nationwide programme has been widely evaluated, with studies examining its impact in various regions, using different datasets and for a variety of outcomes. As a result, the number of studies in this intervention category does not reflect the far smaller number of interventions evaluated.

Similarly, in the area of administrative reform, a single paper (Sarr 2016) examines the effects of the introduction of semiautonomous revenue authorities across 20 countries. These reforms were introduced from 1980 onwards in various L&MICs as a way of restricting direct political interference and separating tax administration from the constraints of the civil service system. This descriptive analysis counts this one paper as 20 studies to account for the fact that it reports on 20 separate countries.

We classify five per cent of studies (n=14) as multi-category interventions, including, for example, studies that examined the effects of both administrative reform and the introduction of performance incentives for civil servants. As well as counting these as multi-category, we included them in our main intervention categories, so we would have counted the above example three times: under administrative reform, performance incentives and under multi-category.

The most commonly combined interventions are some form of information dissemination combined with another intervention component (n=9). Three studies examine the effects of information dissemination on political processes with another intervention component.

#### 3.2.2 Distribution of outcomes assessed

Included studies evaluate the effects of interventions across a range of outcome measures (Figure 4). A majority of studies (56%, n=171) report on more than a single outcome. Institutional and service performance was the most evaluated outcome, with just under half of studies (50%, n=151) reporting effects on some measure of this outcome.

Studies in the RAI domain account for the majority of studies with service performance outcomes. Seventy-one per cent (n=119) of studies in this domain report effects on some measure of this outcome, compared to only 24 per cent (n=34) of studies in the IPP domain.

Outcomes studied are more evenly distributed across interventions in the IPP domain. Electoral participation is the most commonly reported outcome in this domain, with 36 per cent (n=50) of studies in this domain reporting on some measure of this outcome.

All outcome measures are reported at least once in both intervention domains. Social and psychological situation and electoral malfeasance and violence were the least-reported outcomes overall, with only three per cent of studies (n=<11) measuring each of these outcomes overall. We grouped types of outcome into those measured at individual, electoral, public institutions and services or cross-cutting levels.


Thirty-four per cent (n=105) of all the studies contain some outcome measure at the individual level. Fifty-two per cent of studies in the IPP domain (n=72) measure at least one outcome at the individual level, compared to only 20 per cent of studies in the RAI domain (n=34).

Twenty per cent (n=62) of all studies contain some outcome measure at the electoral level. Forty-two per cent of all studies in the IPP (n=59) domain measure at least one outcome at the electoral level, compared to less than two per cent (n=4) of studies in the RAI domain.

Seventy per cent (n=212) of studies contain some outcome measure at the level of *public institutions and services*. Eighty-seven per cent of studies in the RAI domain measure outcomes at this level (n=146), compared to 48 per cent of studies in the IPP domain.

Service performance was the most measured outcome at this level overall, with 50 per cent (n=151) of studies containing some measure of this outcome. Service-based outcomes more broadly – comprising service performance, access and use – were assessed in 57 per cent (n=175) of studies.

Figure 4: Impact evaluations by outcome category



Note: One study may be included in more than one outcome category.


Twenty per cent (n=61) of studies contain some *cross-cutting* outcome measure, such as public confidence or corruption. Outcomes at this level are reported relatively more in the IPP (24 per cent) than the RAI domain (17%, n=28). Objective measures of corruption are measured in eight per cent of studies (n=25); these are most commonly used as an outcome measure in interventions on the representation of women and minorities (n=5) and audits (n=4).

#### 3.2.3 Distribution of studies by geographic region

The studies were conducted in 62 L&MICs (Figure 5). The majority were in Sub-Saharan Africa (30%, n=91), Latin America and the Caribbean (28%, n=84) and South Asia (23%, n=70). Seventeen per cent of studies (n=51) were conducted in East Asia and the Pacific region; two per cent (n=6) in the Commonwealth of Independent States and less than one per cent in Europe (n=3). No included studies were conducted in the Middle East or North Africa, despite there being several L&MICs in this region.

The spread of studies across countries is relatively uneven. While in some countries, a relatively large number of studies have been conducted, in others evidence is more limited. In Figure 5, L&MIC countries for which we found no includable studies are in dark grey. This is the case in many Sub-Saharan and North African and Middle Eastern countries with large populations. Only three studies are included from Nigeria and only one from Bangladesh, despite both having large populations.

Figure 5: Impact evaluations by geographic location



While we found 14 studies in China, when population size is taken into account, this amounts to only 0.01 studies per million people<sub>4</sub>. Conversely, some smaller countries, such as Benin (with six studies or 0.55 studies per million people) and Rwanda (with seven studies or 0.6 studies per million people), have a relatively large number of studies, given their population size.

When we take into account the population and number of eligible (L&MIC) countries in each region (Figure 6), we find the highest number of studies relative to the population is in Latin America and the Caribbean (0.16 per million), followed by Sub-Saharan Africa (0.1 per million), the Commonwealth of Independent States and South Asia (both .04 per million). The smallest proportion of studies compared to population is in East Asia and the Pacific (0.02 per million) and Europe (0.03 per million).




Figure 6: Impact evaluations by geographic region

More of the Latin American and Caribbean studies are in the RAI domain (n=62) than the IPP (n=23). In India, there are more studies (n=32) in the IPP domain than the RAI (n=20). Interventions in Sub-Saharan Africa are almost equally distributed between IPP (n=45) and RAI (n=46).

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<sup>4</sup> The figures for studies per million are based on 2015 data (World Bank 2017)

#### 3.2.4 Distribution of studies by country income status

Figure 7 shows the spread of studies by country income status. Most were conducted in countries that were, at the time of publication, LMICs (44%, n=134), followed by upper-middle-income countries (30%, n=94) and low-income countries (25%, n=77).

While low-income countries are less well represented in terms of the absolute number of studies, they are better represented than other income status groups in terms of studies per million people. There are 0.12 studies per million people in low-income countries, compared to 0.06 studies per million in L&MICs and 0.04 studies per million in upper-middle-income countries<sub>5</sub>.




Figure 7: Impact evaluations by country income status

#### 3.2.5 Distribution of studies by World Governance Indicator

We also explore how our sample of studies rates in terms of the six dimensions of governance captured under the World Governance Indicators (WGIs) voice and accountability; political stability and absence of violence/terrorism; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2010).6 Figure 8 is a spider plot comparing the average from our sample of included studies7 with the average for L&MICs8 over each of the six governance dimensions, using the most recent WGI dataset from 2015. The green line denotes average governance scores across WGI indicators for all L&MIC countries. The yellow line denotes the average governance scores for the studies that we include in the EGM, weighted by the number of studies in each country.

The spider plot shows that our sample of included studies rates higher than the L&MIC average across several dimensions: voice and accountability; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; and rule of law. It also indicates that the average for L&MICs in terms of control of corruption, political stability and the absence of

<sup>5</sup> The figures for studies per million are based on 2015 data (World Bank 2017)

 $<sup>\</sup>ensuremath{_{6}}$  Appendix D contains full definitions for each of the six dimensions.

