Does engaging citizens in the governance of public services lead to improved delivery and quality of life?

Findings from a systematic review

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Who we are & what we do

3ie is a member-based international NGO promoting evidence-informed development policies and programmes.

- **Grant maker and standard setter** for policy-relevant impact evaluations, systematic reviews, evidence gap maps, evidence syntheses and replication studies focussed on low- and middle-income countries

- **Convener** of forums to build a culture of evaluation, capacity to undertake impact evaluations and reviews and commitment to evidence-informed decision-making

- **Producer** of knowledge products for policymakers, programme managers, researchers, civil society, the media and donors
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Advisory group helped define the scope of this complex review

**Review scope:**
Studies evaluating interventions that influence citizens’ capacities, opportunities and practices for civic engagement in service delivery.

Primary focus on “short route” through direct citizen engagement in the planning, oversight and performance measurement of service delivery.

Also included “long route” of pressure on political actors, who in turn pressure service providers.

Source: Devaraj et al. 2013
Review scope: interventions promoting civic engagement in service delivery in L&MICs

Interventions to encourage or mandate citizen participation

- **Participatory planning**, including inclusive planning and participatory priority setting
- **Community-based natural resource management (CBNRM)** committees

Interventions to improve **accountability**

- **Citizen feedback and monitoring**
- **Rights information** provision to citizens
- **Performance information** provision to citizens

Short routes

Long route
1. Determine scope consultatively in study protocol
2. Collect all relevant studies on a particular topic
3. Assess biases in eligible studies
4. Synthesis of evidence on programme impacts using meta-analysis
5. Synthesis of evidence on mechanisms using programme theory

10,457 records identified through academic database searching

408 records identified through grey literature search and other

9,835 records excluded

Excluded on intervention: 98
Excluded on sector: 6
Excluded on outcome: 23
Excluded on study design:
• not a primary study: 12
• does not address effects: 13
• no comparison group: 17
• does not address confounding: 5
• qualitative: 5
Unclear - no access to paper: 1

10,054 records screened at title/abstract (after duplicates removed)

219 articles screened at full-text

50 included impact evaluations (papers) for quantitative synthesis and 11 ongoing studies

36 additional qualitative and project documents included for the framework synthesis

Corresponding to 35 studies testing 41 unique policies / trial arms
Geographic coverage of included studies
Outcomes organised along results chain

User engagement - participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>g (95% CI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>-0.01 (-0.08, 0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>0.07 (-0.07, 0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>0.09 (-0.61, 0.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India (Bihar)</td>
<td>0.12 (0.03, 0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>0.24 (0.18, 0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>0.34 (0.09, 0.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>0.77 (0.47, 1.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1.12 (0.84, 1.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1.47 (1.18, 1.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>0.45 (0.24, 0.66)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Underlying each set of findings is a meta-analysis of outcomes measuring a similar construct across studies.
Intermediate Outcomes
### Immediate Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>g (95% CI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Corruption/leakage</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal (I-squared = .%, p = .)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.03 (-0.19, 0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perceived response by user</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal (I-squared = 21.3%, p = 0.253)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.03 (-0.02, 0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Politician performance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal (I-squared = 4.7%, p = 0.350)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.07 (-0.20, 0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Provider actions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal (I-squared = 87.7%, p = 0.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.13 (-0.10, 0.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public spending</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal (I-squared = 62.4%, p = 0.009)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.06 (-0.11, 0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Staff motivation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal (I-squared = 63.8%, p = 0.026)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.21 (-0.01, 0.43)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### User engagement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>g (95% CI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Participation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal (I-squared = 95.5%, p = 0.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.45 (0.24, 0.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Knowledge about services</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal (I-squared = 56.5%, p = 0.100)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.09 (0.01, 0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Knowledge about processes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal (I-squared = 0.0%, p = 0.463)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.08 (-0.01, 0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Freedom to participate</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal (I-squared = 0.0%, p = 0.886)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.35 (0.16, 0.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contribute to community fund</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal (I-squared = 0.0%, p = 0.433)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.46 (0.06, 0.86)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Provider response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>g (95% CI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Participation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal (I-squared = 95.5%, p = 0.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.45 (0.24, 0.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Knowledge about services</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal (I-squared = 56.5%, p = 0.100)</td>
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<td><strong>Knowledge about processes</strong></td>
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<td>0.46 (0.06, 0.86)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### State-society relations