<sup>7</sup> Studies were assigned WGI ratings based on country data for their year of publication. No WGIs were available for 2002 or 2016, so we used the previous years' figures instead. 8L&MIC average was calculated as the average across all years between 2000 and 2016 for which a country was an L&MIC and WGI data was available.

violence is higher than the sample average. This suggests that the studies included in the EGM were more likely to be from countries with lower political stability and control of corruption than the L&MIC average, but higher than average for voice and accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law.




Figure 8: Impact evaluations by World Governance Indicators

3.2.6 Distribution of studies by literature type and publication date Forty-nine per cent (n=148) of included studies were published in peer-reviewed journals. A further 10 per cent (n=29) were reports contracted by an implementing agency, such as an NGO, a government or donor organisations. Forty-two per cent (n=128) were published as grey literature.

Figure 9 displays the number of completed impact evaluations published each year from 2000 to 2016 in the form of histogram bars. The black line indicates the cumulative number of studies published. The percentage change in the cumulative number of included studies increases fairly steadily between 2000 and 2016 (average=24%). In absolute terms, the trend is for a year-on-year increase in the number of studies published over the period covered. The largest year-on-year increase was in 2010, when the number of included studies jumped from 13 to 20, a year-on-year increase of 65 per cent. Note that the count for 2016 may underrepresent studies published, as we completed our main search in September 2016.




Figure 9: Impact evaluations by publication date

Note: Main EGM search was completed by the end of September 2016

#### 3.2.7 Distribution of studies by equity focus

We disaggregated studies by their focus on equity, using categories from Masset and Snilstveit (2016). Equity focus is defined as the extent to which the intervention or analysis focuses on specified disadvantaged populations. Thirty-six per cent of included impact evaluations had some form of equity focus:

- Interventions targeting a disadvantaged population (16%)9
- Studies that examine the effect of an evaluation on specified disadvantaged population(s) (15%) 10
- A subpopulation analysis to explore the effects of an intervention across a number of populations (24%).11

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<sup>9</sup> Studies that assess the effects of a programme on a specific subpopulation considered to be vulnerable – for example, a study examining the effects of a land certification programme on women only – were coded as 'assessing impact on disadvantaged group'.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Studies that examine interventions aimed at reducing inequality – for example, a land certification programme aimed partly or wholly at providing land certification for women – were coded as 'intervention aimed at reducing inequality'.

<sup>11</sup> Studies that analyse a subpopulation – for example, exploring outcomes by sex, caste or socioeconomic status – were coded as 'undertaking subgroup analysis'.




Figure 10: Impact evaluations by equity focus

Note: One study may be included in more than one equity category

The highest number of studies with some form of equity focus assess sex-based differences and inequality based on social or structural determinants (21%, n=63). These predominantly relate to the representation of women and minorities and CDD interventions.

The next-highest number focus on socioeconomic status (12%, n=38), with most of them also relating to the representation of women and minorities, CDD interventions and, to a lesser extent, information on political processes.

Six per cent (n=18) focus on disparities between sex or some type of socioeconomic inequity in levels of education. Four per cent (n=12) focus on caste, mostly relating to interventions to improve the representation of minorities. But some evidence relates to performance incentives, participatory priority setting and land certification.

Fewer studies focus on education status (6%, n=19), place of residence (4%, n=12) and land ownership (3%, n=10). None of our included studies have an equity focus on disability.

#### 3.2.8 Distribution by study type

Figure 11 shows the distribution of included studies by study type. A majority of studies (n=179, 59%) used randomisation; the others used quasi-experimental methods to measure effects. Seventy per cent (n=97) in the IPP domain used a randomised study design, compared to 50 per cent (n=84) in the RAI domain. This difference is likely due, at least in part, to a number of studies on the randomised introduction of political reforms in India and the challenges of randomising some interventions in the RAI domain, such as decentralisation and administrative reforms. Overall, the percentage of studies that use RCT designs steadily increased between 2000 and 2015, increasing from 25 per cent of all studies in 2000 to 80 per cent in 2015.

Fifteen per cent (n=47) of studies combined more than one of the study types that met our inclusion criteria. For instance a study may have combined both propensity score matching and a difference-in-differences approach.




Figure 11: Impact evaluations by study type

Note: One study may be included in more than one study type category

A number of studies take advantage of natural or policy experiments that involved randomised assignment. For example, some included studies (n=24) examine the effects mandated political representation of women and disadvantaged castes in India. This legislation, introduced in 1993, reserved 33 per cent of seats in India's house of parliament and all its state legislative assemblies for women and disadvantaged castes.

Some of these studies take advantage of the randomised process of reserving places to infer differences between villages with and without reservations. Others use state-level variation in the timing of reservations to more broadly infer the difference in outcomes between states whose legislatures have already enforced these reservations and those that have not. This type of study was coded as RCT.<sub>12</sub> Similarly, three studies examine the effects of the 2003 introduction of random audits of municipal expenditure of federally transferred funds as part of an anticorruption programme in Brazil.

Difference-in-differences is the next most common study method overall, used in 24 per cent (n=72) of studies. In 43 of them, it was used in combination with another study method, most commonly propensity score matching (n=27) and instrumental variables (IV) (n=7).

<sup>12</sup> Strictly speaking, this type of intervention might be categorised as 'natural experiments'.

Disaggregating this data by intervention category, RCTs are least common as a percentage of study types in a given intervention category in land certification (9%, n=2), administrative reform (21%, n=9) and decentralisation (22%, n=8). These are all arguably difficult areas to evaluate through randomised study designs. The intervention categories with the absolute highest number of RCTs were information dissemination (n=39) and performance incentives (n=22).

Study types in the 'other' category include synthetic controls and quasi-experimental with coarsened exact matching. One study combines IV with analysis from an additional spatial autoregressive model.

#### 3.2.9 Ongoing impact evaluations

We included 60 ongoing impact evaluation studies described in 59 papers (Figure 12). The majority of these assess interventions in Sub-Saharan Africa (60%, n=36) or South Asia (20%, n=12). Others assess interventions in East Asia and the Pacific (8%, n=5), Latin America and the Caribbean (8%, n=5) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (3%, n=2).

Figure 12 provides an overview of the distribution of the ongoing impact evaluation studies across our framework domains and categories. Fifteen per cent of studies (n=9) evaluate multi-category interventions; 45 per cent (n=27) evaluate interventions from the IPP domain; 67 per cent (n=40) evaluate interventions in the RAI domain. Most ongoing studies (30%, n=18) focus on information dissemination (political processes).

Overall, this pattern is similar to the average for completed studies included in our map. However, we found no ongoing studies addressing CDD or decentralisation, despite these two categories being relatively well-populated with completed studies. The Metaketa Initiative is funding a key area of ongoing work in a cohort of studies of governance, politics and institution-related interventions (EGAP 2017).




Figure 12: Ongoing impact evaluations by intervention category

Note: One study may be included in more than one intervention category

# 3.4 Characteristics and trends of the evidence base from systematic reviews

We identified 18 systematic reviews and two systematic review protocols that met our inclusion criteria. Figure 13 provides an overview of the distribution of the 18 completed reviews across the different framework domains and categories. Only 22 per cent (n=4) include evidence relating to interventions from the IPP domain, while 94 per cent include evidence on interventions from the RAI domain (n=17). Five per cent (n=3) include evidence relating to interventions across both domains (Alexander et al. 2010; Eichler et al. 2013; Hanna 2011).

Reviews covering the IPP domain examine evidence on the effect of CDD interventions (n=3) on a range of outcomes at individual, institutions and services and cross-cutting levels and the effect of information dissemination (n=1) on public confidence and corruption.

Information dissemination (political processes) Inclusive political processes Electoral monitoring E-voting Democratic processes Representation of women & minorities Training for politicians & leaders Community-driven development Decentralisation Responsive and accountable institutions Administrative reform Performance incentives Audits Citizen feedback mechanisms Information dissemination (services) Participatory priority setting Tax compliance & formalisation

Figure 13: Systematic reviews by intervention category

Note: One study may be included in more than one intervention category

Land certification

Thirty-nine per cent (n=7) of reviews covering the RAI domain examine evidence on the effects of decentralisation interventions on outcomes at institutions and services and cross-cutting levels. Twenty-two per cent (n=4) examine the effects of administrative reforms and 39 per cent (n=7) the effect of performance incentives on outcomes at individual, institutions and services and cross-cutting levels. Eleven per

0

2

8

Number of studies

10

12

14

cent (n=2) examine evidence on the effects of audits on outcomes at electoral, institutions and services and cross-cutting levels. Sixty-seven per cent (n=12) review citizen feedback mechanisms, 56 per cent (n=10) information dissemination (services) and 56 per cent participatory priority setting. All these examine effects across all our different outcome categories. Finally, a single review (Alexander *et al.* 2013) examines the effects of land certification on land security and other outcomes at the individual level.

The two systematic review protocols cover interventions from our RAI domain. One ongoing review examines decentralisation and administrative interventions (Killias *et al.* 2016); the other looks at pay incentive programmes in the education sector (Ritter *et al.* 2016).

## 3.4.1 Results of critical appraisal of systematic reviews

We used a standardised checklist to assess our confidence in the findings of each systematic review (Snilstveit *et al.* 2014). The confidence ratings do not appraise the studies included in a review, but rather their methodology and reporting. Based on this appraisal, we rated seven reviews as high-confidence, five as medium-confidence and six as low.

The checklist sets out in detail how we reached our overall decisions regarding confidence ratings. In general, we downgraded reviews based on the number and seriousness of the limitations we found during the quality appraisal. Some key limitations that would have likely resulted in downgrading a review's confidence rating included:

- absence of clear inclusion criteria or criteria that introduced bias (such as including only journal or English language articles)
- no independent double screening of studies
- using vote counting rather than presenting or synthesising the size and precision of individual study estimates
- absence of a thorough risk of bias appraisal of included studies.

We review the findings of the high- and medium-confidence studies in Section 3.5.2.

## 3.5 Major evidence gaps

Figure 14 provides a visual display of the included studies, mapping each study according to the intervention and outcome intersection(s) it covers. The size of each bubble indicates the relative size of the evidence base for each intersection. Grey bubbles indicate evidence from impact evaluations; the coloured bubbles indicate systematic reviews and our confidence in their findings.

Figure 14: State-society relations evidence gap map

nterventions	Knowledge and understanding	Attitudes and behiefs	Social and paychological intuation	Economo situation	Electoral participation	Electoral maifessance B violence	Potitical representation	Participation and inclusion	Public servant of anotecities & behaviour	Public fundzi goods siloostion	Service access	Service utilization	Service performance	Public confidence	Corruption
Information dissemination: political processes	0		0	o o	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	•	0
Electoral monitoring		0			0	0	0			0	0	0	0	0	0
e-voting		á			ē		ó			ó		ě	0		
Democratic processes	0	0	0		0		0	.0	0	0	0	0	0		
Representation of women & minorities	۵	0	0	0	0		0	۰	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Training for politicians & leaders	0	0					0		0					0	
Community driven development			0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	. 0
Decentralisation		0	0	ALC.					0	0	0 0			0	
Administrative reform	0	0		0				0	0	0	0	0	•	0	0
Performance incentives	0	0	0		0:		0	0	•	0	0		<b>.</b>	0	0
Audits	0				0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Citizen feedback mechanisms	0	0		0				0	0 0		0 0	0 0		0	0 0
Information dissemination: services	0	0		0	0		0		0	0	0 0	•		0	0 0
Participatory priority setting	0	(6.)	0	•					0	0	0 0			0	0
Tax compliance & formalisation	0	0		0				0					0	0	0
Land certification	0	0	0		0						0	0	0	0	

The EGM highlights two types of gap: absolute evidence gaps, where few or no studies have been conducted and synthesis gaps, where there is a lack of up-to-date, high-quality systematic reviews.

An empty or lightly-populated intersection in the map indicates one of two things. It can indicate that this type of question is under-researched. Or it can indicate that the research question an intersection represents (the effect of a given intervention on a given outcome) is not of primary import, so has not been a focus of research.

### 3.5.1 Evidence gaps in primary research

#### Interventions

Although we found evidence relating to all 16 EGM intervention categories. However, for several the evidence base is very limited.

The most obvious evidence gaps are for interventions such as e-voting or training of politicians and leaders, where we found only a handful of studies. Given the programmatic emphasis on interventions to provide citizen feedback mechanisms or involve civil society in priority setting (for example, World Bank 2012), the evidence base is not especially large.

Even the more extensively populated areas of the map have evidence gaps. Many of the studies on performance incentives, decentralisation or providing information on services focus on sector-specific implementation of education or health programmes. Far fewer look at their effect on central government departments, for example.

In some intervention categories, a single nationwide programme has been evaluated multiple times. For example, a large number of studies examine India's 73<sup>rd</sup> constitutional amendment reserving political representation for women and scheduled caste. These often analyse datasets from different regions, look at different outcomes or use different methods of analysis. So, although there are a large number of studies in the representation of women and minorities category, the vast majority relate to India and the constitutional amendment. The same is true of our audits category, where several studies examine the same nationwide Brazilian programme to implement randomised audits. Finally, much of the evidence for our administrative reform category comes from a single paper on the introduction of semi-autonomous revenue authorities and multiple countries using a synthetic controls methodology.

#### Outcomes

Few studies report individual-level outcomes such as changes in individuals' knowledge of their rights or responsibilities as citizens or attitudes towards the state. Studies in the IPP domain are more likely to report multiple outcomes across different categories. Those in the RAI domain generally focus on service delivery outcomes and have a thinner evidence base on individual-level outcomes.