- **User engagement**
- **Immediate Outcomes**
- **Provider response**
### Integrated synthesis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>g (95% CI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public good</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Grossman, 2017</td>
<td>Citizen feedback</td>
<td>-0.17 (-0.72, 0.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Humphreys &amp; Weinstein, 2012</td>
<td>Performance information</td>
<td>-0.02 (-0.09, 0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Berman, 2017</td>
<td>Citizen feedback</td>
<td>0.08 (-0.22, 0.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Olken, 2007</td>
<td>Citizen feedback</td>
<td>0.08 (-0.39, 0.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Olken, 2007</td>
<td>Rights information</td>
<td>0.13 (-0.13, 0.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>(I-squared = 0.0%, p = 0.705)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00 (-0.06, 0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private good</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Ahhassan, 2016</td>
<td>Citizen feedback</td>
<td>-0.00 (-0.42, 0.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India - Uttar Pradesh</td>
<td>Pandey, 2007</td>
<td>Rights information</td>
<td>0.02 (-0.21, 0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Banerjee, 2018</td>
<td>Rights information</td>
<td>0.07 (-0.00, 0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Banerjee, 2018</td>
<td>Rights information</td>
<td>0.07 (0.01, 0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Gullo, 2017</td>
<td>Citizen feedback</td>
<td>0.11 (-0.10, 0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Bjorkman, 2009</td>
<td>Citizen feedback</td>
<td>0.11 (-0.34, 0.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India (Bihar)</td>
<td>Ravallion, 2013</td>
<td>Rights information</td>
<td>0.12 (0.03, 0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Banerjee, 2018</td>
<td>Rights information</td>
<td>0.13 (0.07, 0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Fiala, 2017</td>
<td>Citizen feedback</td>
<td>0.13 (-0.00, 0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea, Kenya</td>
<td>Bradley, 2005</td>
<td>Citizen feedback</td>
<td>0.78 (0.46, 1.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>(I-squared = 57.7%, p = 0.012)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.12 (0.06, 0.18)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- The graph illustrates the impact of interventions on service quality and access, categorized into public and private goods.
- The interventions include citizen feedback, performance information, and rights information.
- The results are presented as standardized effects with 95% confidence intervals.
- The graph visualizes the findings from various studies across different countries.
User engagement

Provider response

Service quality & access

Service use

Well-being (quality of life)

State-society relations

Study
ID

Nutrition
Subtotal (I-squared = 0.0%, p = 0.738)

Mortality
Subtotal (I-squared = 70.8%, p = 0.016)

Morbidity
Subtotal (I-squared = 0.0%, p = 0.368)

Fertility
Subtotal (I-squared = 0.0%, p = 0.855)

Agricultural yields
Subtotal (I-squared = 0.0%, p = 0.927)

Assets
Subtotal (I-squared = 100.0%, p = 0.000)

Crime rates
Subtotal (I-squared = 89.6%, p = 0.002)

Empowerment
Subtotal (I-squared = 28.7%, p = 0.236)

Feelings of security
Subtotal (I-squared = 0%, p = 0)

Income/expenditure
Subtotal (I-squared = 0.0%, p = 0.537)

Satisfaction with life
Subtotal (I-squared = 0%, p = 0)

But very few studies!