Although a large number of studies examined interventions to provide information on electoral processes, most reported on electoral participation, with comparatively few telling us about impact on electoral malfeasance or violence. Studies on evoting did not examine their impact on electoral malfeasance, and cross-cutting measures of corruption or public confidence in political or other state institutions were measured relatively less than we had expected.

#### Geographic coverage

Over half (52%, n=158) of the included studies were conducted in only eight countries: Argentina, China, Philippines, Indonesia, Uganda, Mexico, Brazil and India. For many L&MICs we found no studies, while we found very few for others with large populations (for example, we found no studies in the Middle East and North Africa region).

Despite the relatively high number of studies in China and Indonesia, the large population in these countries means that the East Asia Pacific region is one of the least well represented in terms of number of studies proportional to population.

#### Study type

A relatively high proportion of studies used some form of randomised design. However, it should be noted that some of these studies took advantage of natural or policy experiments that allowed for randomisation. Even when randomisation could be used, there are relatively few RCTs for some categories of interventions – such as e-voting, administrative reform and citizen feedback mechanisms. RCTs were less common in the decentralisation, democratic processes, audits or land certification. All of those categories are more difficult to evaluate using a randomised design. They are amenable to evaluation through alternative methods such as RDD and IV.

#### 3.5.2 Synthesis gaps

The most striking conclusion regarding the gaps in the synthesis of the evidence relates to the IPP domain. Only four reviews synthesise evidence in this sector and three of these focus on CDD interventions (Alexander *et al.* 2013; de Renzio and Wehner 2015; King *et al.* 2010). The most comprehensive and highest-quality of these reviews (King *et al.* 2010) synthesises evidence on CDD interventions from seven studies of interventions in Africa. We include 33 CDD studies in the EGM, nine of which evaluate interventions in Sub-Saharan Africa. There is clear scope for a review in this area with a geographic scope beyond Sub-Saharan Africa.

The other review in the IPP domain focuses on interventions disseminating information on political processes and several interventions in the RAI domain (Hanna 2011). The review only incorporates a fraction of the 41 studies that we include in the information on political processes category in our gap map. There is real scope for a systematic review of the evidence relating to this type of intervention. The number of studies that evaluate the introduction of democratic processes (n=12), e-voting (n=7) and electoral monitoring (n=16) suggest that systematic reviews could be very valuable. And although a relatively large number of studies focus on interventions to improve representation of women and minorities, most of them evaluate one constitutional amendment in India that reserves political positions for women and minorities.

The majority of reviews examine interventions within the RAI domain. A number of systematic reviews already include studies on decentralisation, administrative reforms, performance incentives, citizen feedback mechanisms, information dissemination on services and participatory priority setting, though these are often sector-specific, looking at education or health, for example. However, the number of ongoing studies in areas such as citizen feedback mechanisms, information dissemination on services and participatory priority setting suggests that additional reviews or updates of existing reviews in the near future could add value.

The number of studies looking at tax compliance and formalisation also indicates that research in this area might be worth systematically reviewing. Finally, we only included studies of land certification that looked at land or tenure security as an outcome. Consequently, we include only a single systematic review of land certification in our map, together with 13 impact evaluations and five ongoing studies. We are aware of one recent systematic review by Lawry *et al.* (2014), which we do not include as they do not consider tenure security as an outcome of interest. Given the disparity between the number of studies that we find (both completed and ongoing) and those covered by existing reviews, an updated systematic review could provide new insights.

#### 3.6 Policy-relevant findings from higher-quality systematic reviews

In this section, we discuss the findings of 12 systematic reviews assessed as highor medium-confidence. 13 We do not aim to be exhaustive but instead focus on the reviews' main findings. A summary of the findings of all included systematic reviews can be accessed via the online EGM. This section is structured by outcome type.

#### 3.6.1 Individual level

Two high-confidence reviews assess the impact of programmes on individual-level outcomes. King *et al.* (2010) synthesise evidence on seven CDD interventions, concluding that they have weakly positive effects on some measures of social cohesion such as participating in community meetings or assisting community members that are in need. But the review also finds a negative effect on inter-group relations.

Bosch-Capblanch *et al.* (2011) carried out a narrative synthesis of nine studies evaluating managerial supervision of primary healthcare and find mixed results: some indicate that supervision has a small benefit on health worker practices and knowledge; others indicate no benefit or are inconclusive.

No medium- or high-confidence systematic reviews synthesised evidence on

#### 3.6.2 Electoral level

electoral outcomes.

-

<sup>13</sup> We used 3ie's systematic review quality appraisal checklist to assess study confidence (Appendix A).

#### 3.6.3 Public institutions and services level

### Participation and inclusion

One high-confidence review (King *et al.* 2010) assesses the impact of programmes on participation and inclusion in decision-making bodies. Synthesising evidence on seven CDD interventions, they find weakly positive effects on some measures, such as participation in meetings and non-traditional events.

#### Public servant characteristics and behaviour

Three high-confidence reviews (Guerrero *et al.*, 2012; Carr-Hill *et al.* 2015; Snilstveit *et al.* 2015) and one medium-confidence review (George *et al.* 2015) assess the impact on public servant characteristics and behaviours. All three high-confidence reviews relate to education programmes.

Carr-Hill *et al.* (2015) synthesise evidence from 26 studies on SBM interventions. They find no evidence of positive effects on average but observe that more comprehensive SBM interventions in low-income contexts have an effect on teacher attendance.

In their review of six studies of teacher monitoring and incentives programmes, Guerrero *et al.* (2012) note that four find a positive effect, while two do not. All four studies that find a statistically significant positive effect on teacher attendance include some form of monitoring.

Snilstveit *et al.*'s (2015) review of a range of education programmes concludes that, on average, SBM does not appear to improve teacher attendance. They also find that, while teacher incentives do not on average have an impact on teacher attendance or performance, they may improve teacher attendance if it is an explicit condition for a bonus.

George *et al.* (2015) include four studies in a review of the effect of promoting rights awareness for maternity healthcare. The three studies that report on staff behaviours all find an increase in attendance or the number of visits to patients.

#### 3.6.4 Public institutions and services

Public funds or goods allocation

No medium- or high-confidence systematic reviews synthesise evidence on public funds of goods allocation.

Service utilisation, access and performance

Six high-confidence<sub>14</sub> and four medium-confidence<sub>15</sub> reviews report on some measure of service utilisation, access or performance. Molina *et al.* (2016) find that community monitoring interventions improve health service use but not waiting times. They also find improvements in weight-for-age but not in child mortality. They find no significant effect on school enrolments or dropouts, though there are beneficial effects on test scores. They note that community monitoring interventions are more effective when they give citizens tools to monitor providers or politicians, or promote direct contact between them.

#### Education

Five more reviews focus on various education programmes. Carr-Hill *et al.* (2015) synthesise evidence on 26 SBM intervention studies, finding positive effects on average for test scores, repetition and drop-out rates. They also find qualitative evidence that SBM may have a positive impact on student absence and failure rates. Effects on test scores are particularly pronounced for middle-income countries. They conclude that SBM is less likely to be successful in highly disadvantaged communities.

Conn (2014) finds no effect on average for SBM or teacher incentive interventions on learning. Guerrero *et al.*'s (2012) review of six studies of teacher monitoring and incentive programmes that report on school test scores finds no impact on average.

A review by Petrosino *et al.* (2012) does not disaggregate our includable interventions from other education programmes in their analysis.

In a large review of education effectiveness interventions, Snilstveit *et al.* (2015) examine several interventions that are included in this EGM, for which they report useful findings. SBM has small or no average effect on test scores, though more comprehensive programmes produce positive effects (based on 15 studies). SBM does not appear, on average, to improve school participation (in the form of enrolment, attendance and drop-out rates)

Sniltstveit and others find that teacher incentives do not, on average, improve student learning outcomes (based on 10 studies).

They also find some evidence that providing information on education affects student attendance and school completion and mixed evidence of its effect on learning (based on four studies on providing information on education).

Community-based monitoring programmes have a positive impact on average on student enrolment and completion (based on nine studies). Community-based monitoring improves student learning in some contexts.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Bosch-Capblanch *et al.* (2011); Guerrero *et al.* (2012); Willey *et al.* (2013); Carr-Hill *et al.* (2015); Snilstveit *et al.* (2015); and Molina *et al.* (2016).

<sup>15</sup> Preston et al. (2011); Petrosino et al. (2012); Conn (2014); and George et al. (2015).

#### Health

Bosch-Capblanch *et al.* (2011) include nine studies that evaluate the effect of managerial supervision in primary health. Two find small benefits on provider practice and knowledge; seven on workers' performance. One finds no evidence that reducing supervision frequency has any effect on service use.

George *et al.* (2015) find that all four included studies of interventions to promote rights awareness for maternity healthcare report increased use of health facilities (though one is not statistically significant) They also find that studies reported improvements in perceptions and observed quality of services.

Willey *et al.*'s (2013) review of interventions to improve healthcare delivery finds mixed results for impact on quality of care. They conclude that interventions that go beyond providing technical guidance show more success in improving quality of care.

Preston *et al.* (2010) review 37 studies using a range of designs to assess community participation in healthcare. They conclude that it can have a positive effect on some health outcomes, including better access to health services and more relevant and culturally appropriate services. However, they caution that the quality of the evidence base is low.

3.6.5 Cross-cutting outcomes: public confidence and corruption

One high-confidence review (Molina *et al.* 2016) and one medium-confidence review (Hanna *et al.* 2011) assess outcomes on public confidence and corruption:

- Molina et al. (2016) examine the effects of community monitoring interventions on corruption, and report that four studies – two reporting objective measures of corruption and two measuring perceived corruption – find a positive impact.
- Hanna et al. (2011) include 14 studies evaluating a mix of anti-corruption strategies on public perceptions and objective measures of corruption. They conclude that these can be successful but that the combination of monitoring and incentives is a key factor in producing positive outcomes.

#### 3.6.6 *Equity*

Few of the included systematic reviews examine equity outcomes. Carr-Hill *et al.* (2015) conclude that SBM interventions only have an effect in high-decentralisation and low-income contexts. More generally, they note that SBM interventions are less effective for disadvantaged individuals and communities.

Petrosino *et al.* (2012) synthesise evidence on education programmes, making it impossible to examine outcomes only for interventions of interest to this map. However, they report that the average effect for female-focused interventions was slightly larger than those designed for both boys and girls.

A protocol examining merit pay for teachers also plans to examine outcomes, disaggregated by sex, socioeconomic status and ethnicity (Ritter *et al.* 2016).

## 4. Conclusions and implications

Interventions that aim to strengthen the relationship between state and society can play a crucial role in ensuring that governance is effective. This EGM draws on a systematic search and inclusion or exclusion of studies to take stock of the volume and characteristics of evidence published between 2000 and 2016.

The map contains 18 completed systematic reviews, two systematic review protocols and 305 completed impact evaluations, as well as a further 60 ongoing impact evaluations. We categorise these studies in a framework built around two of the United Nations SDG 16 domains: inclusive political processes and responsive and accountable institutions.

There is a clear trend indicating increasing numbers of systematic reviews and impact evaluations on state-society relations. All our included systematic reviews were published from 2010 onwards, while the absolute number of impact evaluations published has been growing each year. However, despite the increasing number of publications in the area, there are some clear gaps in the evidence.

## 4.1 Gaps in synthesised evidence in inclusive political processes

One striking implication of our findings is that there is a body of studies in the IPP domain that it is yet to be the subject of a systematic review. For example, while there is a large number of both completed and ongoing evaluations addressing interventions focusing on voter mobilisation and education to promote free and fair elections, there is no high-quality synthesis that unpacks if and why these types of intervention work across contexts.

Similarly, there are enough impact evaluations to make a systematic review possible on other interventions from the IPP domain, such as electoral monitoring, e-voting and democratic processes. But again, despite a relatively robust body of impact evaluations to draw on, no systematic reviews have addressed these interventions.

#### 4.2 Uneven distribution of impact evaluations by category

The distribution of impact evaluations across intervention categories is uneven. Interventions with a comparatively large evidence base include information dissemination on political processes, CDD and performance incentives. For some intervention categories – such as performance incentives, decentralisation or providing information on services – most studies focus on sector-specific implementation of education or health programmes. Far fewer of these studies examine their effect on central government departments.

For other intervention categories – such as representation of women and minorities and audits – a large proportion of the studies examine the same national programmes. The result is an evidence base focused on a small number of different contexts.

More obvious evidence gaps include e-voting or training for politicians and leaders, where we found only a handful of studies. Given the popularity of citizen feedback mechanisms and involving civil society in priority setting as ways to build state-society relations, the number of studies in these areas is relatively small.

Studies are more likely to report on institutional and service-based outcomes than other types of outcome. Overall, while studies in the IPP domain tend to look at outcomes across categories, most studies in the RAI domain focus on institutional and service delivery outcomes and the evidence base on individual-level outcomes is comparatively thin. Relatively few studies assess the impact of these interventions on public confidence and corruption.

### 4.3 Uneven geographic distribution of impact evaluations

The spread of studies across countries is also relatively uneven. While in some countries, a relatively large number of studies have been conducted, in others evidence is more limited. Over half of the included impact evaluations are from eight countries: Argentina, China, Philippines, Indonesia, Uganda, Mexico, Brazil and India. For many L&MICs, we found no studies, while for others with large populations, we found relatively few.

## 4.3.1 Gaps in L&MIC-specific evidence

Using data on the six WGIs, we compare the average from our sample of included impact evaluations to the average for L&MICs. The data in our sample have lower average ratings for control of corruption and political stability and absence of violence than the L&MIC average, but higher levels of voice and accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law.