Reduces outcome | Increases outcome

Health outcomes

Final Outcomes

Other outcomes

Reduces outcome | Increases outcome

0.04 (-0.06, 0.13)

0.07 (-0.13, 0.26)

0.09 (0.02, 0.16)

0.07 (-0.06, 0.21)

0.24 (0.12, 0.36)

1.59 (-1.43, 4.61)

0.24 (-0.36, 0.84)

0.09 (-0.04, 0.22)

0.05 (-0.27, 0.37)

0.02 (-0.30, 0.34)

0.08 (0.01, 0.14)
Performance information interventions

Provision of citizens with information about performance of politicians or public service providers (6 studies – Uganda, Brazil, Philippines, India)

Immediate outcomes

Intermediate outcomes

Final outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study ID</th>
<th>g (95% CI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.37 (-0.40, 1.13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.03 (-0.09, 0.03)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.02 (-0.09, 0.05)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.02 (-0.25, 0.21)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.02 (-0.06, 0.10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.32 (-0.25, 0.88)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Is the results chain simply too long to see effects on services?
Intervention increases citizens’ and common knowledge of political individuals’ or government offices’ performance.

Citizens pressure politicians to improve their performance.

**Competitiveness** of constituency; **Timing** of intervention relative to elections; **Credibility** of messenger.

Threat of job loss at next election triggers politician improvements in visible areas.

Myriad actors involved in service delivery; Politicians claim plausible deniability of capacity to realise improvements.

Politicians able to ignore performance rating, or undermine credibility of messenger, or block implementation.

Performance information: simplified results chain.
Citizen feedback and monitoring: simplified results chain

- **Intervention sparks citizens’ engagement** in the monitoring of public service provision and quality
- **Direct delivery** of services vs. **Indirect delivery** of services
- Citizens pressure SPs to improve delivery; create **credible social sanctions threat**
- **Phased, facilitated approaches** that jointly engage citizens and SPs in monitoring and local quality improvement efforts
- Increased access to and quality of public services; improved well-being outcomes

- **Weak social sanction threat** posed by citizen actions
- **Organized citizen groups** strengthen weight of collective voices, build coalitions with political actors

- No sustained citizens’ group collective action; **social sanction threat isn’t strong enough** to spur improvements by service providers (SPs)
Community-based natural resource management: simplified results chain

Intervention devolves control over and responsibility for the management of a natural resource to a community group.

Extent to which the intervention changes existing de facto or official control of benefits from NRM.

Improved sustainability of resource use and maintenance practices at community level.

Extent to which CBNRM group is resilient to shocks to resource access // Extent to which CBNRM addresses access barriers for vulnerable groups.

Improved social and economic development outcomes for users; improved environmental sustainability.

Communities have increased access to resource benefits or replacement livelihoods support to offset opportunity cost of resource management and/or use restrictions.

NRM officials may block full implementation of devolution policy or exploit contradictions in policies to maintain control of benefits.

Extent to which policy and legal framework for devolution of NRM is clear and fully enforced.
Summary findings

1. Interventions promoting citizen engagement in public service delivery are often effective at stimulating active citizenship and improving access to and quality of public services.

2. However, implemented alone, these interventions may not improve key well-being or “quality of life” outcomes for target populations.

3. Interventions that aim to influence public service quality via pressure on politicians to improve performance are only able to effect change in particular circumstances and not on service delivery.

4. The nature of the service targeted is a key moderating factor:

   A. Where services are delivered by front-line staff, citizen engagement tends to be more effective at sparking positive actions from service providers, and thus can effect impacts further down the causal chain.

   B. Where services are pure public goods (e.g. roads infrastructure) that citizens access independently of service providers, it may be necessary to draw on local social capital and capacity for collective action.

   C. Where the intervention involves devolution of management of scarce resources (land, water, forests) to community groups, there is a risk that management burdens are transferred to communities but benefits of control are retained by public service officials.
Implications for policy

Citizen engagement interventions usually effective in stimulating active citizenship and improving access to and quality of public services

The further along the causal chain, the smaller the impacts:

- Increasing well-being outcomes for target populations likely requires more than citizen engagement interventions, to overcome bottlenecks in public service supply chains and service use
- Similar finding to other programmes targeting citizens (e.g. CCTs)

Citizen engagement interventions were less successful where:

- They attempted to influence service delivery through the “long route” of increasing citizen pressures on politicians to improve public services
- They targeted the provision of a “pure public good” such as infrastructure
Implications for practice

Undertaking a diagnostic during programme design may help ensure that the targeted barrier to public service use and quality is accurately identified.