Approximately a third of included impact evaluations have some form of equity focus, either reporting on an intervention that targets a particular disadvantaged subpopulation or assesses the impact of an intervention on a disadvantaged population. The equity focus most commonly looked at women and subpopulations with differing socio-economic status.

A relatively high number of studies use some form of randomised design, though we note that a number of these studies took advantage of natural or policy experiments involving randomised allocation. RCT designs are feasible in many of the intervention categories included in the map, even for some of those containing the fewest studies such as e-voting, administrative reform and citizen feedback mechanisms. However, some types of interventions, such as decentralisation, democratic processes, audits or land certification, are less amenable to this type of evaluation, quasi-experimental study techniques such as RDD and IV can be used.

#### 4.4 Discussion

The distribution of evidence across the map should be interpreted carefully. Empty or lightly populated intersections within the map may indicate a research gap where additional research would add great value. However, it may also indicate that a particular intersection represents a lower priority question. For example, while you

might expect an evaluation of e-voting to look at electoral outcomes, it may be less likely to assess whether such interventions affect individuals' attitudes.

The map covers an extremely large thematic area. So, just as lightly populated intersections do not necessarily indicate an area where there is a dearth of research, comparatively well-populated intersections should not be seen as evidence that all important questions have been addressed.

Some studies investigate behavioural questions, such as whether introducing ballot papers with photos of political candidates affects the incidence of clientelism (Conroy-Krutz and Moehler 2015) or whether changing the format of tax communications can increase tax compliance (Castro and Scartascini 2013).

A large proportion of studies evaluate highly contextualised programmes, such as the introduction of community monitoring of service provision (Bjorkman and Svensson 2009) or incentives for civil servants in a given regional set of schools (Miller *et al.* 2012).

There are also studies that evaluate national policies, such as the Indian constitutional amendment introducing reserved seats for minorities (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004). However, the map contains a smaller proportion of evidence on such national policies, as they are less amenable to impact evaluation.

Although evaluating the effectiveness of state-society relation interventions using impact evaluation methods presents challenges, there is a sizable body of completed and ongoing studies. However, even where that evidence base is strongest, we cannot say it addresses all of the important policy questions. The key challenge for future research lies in finding ways to evaluate those interventions where the policy and programming interest is highest and the evidence base slimmest.

## Appendix A: Detailed methodology

## **Developing the scope**

We started by setting the scope of the EGM and developing a framework of interventions and outcomes to reflect it. The finalised scope drew on a review of documents from major international initiatives with a focus on governance and state-society relations. To provide a well-defined thematic focus and ensure the map's scope was manageable, we chose to focus on two of the four domains that make up SDG 16 to promote peaceful, just and inclusive societies as the underlying logic for our intervention domains: IPP and RAI.

Where possible, our intervention categories were designed to be mutually exclusive and avoid significant overlap. However, some included studies involved elements that cover multiple intervention categories (for example, combining decentralisation with administrative reform) and these therefore appear in the map at multiple intersections. We shared a draft framework with a small group of experts from research, policy and practice to ensure we did not omit major intervention categories in this area of research from the framework and that the terms we used to describe categories were clearly defined and aligned with existing terminology.

#### Search

We conducted the main search in September 2016 and completed the final searches of publication databases and topic and organisational websites by 30 September 2016. We limited our search to studies dated 2000 and later, setting this publication date partly because the broad nature of the map's subject area meant that the search, screening and data extraction processes were extensive. There was also good evidence that the vast majority of studies relevant to this EGM would have been published from 2000 onwards (Cameron, Mishra and Brown 2016), which our own analysis of publication dates in Figure 9: Impact evaluations by publication date supports.

We identified potential studies using three strategies, as outlined below:

- Academic database searches: We searched Econlit (Ovid), Scopus (Proquest), Worldwide Political Science Abstracts (Proquest), Political Science (Proquest), PAIS, Web of Science (Thompson-Reuters) and the World Bank eLibrary (Ebsco).
- 2. Topical website-based databases: We conducted targeted searches of specialist websites and databases, particularly focusing on established online repositories of impact evaluations and systematic reviews on related topics to our research question. Table A1 provides a list of the websites we searched.
- 3. Bibliographic searches: We screened several relevant systematic and literature reviews such as Alexander *et al.* 2013, Snilstveit *et al.* 2016, Lynch *et al.* 2013 and Moehler 2013 that address questions of relevance to our scope for any studies meeting our inclusion criteria.
- 4. We consulted a group of experts from research, policy and practice to identify additional includable studies and screened the curriculum vitae of researchers known to publish on the area of thematic focus.

Table A1: List of topical website-based databases searched

Database or organisation	Web URL
AEA RCT Registry	www.socialscienceregistry.org
American Political Science	https://convention2.allacademic.com/one/apsa/a
Association (APSA) Annual	psa16
Conference 2016	
Campbell Collaboration	www.campbellcollaboration.org
DFID Research for Development	http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk
Outputs	
Evidence in Governance and Politics	www.egap.org
(EGAP) Evidence Briefs and	
Registry	
GSDRC Applied Knowledge	www.gsdrc.org
Services	
Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA)	www.poverty-action.org
J-Poverty Action Lab (JPAL)	www.povertyactionlab.org
Overseas Development Institute	www.odi.org/publications
USAID Evaluation Clearinghouse	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/home/Default.aspx
USAID land tenure	www.usaidlandtenure.net
3ie Registry for International	www.3ieimpact.org/evidence-hub/ridie
Development Impact Evaluations (RIDIE)	
3ie Impact Evaluation and	www.3ieimpact.org/evidence-hub/systematic-
Systematic Review Database	review-repository

We worked with an information specialist to develop a systematic search strategy. Appendix B provides full details of our search string, as applied to Ovid.

#### **Screening**

All search results from academic databases were imported into EPPI-Reviewer (EPPI-Centre, n.d.). Screening of topical website-based databases, reference checks of relevant systematic and literature reviews and checks of authors' curricula vitae were undertaken at source and any includable studies then imported into EPPI-Reviewer.

To ensure consistent application of screening criteria, we trialled the screening process with a small sample of studies before initiating the process. We discussed discrepancies within the team and clarified inclusion criteria where necessary. Once all screeners were trained, we manually screened all titles and abstracts obtained from our search. Time and resource constraints meant we did not carry out independent double-screening of all studies at full text. To minimise bias and human error, however, we double-screened any studies where the first screener was uncertain about inclusion or exclusion. Finally, all studies identified for inclusion at full text were screened by a second person before being added to the EGM.

Where multiple versions of the same study were available, we chose the most comprehensive or up to date. If different papers by the same authors examined the same programme but used different datasets or looked at different outcomes, we included them in their own right.

#### Data extraction

We used a standardised data extraction form to extract descriptive data from all studies meeting our inclusion criteria. Data extracted from each study include bibliographic details, intervention type, outcome type and definition, study type and geographical location.

3ie is piloting equity-sensitive EGMs, which identify the extent to which and how current research practice incorporates equity (Masset and Snilstveit 2016). As a result, we also extracted data on the extent to which existing evidence incorporates populations considered vulnerable in this context, either because they have less access to services or programme benefits are differentially distributed. In identifying relevant groups, we drew on the PROGRESS-Plus framework (O'Neil et al. 2014), adapting it as applicable. We considered the following groups:

- age: for example, programmes targeting youth or the elderly
- caste
- disability
- education
- sex
- land ownership
- place of residence
- race, ethnicity, culture and language
- religion
- socioeconomic status, which can be measured in different ways, including grouping results by income level, defining people as poor, and so on
- social capital
- other vulnerable populations, open category, to be used iteratively to record details of any vulnerable populations otherwise identified.

We recorded the following information as it applies to these populations:

- If studies assess a programme targeting a specific population or subpopulation considered vulnerable or otherwise aim to reduce inequalities
- If studies assess the effects of a programme on a specific subpopulation considered vulnerable
- If studies use subgroup analysis to assess effects on different populations.

A full list of the data extracted is described in our coding tool in Appendix C. To ensure consistent application of data extraction, we trialled the process and discussed discrepancies within the team. We then completed data extraction by a single coder. Following the 3ie systematic review database protocol for appraising systematic reviews (Snilstveit *et al.* 2014), two experienced researchers critically appraised the systematic reviews.

## Visualisation and analysis

We uploaded data onto 3ie's EGM platform to create a graphical display of the evidence. We grouped included studies according to the intervention and outcome categories contained in our framework. This allowed us to identify absolute evidence gaps where there are no impact evaluations or systematic reviews and synthesis gaps where there are impact evaluations, but there are a lack of high-quality systematic reviews.

We provide a narrative description summarising this information alongside the graphical display. We analysed the dataset of included studies in Microsoft Excel to explore and describe the populations, interventions, study types and outcomes covered in our included studies and then reported these findings.

We also provide a descriptive overview of the main findings of all systematic reviews assessed as high confidence.

## Appendix B: Example search string

The search string below was applied to Ovid to search Econlit for includable studies on 30 September 2016. The search string included L&MIC terms, intervention terms and study type terms.

- 1 ((govern\* adj3 (accountab\* or transparen\* or partici\* or corrupt\* or anti-corruption or "anti corruption" or "rent seeking" or "rent-seeking" or fraud\* or anti-fraud or audit\* or monitor\* or decentralis\* or decentraliz\* or devolution or devolv\*)) or ((woman or women or female\* or minorit\* or gender or caste\* or tribe\*) adj3 (quota or quotas or "reserved seat\*" or "reserved place\*" or "reserved position\*" or "political representation" or "political reserv\*")) or (mandated adj2 "female\* participation")).ti,ab. (3,221)
- 2 ((election\* or electoral or elected or electorate or vot\* or plebiscite\* or ballot\*) adj3 (accountab\* or transparen\* or partici\* or corrupt\* or anti-corruption or "rent seeking" or monitor\* or fraud\* or anti-fraud or audit\* or observ\* or reform or reformed or reforms or reforming or irregular\* or malpractice\* or misconduct or legitim\* or clientelism or violence or anti-violence or brib\* or manipulat\* or buying or rigg\* or violence or anti-violence or gerrymander\*)).ti,ab. (1,280)
- 3 "local election\*".ti,ab. (137)
- 4 ((election\* or electoral or elected or electorate or plebiscite or ballot) and (SMS or "text messag\*" or "short message service" or "score card\*" or "score-card\*" or scorecard\* or "report card\*" or report-card\* or reportcard\* or e-vot\* or "electronic vot\*" or "ID card\*" or "identity card\*" or "electronic ID")).ti,ab. (15)
- 5 D72.cc. (34,919) Econlit Subject Heading: Political processes Rentseeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, Voting behavior
- 6 (("public service" or "public sector" or "service provider\*" or "service provision" or "service delivery") adj3 (accountab\* or transparen\* or partici\* or corrupt\* or anticorruption or "anti corruption" or "rent-seeking" or "rent seeking" or monitor\* or fraud\* or anti-fraud or audit\* or reform\* or governance or governing or "community monitoring" or "elite capture" or "community engagement" or "community participation" or "community representation" or "public participation")).ti,ab. (785)
- 7 (("public service" or "public sector" or "service provider\*" or "service provision" or "service delivery") adj3 (SMS or "text messag\*" or "short message service" or "score card\*" or "score-card\*" or scorecard\* or "report card\*" or report-card\* or reportcard\*)).ti,ab. (3)
- 8 (e-governance or "electronic governance" or "e governance" or egovernance).ti,ab. (75)
- 9 ((education or school\* or hospital\* or "health facility" or "health facilities" or "healthcare provider\*" or "health care provider\*" or "health service\*" or "health-centre\*" or "health

- center\*") and ("community monitoring" or "community engagement" or "community participation" or "community representation" or "public participation")).ti,ab. (106)
- 10 ("school committee\*" or "health care committee\*" or "healthcare committee\*" or "hospital committee\*" or "social accountability mechanism\*" or "social audit\*").ti,ab. (63)
- 11 ((citizen or community) adj2 ("score card\*" or "score-card\*" or scorecard\* or "report card\*" or report-card\* or reportcard\*)).ti,ab. (9)
- 12 ((((participat\* adj2 budget\*) or "public financ\* management") and reform\*) or (fiscal and (decentraliz\* or decentralis\*)) or (Tax\* adj2 (complian\* or evasion or evad\* or incentiv\* or enforcement or deterren\* or regulation\* or audit)) or ((business\* or enterprise\* or firm\* or micro-firm\*) and (formaliz\* or formalis\*))).ti,ab. (6,462)
- 13 (land adj3 (tenure or right\* or conversion or freehold\* or titl\* or recognition or certification or reform\* or regist\* or law or legislation or govern\* or (dispute\* adj2 (resolution or resolv\* or settl\*)))).ti,ab. (3,118)
- 14 ("community-driven development" or CDD or "community-driven-development").ti,ab. (88)
- 15 ((Afghanistan or Albania or Algeria or Angola or Antigua or Barbuda or Argentina or Armenia or Armenian or Azerbaijan or Bahrain or Bangladesh or Barbados or Benin or Byelarus or Byelorussian or Belarus or Belorussian or Belorussia or Belize or Bhutan or Bolivia or Bosnia or Herzegovina or Hercegovina or Botswana or Brasil or Brazil or Bulgaria or "Burkina Faso" or "Burkina Fasso" or Burundi or Cambodia or Cameroon or Cameroons or Cameroun or "Cape Verde" or "Cabo Verde" or "Central African Republic" or Chad or Chile or China or Colombia or Comoros or "Comoro Islands" or Comores or Mayotte or Congo or Zaire or "Costa Rica\*" or "Cote d'Ivoire" or "Ivory Coast" or Croatia or Cuba or Czechoslovakia or "Czech Republic" or Slovakia or "Slovak Republic" or Djibouti or "French Somaliland" or Dominica or "Dominican Republic" or "East Timor" or "East Timur" or "Timor Leste" or Ecuador or Egypt or "El Salvador" or Eritrea or Estonia or Ethiopia or Fiji or Gabon or "Gabonese Republic" or Gambia or Gaza or "Georgia Republic" or "Georgian Republic" or Georgia or Ghana or Grenada or Guatemala or Guinea or Guiana or Guyana or Haiti or Honduras or Hungary or India or Maldives or Indonesia or Iran or Iraq or Jamaica or Jordan or Kazakhstan or Kazakh or Kenya or Kiribati or Korea or Kosovo or Kyrgyzstan or Kirghizia or "Kyrgyz Republic" or Kirghiz or Kirgizstan or "Lao PDR" or Laos or Latvia or Lebanon or Lesotho or Liberia or Libya or Lithuania or Macedonia or Madagascar or Malaysia or Malaya or Malay or Malawi or Mali or Malta or "Marshall Islands" or Mauritania or Mauritius or Mexico or Micronesia or "Middle East" or Moldova or Moldovia or Moldovian or Mongolia or Montenegro or Morocco or Mozambique or Myanmar or Myanma or Burma or Namibia or Nepal or "Netherlands Antilles" or Curacao or "Sint Maartin" or Nicaragua or Niger or Nigeria or "Northern Mariana Islands" or Oman or Pakistan or Palau or Palestine or Panama or Paraguay or Peru or Philippines or