Implementers should seek buy-in for the intervention from service providers at the point of service delivery.

Working in partnership with local civil society organisations may strengthen citizens’ voices, institutionalise practices and build local social capital through coalition-building.

Without specific measures to facilitate inclusion of vulnerable groups, interventions may not realise equitable outcomes. Measures must be culturally appropriate.
Implications for research

- Persistent problems in primary research
- More consistent consideration of equity (interventions and outcomes)
- Better reporting of what was actually implemented
- More transparent reporting of planned analyses and problems in trial implementation
- Cost-effectiveness analysis only reported in one (very early) study!
- Studies needed examining longer-term effects

- Synthesis research - 2 main types of SRs:
  - SRs oriented to answer questions about specific interventions (more useful for practice)
  - SRs oriented to answer questions about broader mechanisms (more useful for strategy)
Review questions

1. What are the effects of interventions that aim to strengthen participation and accountability mechanisms on participatory, inclusive, transparent or accountable processes?

2. What are the effects of PITA interventions on social and economic wellbeing?

3. How do effects vary by population and location?

4. What factors relating to programme design, implementation, context and mechanism are associated with better outcomes?
Review inclusion criteria: summary

- **POPULATION:** public service users in low- and middle-income countries
- **INTERVENTION:** interventions promoting citizen participation and accountability in public services
- **COMPARISON:** standard access/ ‘business as usual’ public service provision
- **OUTCOME:** service access and use; wellbeing; state-society relations + user and provider engagement with governance intervention
- **STUDY DESIGNS:** rigorous impact evaluations (RCTs and quasi-experiments) + background literature on included programmes
Critical appraisal of included studies

Risk of bias in randomized studies (RCTs)

Risk of bias in non-randomized studies:

- Main issue is self-selection into the program or unclear selection process
- Most common methods to overcome confounding: panel data sets or difference-in-difference combined with statistical matching.
- But few ‘natural experiments’ with lower risk of bias
Geographic coverage of included studies
Access to services and wellbeing

Immediate Outcomes (Question 1)
- User engagement
- Provider response

Intermediate Outcomes (Question 2)
- Service access
- Service use

Final Outcomes (Question 2)
- Well-being (quality of life)
- State-society relations

Country | $g$ (95% CI)
---|---
Afghanistan | -0.23 (-0.47, 0.02)
Uganda | -0.06 (-0.13, 0.02)
India (Karnataka) | 0.00 (-0.25, 0.25)
India (UP) | 0.02 (-0.21, 0.24)
Indonesia | 0.07 (0.01, 0.13)
Indonesia | 0.07 (-0.00, 0.14)
Uganda | 0.07 (-0.48, 0.63)
Tanzania | 0.08 (-0.30, 0.45)
Afghanistan | 0.10 (-0.39, 0.60)
Pakistan | 0.11 (0.02, 0.19)
Indonesia | 0.11 (0.05, 0.18)
India (Bihar) | 0.12 (0.03, 0.21)
Mexico | 0.15 (-0.04, 0.33)
Brazil | 0.15 (0.03, 0.28)
Uganda | 0.26 (-0.11, 0.64)
China | 0.90 (0.20, 1.60)
Overall (I-squared = 50.6%, $p = 0.011$) | 0.07 (0.03, 0.12)

Service access - physical access
State-society relations

Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>g (95% CI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Confidence in institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subtotal (I-squared = 0.0%, p = 0.739)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institutional sustainability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subtotal (I-squared = 0.0%, p = 0.892)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tax paid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subtotal (I-squared = 94.4%, p = 0.000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