Philipines or Phillipines or Phillippines or "Puerto Ric\*" or Romania or Rumania or Roumania or Russia or "Russian Federation" or Rwanda or Ruanda or "Saint Kitts" or "St Kitts" or Nevis or "Saint Lucia" or "St Lucia" or "Saint Vincent" or "St Vincent" or Grenadines or Samoa or "Samoan Islands" or "Sao Tome" or "Saudi Arabia" or Senegal or Serbia or Montenegro or Seychelles or "Sierra Leone" or Slovenia or "Sri Lanka" or "Solomon Islands" or Somalia or "South Africa" or Sudan or Suriname or Surinam or Swaziland or Syria or "Syrian Arab Republic" or Tajikistan or Tadzhikistan or Tadjikistan or Tadzhik or Tanzania or Thailand or Togo or "Togolese Republic" or Tonga or Trinidad or Tobago or Tunisia or Turkey or Turkmenistan or Turkmen or Tuvalu or Uganda or Ukraine or Uruguay or Uzbekistan or Uzbek or Vanuatu or Venezuela or Vietnam or "Viet Nam" or "West Bank" or Yemen or Zambia or Zimbabwe or ((developing or "less\* developed" or "under developed" or underdeveloped or under-developed or "middle income" or "low\* income") adi3 (countr\* or nation\*)) or ((low\* adi3 (middle adi3 countr\*)) or (Africa or Asia or Caribbean or "West Indies" or "South America" or "Latin America" or "Central America"))) not ("African-American\*" or "African-American\*" or "Mexican American\*" or "American Indian\*" or "Asian American\*" or "native american\*")).ti,ab. (209,848)

16 ("random\* control\* trial\*" or "random\* trial\*" or RCT or "propensity score matching" or PSM or "regression discontinuity design" or RDD or "difference in difference\*" or DID or difference-in-difference or "systematic\* review\*" or meta-analy\* or "meta analy\*" or SR or "case control" or matching or "interrupted time series" or (random\* adj3 allocat\*) or "instrumental variable\*" or IV or "research synthesis" or "scoping review" or "rapid evidence assessment" or "rapid review" or "rapid synthesis" or "systematic literature review" or evaluation or assessment or ((quantitative or "comparison group" or counterfactual or "counter factual" or counter-factual or experiment\*) adj3 (design or study or analysis)) or QED or "field experiment" or "field trial").ti,ab. (84,116)

- 17 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 or 9 or 10 or 11 or 12 or 13 or 14 (47,748)
- 18 15 and 16 and 17 (969)
- 19 limit 18 to yr="2000 -Current" (894)

## Appendix C: Data extraction form

Table A2: Data extraction form

Descriptive information	Study ID Coder ID Title Author citation Publication date Study type (select multiple options if necessary)	Open answer Open answer Open answer Open answer Open answer Open answer o Randomised Controlled Trial (RCT) o Difference-in-differences (DID) o Instrumental variables (IV) o Regression discontinuity design (RDD) o Propensity score matching o Other
	Further comments on study type Regions (select multiple options if necessary)  Countries	Open answer  o East Asia and Pacific  o South Asia o Europe o CIS o Middle East and North Africa o Sub-Saharan Africa o Latin America and the Caribbean o North America See list of countries
Equity data	How does this study consider equity? (Select from dropdown menu. Select multiple options if necessary)	o Assesses impact on a         disadvantaged group     o Intervention aimed at reducing         inequality     o Undertakes subgroup analysis     o Not applicable
	Dimensions of equity of population (Select from dropdown menu. Select multiple options if necessary)	o Age o Caste o Disability o Education o Sex o Land ownership o Place of residence o Race, ethnicity, culture and language o Religion o Socioeconomic status o Social capital
	If other vulnerable population describe* Dimensions of equity/ population description	o Other vulnerable populations* Open answer Open answer

		IDD
Interventions	Intervention domain	o IPP
		o RAI
	Category of intervention	<ul><li>o Information dissemination (political processes)</li></ul>
		o Electoral monitoring
		o E-voting
		o Democratic processes
		o Representation of women &
		minorities
		o Training for politicians & leaders
		o CDD
		o Decentralisation
		o Administrative reform
		o Performance incentives
		o Audits
		o Citizen feedback mechanisms
		o Information dissemination:
		services
		o Participatory priority setting
		o Tax compliance & formalisation
		o Land certification
	Intervention description	Open answer
Outcomes	Category of outcome	o Knowledge & understanding
		o Attitudes & beliefs
		o Social & psychological situation
		o Economic situation
		o Electoral participation
		o Electoral malfeasance &
		violence
		o Political representation
		o Participation & inclusion
		o Public servant characteristics & behaviour
		o Public funds/goods allocation
		o Service access
		o Service utilisation
		o Service performance
		o Public confidence
		o Corruption
		o Knowledge & understanding
		o Attitudes & beliefs
		o Social & psychological situation
	Outcome descriptions	Open answer
-	Publication status	Journal or book
		Contracted report
		Other grey literature

## **Appendix D: World Governance Indicators**

## The process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced:

- 1. Voice and accountability: capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free media.
- 2. Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism: capturing perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically motivated violence and terrorism.

# The capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies:

- 3. Government effectiveness: capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.
- 4. Regulatory quality: capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.

## The respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them:

- 5. Rule of law: capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
- 6. Control of corruption: capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as capture of the state by elites and private interests.

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International Initiative for Impact Evaluation 203-202, 2nd Floor, Rectangle One D-4, Saket District Center New Delhi – 110017 India

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