State society relations

Final Outcomes
Rights information provision: theory of change

Assumption: Bottleneck is correctly identified as lack of information amongst users
Facilitator: Some engagement with supply-side actors in intervention design and implementation
Moderator: Public versus private good targeted; collective community action engaged

Block 1
Interventions increase individuals’ and common knowledge about rights to services and quality standards

Block 2
Organized community engagement (through CSO) builds coalitions of support from political and private actors, strengthens citizens’ voice and power of social sanctions threat

Block 3
Citizens put pressure on service deliverers; change in citizens’ knowledge successfully shifts power balance

Block 4
Supply-side actors respond to citizen pressure and implement improvements in efficiency, effectiveness, and/or equity of public service delivery

Block 5
Increased access to public services

Assumption: Public service supply chains function effectively enough for service provision; Those accountable for improving service delivery have the authority & control over resource allocation to do so

Moderator: If bottleneck was lack of information about existing access OR about denied access (quantity or quality)

Block 6
Use of, and satisfaction with, public services increases

Block 7
Improved social and economic development outcomes for users

Block 8
Increased perceptions of State legitimacy and effectiveness

Demand-side stakeholders: Community leaders; wider community members, including marginalised groups; civil society groups
Supply-side stakeholders: Public and civil servants; public officials; public service providers
Context: Low levels of education and capacity amongst frontline supply and demand side stakeholders; high turnover of supply-side stakeholders; resource poor communities; high levels of inequality; weak state capacity or reach; frequent access challenges, due to remoteness and/or insecurity; and endemic corruption.
Performance information provision: theory of change

**Moderator:** Competitiveness of the targeted politicians’ constituencies
- Timing of the intervention in relation to elections
- Credibility of messenger amongst local population

**Critical facilitator:** Supply-side actors support and engage positively in intervention, especially where they control provision of performance information
- Political versus non-political targeted supply-side actors

**Assumption:** Information is salient to citizens’ decision-making

**Block 1:** Interventions increase individuals’ and common knowledge about service provider performance

**Block 2:** Citizens put pressure on service deliverers; change in citizens’ knowledge successfully shifts power balance

**Block 3:** Threat of future job-loss at the ballot box incentivises politician to improve performance

**Block 4:** Politicians in uncompetitive areas able to ignore intervention; Politicians with stronger ties to community than messenger may successfully undermine credibility of message; Interventions too close to an election may spark a negative reaction by politicians

**Block 5:** Politician improves personal performance in highly visible areas

**Block 6:** Use of, and satisfaction with, public services increases

**Block 7:** Improved social and economic development outcomes for users

**Block 8:** Increased perceptions of State legitimacy and effectiveness

**Assumption:** Sustained support to institutionalise the changes

---

**Demand-side stakeholders:** Community leaders; wider community members, including marginalised groups; civil society groups

**Supply-side stakeholders:** Public and civil servants; public officials; public service providers

**Context:** Low levels of education and capacity amongst frontline supply and demand side stakeholders; high turnover of supply-side stakeholders; resource poor communities; high levels of inequality; weak state capacity or reach; frequent access challenges, due to remoteness and/or insecurity; and endemic corruption.
Citizen feedback and monitoring: theory of change

**Demand-side stakeholders:** Community leaders; wider community members, including marginalised groups; civil society groups

**Supply-side stakeholders:** Public and civil servants; public officials; public service providers

**Context:** Low levels of education and capacity amongst frontline supply and demand side stakeholders; high turnover of supply-side stakeholders; resource poor communities; high levels of inequality; weak state capacity or reach; frequent access challenges, due to remoteness and/or insecurity; and endemic corruption.
Participatory and inclusive planning: theory of change

**Demand-side stakeholders:** Community leaders; wider community members, including marginalised groups; civil society groups

**Supply-side stakeholders:** Public and civil servants; public officials; public service providers

**Context:** Low levels of education and capacity amongst frontline supply and demand side stakeholders; high turnover of supply-side stakeholders; resource poor communities; high levels of inequality; weak state capacity or reach; frequent access challenges, due to remoteness and/or insecurity; and endemic corruption.

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**Block 1:** Participatory planning opportunities exist or are created through intervention

**Block 2:** Citizens are empowered to engage in participatory planning process

**Block 3:** Demand-side expectations are more realistic
- Supply-side service providers have higher intrinsic motivation, are more responsive to and inclusive of citizens’ needs and priorities

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**Block 4:** Improved efficiency, effectiveness, and equity of public service delivery

**Block 5:** Increased access to public services

**Block 6:** Use of, and satisfaction with, public services

**Block 7:** Improved social and economic development outcomes for users

**Block 8:** Increased perceptions of State legitimacy and effectiveness

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**Assumption:** Public service supply chains function effectively enough for service provision

**Assumption:** Those engaged to improve service delivery have the authority & control over resource allocation to do so

**Assumption:** Sustained support to institutionalise the improvements

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**Facilitator:** Intervention engages and promotes the strengthening of local civil society

**Facilitator:** Intervention addresses key barriers to participation in culturally appropriate way, particularly for marginalized groups

**Critical assumption:** Supply-side body tasked with undertaking participatory planning has the capacity to do so

**Facilitator:** Supply-side actors have strong ties to local civil society

**Facilitator:** Supply-side actors are supportive of the intervention
Community-based natural resource management: theory of change

Block 1
Intervention devolves control over and responsibility for the management of a natural resource to an organised community group

Block 2
Community management rules over use, maintenance and benefits are agreed

Block 3
Improved sustainability of resource use and maintenance practices at community level

Block 4
Communities have increased access to resource benefits or replacement livelihoods support to offset opportunity cost of resource management and/or restrictions on use

Block 5
Improved social and economic development outcomes for users

Block 6
Increased perceptions of State legitimacy and effectiveness

Barrier: Unclear or contradictory legal framework for devolution of resource management
Assumption: Communities have the capacity to enforce resource-use rules
Assumption: Intervention is fully implemented, particularly agreements formalizing community rights to benefits from resource management

Barrier: Extent to which Block 4 outcome is achieved will affect whether welfare outcomes are improved, stay static, or worsen through intervention, moderated by extent of change in access induced through intervention
Assumption: Public service supply chains function effectively enough for service provision
Assumption: Community management group has capacity to mitigate effects of shocks to natural resource access (e.g. drought)
Assumption: Community management does not perpetuate existing inequalities in resource access; addresses access and participation barriers for vulnerable groups

Bottleneck: Extent to which the intervention changes existing de facto or official control of benefits from resource management (larger changes challenging)
Critical facilitator: Supply-side actors at local level support and engage positively in intervention

Demand-side stakeholders: Community leaders; wider community members, including marginalised groups; civil society groups
Supply-side stakeholders: Public and civil servants; public officials; public service providers
Context: Low levels of education and capacity amongst frontline supply and demand side stakeholders; high turnover of supply-side stakeholders; resource poor communities; high levels of inequality; weak state capacity or reach; frequent access challenges, due to remoteness and/or insecurity; and endemic corruption.
Variation by population (question 3)

- 6 interventions incorporated mechanisms to include disadvantaged groups:

- All were implemented in vulnerable contexts (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uttar Pradesh, DRC, Malawi)

- These interventions had smaller impacts on citizen engagement and access to services on average, but sample size is very small to draw strong conclusion

- Equity analysis:

  - Only 9 studies presented results for sub-groups of participants (men/women, poor/nonpoor)

  - 1 study incorporated equity-oriented causal chain analysis to measure differential impacts

- Geographical analysis:

  - Intervention focus by global region (EAP mainly rights and feedback; LAC mainly planning; SA largely planning and rights information; SSA largely performance info and feedback) (CBNRM in EAP and SSA)

  - No systematic differences in effects across regions